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PART 1 
INTRODUCTION 

PARTI 
INTRODUCTION 
The central issue I address in this study, is: Why do some people experience a 
great deal of political mobility, others less, while some experience no political 
mobility at all? I make a distinction between two kinds of political mobility. 
The first kind of mobility concerns differences in political preferences between 
parents and their adult children, or intergenerational political mobility. The 
second kind of political mobility involves change in individual voting behavior 
over the life-course, or intragenerational political mobility. When I try to 
explain these two kinds of political mobility or change in voting behavior, I 
examine change in social class position (social mobility) and change in 
religiosity (religious mobility) as possible explanations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Intergenerational and intragenerational political mobility 
The support for confessional political parties in the Netherlands at general 
elections has followed a remarkable pattern since World War I. From 1918 
onwards, the support for religious parties fluctuated around 53% of the votes. In 
1918 the confessional parties received 50% of all valid votes. In 1963 52% of 
the voters voted for a confessional party. At the 1967 elections confessional 
parties received only 47% of the votes and thus lost their majority. After 1967, 
the support for religious political parties fluctuated around 35%, until the 1994 
elections when it dropped to 27% (CBS, 1994). 
From the 1960's onward there was a steady decline in church 
membership. The relatively stable support for confessional political parties in a 
period when church membership was rapidly declining illustrates the starting 
point of this study. The hypotheses I test explain why confessional parties did 
not lose their support much earlier than they did, given that the number of 
church members declined rapidly from the I960's onwards. What is puzzling 
are not the sudden declines in 1967 and 1994, but the stability of the years 
before these changes. The explanation I propose is that those who left the 
church did not adjust their voting behavior immediately to their new situation, 
and consequently they continued to - at least some time - support confessional 
parties. Hence, differences in religiosity between parents and their adult 
children, or religious mobility, forms the centerpiece of my explanation. More 
generally, I examine not only the role of current situations but also that of 
previous situations in determining a person's vote. 
Along a similar line, I ask why the support for the Dutch labor party 
remained essentially stable after World War Π even though at that time the 
middle class expanded at the expense of the manual classes. Again, I will stress 
the importance of mobility as an explanation for this relatively stable pattern of 
voting behavior. My hypothesis here is that those who were intergenerationally 
mobile with respect to their social class positions continued - to a certain extent 
- to vote for the labor party. Thus, I emphasize the importance not only of 
one's present social position, but also of the social position of one's parents. 
In these examples I emphasize the stability in the aggregate support for 
political parties. However, a stable support for political parties does not mean 
that individuals do not change their voting behavior from one election to 
another, nor that individuals cannot have political preferences that are different 
from those of their parents. Since people increasingly tend to change their 
voting preferences from one election to another (Irwin & Dittrich, 1984; 
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Andeweg, 1995), and consequently increasingly vote for parties other than those 
their parents voted for, special interest in electoral change or political mobility 
is warranted. I examine both infergenerational political mobility, that is electoral 
change between parents and their adult children, and mfragenerational political 
mobility, or change in individual voting behavior over the life-course. 
Generally, social class and religion largely explain Dutch voting 
behavior (Andeweg, 1982; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1992). Some have argued 
that these social-structural characteristics of a person show relatively little 
change and thus these factors are unable to explain change in party choice (Van 
der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b). However, as I will show in the remainder of this 
study, these social-structural characteristics, especially church membership, are 
more and more prone to change. Therefore, I consider change in social class 
position and change in church membership possible causes of electoral change. 
In other words, I examine social mobility and religious mobility to see to what 
extent they can explain political mobility. 
Like change in political preferences, change in social characteristics can 
be conceived of in two ways. First, one can look at change in social 
characteristics between two generations. I will call this change intergenerational 
mobility. This intergenerational change in social characteristics can affect the 
individual vote. In the Netherlands there has been an increase in 
intergenerational social mobility: men do not automatically take over the 
occupation of their fathers. And an increasing number of women has joined the 
labor force compared to, for instance, forty years ago (Van der Lippe & Van 
Doome-Huiskes, 1995). Also, there has been an increasing amount of 
intergenerational religious mobility: more and more people abandon the religion 
of their parents (Becker & Vink, 1994a). 
Second, one can investigate change in social class position and religious 
denomination over the life-course, and investigate its effect on voting behavior. 
In contrast to the intergenerational perspective on voting behavior, I call this 
intragenerational mobility. The relevance of intragenerational mobility as an 
explanation for political mobility becomes clear when one realizes that the 
frequency with which people attend religious services decreases as they grow 
older (Becker & Vink, 1994a). Also, since one's job is no longer a position for 
life, intragenerational mobility is more likely today than it was forty years ago 
(Pollaerts, De Graaf & Luijkx, 1997). 
In this study I improve upon earlier studies in three ways. First, I study 
not only present voting behavior, but also previous voting behavior. My focus is 
thus upon electoral change, rather than on voting behavior at one point in time. 
Second, in the explanation of electoral change, I take into account not only a 
person's own characteristics but also parental characteristics such as parental 
social class, parental religion and parental party preference. Third, I investigate 
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not only the effect of a person's current religion on electoral change but also 
that of a possible previous religion. 
1.2 Research questions 
As I have pointed out previously, my main interest in this study is political 
mobility. The central issue is: Why do some people experience a great deal of 
political mobility, others less, while some experience no political mobility at 
alii As I mentioned previously, I make a distinction between intra- and 
intergenerational political mobility. In Part 2 of this study, I address questions 
of intergenerational political mobility, while in Part 3 I pay specific attention to 
questions of intragenerational political mobility. In the remainder of this section, 
I elaborate upon the specific questions that this study addresses. 
1.2.1 Intergenerational Political Mobility 
A first explanation I offer for the fact that some people display more 
political mobility than others could be that people who experience class 
mobility are also more likely to be politically mobile. It is likely that those who 
are intergenerationally mobile - whether upward or downward - have a political 
preference that is not in accordance with that of their parents. In other words, I 
argue that one can explain some of the intergenerational political mobility by 
looking at intergenerational class mobility. This kind of explanation has been 
supported by previous research for the United states (Jennings & Niemi, 1981) 
and for Britain and Australia (McAllister & Kelley, 1985). 
For the Netherlands, however, it is quite likely that religious mobility 
rather than social mobility explains political mobility. In the Netherlands, unlike 
Britain, for instance, where social class is the main cleavage, religion is the 
most important determinant of voting behavior (Andeweg, 1982; Middendorp, 
1991). Consequently, it is quite likely that religious mobility rather than social 
mobility explains political mobility in the Netherlands. In this study I start by 
asking how much intergenerational social, religious and political mobility exists 
in the Netherlands. After all, if there is almost no intergenerational - social or 
religious - mobility, then these phenomena cannot serve as explanations for 
political mobility. Moreover, if there is hardly any political mobility in the 
Netherlands, nothing needs to be explained. The first research question is 
therefore of a descriptive nature: 
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1. How large has (a) intergenerational political mobility; (b) 
intergenerational social mobility; and (c) intergenerational religious 
mobility been in the Netherlands over the last decades? 
Before I address explanatory questions regarding intergenerational political 
mobility, I first take a more detailed look at the causes of intergenerational 
religious mobility in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands religious mobility 
generally means that people leave their churches altogether rather than, as is the 
case in other countries, switch denominations (Dekker, 1987; Schepens, 1991). 
Research into the causes of leaving the church in the Netherlands has hardly 
been done before (Hak & Sanders, 1996), while there is abundant literature on 
the causes of intergenerational class mobility (Blau & Duncan, 1967; 
Ganzeboom et. al, 1987; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993). Therefore, I do not 
investigate the causes of intergenerational social mobility but I do investigate 
causes of intergenerational religious mobility. I consider not only individual 
attributes but also contextual circumstances as possible explanatory factors for 
leaving the church. The second research question is: 
2. Which individual and structural characteristics cause people to leave the 
church in the Netherlands? 
Third, I try to explain the individual vote by looking at a person's own 
characteristics and at characteristics of his or her parents. From previous 
research we know that political preferences are not only dependent upon one's 
own social class but also upon the social class of one's parents (De Graaf & 
Ultee, 1987; 1990). We can assume that parents, as well as their children, will 
vote according to their interest. Therefore, both parental social class and 
parental religious denomination will affect the parental vote. To determine the 
independent effects of parental social class, parental religious denomination and 
parental political preferences on the vote, I establish their relative effects. 
Assuming that parents tend to transmit their vote which corresponds to their 
own social class and religious denomination, I formulate the third research 
question as follows: 
3. To what extent does the relationship between the political preferences of 
parents and the political preferences of their children remain if we 
control for intergenerational social and intergenerational religious 
mobility? 
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Once I have demonstrated the size of the effects of parental social class, 
parental religious denomination and parental vote on a person's voting behavior, 
I want to establish the total influence of parental factors on a person's political 
preferences. This total influence of the family of origin consists of all measured 
and unmeasured parental influences, and can be established by comparing the 
political preferences of siblings. The advantage of such a comparison is that one 
can estimate the total effect of all - measured and unmeasured - parental 
influences on voting behavior, instead of the direct and indirect transmission of 
political preferences. The similarity in voting behavior of siblings tell one 
exactly how large the total effect of parental milieu on voting behavior is. My 
next research question is therefore about the size and the mechanisms of family 
influence: 
4. To what extent is the voting behavior of siblings influenced by (a) 
individual characteristics and (b) parental characteristics? 
1.2.2 Intragenerational Political Mobility 
Until now, my research questions have only dealt with intergenerational 
political mobility, or differences in voting behavior between parents and their 
adult children. However, people also change their voting behavior over the life-
course (Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b; Irwin & Dittrich, 1984). Next, I 
answer questions regarding intragenerational political mobility, that is, change 
in the voting behavior of individuals from one election to another. To 
understand such change in voting behavior, I look at change in social-structural 
characteristics. Because of the importance of religion to voting, I focus on 
voting for confessional parties in the remainder of this study. I start with a 
descriptive question concerning the amount of intragenerational religious and 
political mobility in the Netherlands. 
5. How large has (a) intragenerational political mobility; and (b) 
intragenerational religious mobility been in the Netherlands over the last 
decades? 
The last research question takes a more detailed look at the impact of 
religious and political socialization. I model political mobility over the life-
course using socialization indicators as well as previous religious behavior. The 
last question I address concerns the independent effect of a person's own 
current attributes, of his or her previous attributes, and of attributes of his or her 
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parents. To determine the independent effects of parental, previous and present 
attributes, I establish their relative effects. Hence, the last question I answer is 
the following: 
6. To what extent do previous political preferences have an independent 
effect on a person's later political preferences, if we control for both 
intergenerational and intragenerational religious mobility? 
1.3 Methodological Issues 
The questions I address in this study deal with change in voting behavior or 
political mobility. Social and religious mobility provide possible explanations 
for political mobility. In my research questions, however, I did not mention the 
word 'mobility'. The reason for this is that in the remainder of this study I will 
not analyze mobility measures, but instead decompose the notion of mobility 
into its major components. Blau and Duncan (1967) have shown that it is 
usually not desirable to use mobility scores as variables in a statistical analysis, 
either as dependent variables (in my case this is political mobility), or as 
independent variables (in my case religious and social mobility). Mobility 
scores used as dependent variables are likely to produce 'regression toward the 
mean'. Mobility from one starting point may be more likely than from another 
point. In the analyses I therefore use a person's own political preferences as the 
dependent variable, and the political preferences of his or her parents as the 
independent variable. 
When using the notion of mobility as an explanation it is also desirable 
to disentangle the effect of origin (eg. parental social class and parental 
religious denomination) from that of destination (eg. own social class and own 
religious denomination). Mobility scores do not allow one to separate these 
effects. Therefore I use parental social class and parental religious denomination 
as independent variables, together with a person's own social class and religious 
denomination. 
To answer the questions raised above I make use of several different 
data sources. I chose particular data sets for practical reasons. My aim was to 
answer my questions by making use of as many suitable surveys as possible, 
covering a long period. However, sometimes there was only one suitable survey 
available. The question about the similarity in political preferences of siblings, 
for instance, could only be answered by using a survey that contained 
information on the voting behavior of siblings. Therefore, to answer this 
question I use the only Dutch survey (The Family Survey of the Dutch 
Population 1992-1993) that interviewed siblings independently. Similarly, none 
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of the existing surveys asked respondents to report their job career or their 
voting behavior at previous elections. I was able to ask questions about 
previous voting behavior and previous church membership in the Telepanel 
survey (1994). To answer questions about intragenerational change in voting 
behavior, I use the Telepanel survey. When questions can be answered using a 
pooled set of representative surveys I do so. 
Because I used different data sources to answer different research 
questions the operationalization of the variables is not always the same. When I 
answer questions about the political preferences of siblings, I have only very 
few cases. Therefore I have to use a left-right distinction to operationalize 
political preferences. In other chapters I use a left-wing/right-wing/confessional 
contrast. In Part 3 of this study I make a distinction between confessional and 
secular voting. 
1.4 Outline of this study 
This study has the following outline. In chapter 2 I give a brief overview of 
studies on voting behavior. I focus on studies that deal with the effect of 
religion, social class and parental influences on voting behavior, and give 
special attention to Dutch studies. In chapter 2 I also address several theories 
that explain voting behavior. Next, I connect these theories with each other in 
an integrating theory of voting behavior. I use this integrating theory to derive 
new predictions regarding the effect that factors relating to one's parents have 
on voting decisions in later life. In Part 2 and 3 of this study I test predictions 
from this theory. 
In Part 2, which consists of chapter 3 through 6, I focus on past 
experiences relating to one's parents. I test whether parental characteristics such 
as parental social class, parental religious denomination and parental voting 
behavior influence a person's vote, after controlling for his or her own religious 
denomination and social class. Part 2 focuses on intergenerational change in 
social characteristics and investigates the effects these have on voting behavior. 
In chapter 3 I describe the changes in intergenerational social, religious and 
political mobility that have occurred in the Netherlands over the past decades. 
Therefore, this chapter provides an answer to my first research question. 
Chapter 4 answers the second research question regarding the causes of 
intergenerational religious mobility in the Netherlands. Chapter 5 presents some 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between intergenerational social and 
religious mobility on the one hand, and political mobility on the other hand. In 
this chapter I answer the third research question. In chapter 6 I perform a 
specific test to detect the total influence parents have on the voting behavior of 
their adult children. If parents indeed transmit political preferences to their 
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children, the voting behavior of siblings should be more alike than the voting 
behavior of two unrelated individuals. In this chapter I also examine the extent 
to which I can explain the total parental influence on voting behavior by 
looking at parental characteristics such as parental social class, parental 
religious denomination, and parental voting behavior. Therefore, chapter 6 
provides an answer to the fourth research question. 
Part 3, which consists of chapter 7 and 8 looks at voting behavior from 
an intragenerational perspective. In chapter 7 I describe changes in church 
attendance and changes in people's political preferences since they first voted. 
In this chapter I answer the fifth research question. In chapter 8 I further 
elaborate on the effects of parental factors, previous attributes and present 
attributes. In this chapter I answer the last research question. I conclude in 
chapter 9 by summarizing and discussing the main findings of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this chapter I first address several theories that seek to explain voting behavior. 
After presenting these theories I review empirical studies of voting behavior. I focus 
on studies that address the effects of religion, social class and parental influences on 
voting behavior and give special attention to results from relevant Dutch studies. I 
conclude this chapter by presenting an integrating theory, the theory of the reasoning 
voter, which connects the previously discussed theories. 
2.1 Theories on voting behavior 
Several attempts have been made to gain some understanding of the phenomenon of 
voting. In general, one can distinguish three approaches to the study of voting 
behavior, the sociological, the social-psychological and the economic approach 
(Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993). The sociological approach developed first. As early 
as the 1940's researchers at the University of Columbia sought to explain voting 
behavior by highlighting the importance of social-structural factors such as social 
class and religious denomination (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948; Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967). According to the researchers of the Columbia school, social groups 
to which voters belong influence their choice to vote for a particular political party. 
One of the social groups that influences voting behavior is the family (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld & McPee, 1954). 
Soon after the first publications of the Columbia school a second approach 
towards voting behavior developed. Researchers belonging to this school assumed 
that the attitudes and perceptions of people are more important determinants of their 
voting behavior than are their social positions (Van Deth, 1986). This social-
psychological approach focuses more on the mental processes behind individual 
voting choices (Campbell et al., 1960). This Michigan school of voting behavior pays 
specific attention to predispositions such as party identification. It is no coincidence 
that this approach developed in the United States. In this country voters have to 
register either as a democrat or as a republican in order to vote in the primary 
elections. Paradoxically, this theory overlooks the consequences of certain 
institutions. In an institutional setting - such as the United States - where voters can 
choose candidates in primary elections, it can be worthwhile to investigate whether 
people who identify with a certain party when registering also vote for that party at 
general elections. 
In other institutional contexts the concept of party identification may be less 
useful. It has been demonstrated, for instance, that in the Netherlands party 
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identification does not determine party choice (Thomassen, 1986). Additionally, in 
the Dutch situation party identification is not a very good predictor of voting behavior 
(Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b). That is why Dutch researchers have used the idea 
of left-right selfplacement instead of the notion of party identification (Van der Eijk 
& Niemöller, 1983b, Middendorp, 1991). 
A third theoretical approach to voting behavior that developed essentially at 
the same time as the social-psychological approach originates in economics. This 
approach assumes voter rationality, the notion that voters use their information about 
political parties to evaluate which political parties and candidates best further their 
interests. The ideas of economic voting were first developed by Schumpeter (1943) 
and then further developed by Downs (1957). 
When I test some implications derived from the integrating theory that I 
present later on, I will not discuss the mental processes behind voting decisions, since 
these processes do not provide answers to the questions I raise. My study focusses 
more on the diminishing impact of social-structural characteristics on voting 
behavior. I do have a theory about increasing social and religious mobility, which I 
believe might explain the diminishing relationship between social class and religion 
on the one hand, and voting behavior on the other hand. Theories like those of 
modernization predict more social mobility and more religious mobility. I have no 
theory, however, to explain why there is a weaker identification with certain parties. 
Therefore, I try to explain the diminishing effects of social class and religious 
denomination on voting behavior by looking at both intra- and intergenerational 
mobility. 
As I explained, the sociological approach claims that people are influenced by 
those around them. In this explanation, one's current social conditions as well as one's 
social conditions in childhood and early adulthood, play an important role as well. 
Heath phrases this in the following manner: 
the sociological approach ". does suggests that group membership and its 
consequences -including the influence of parents, friends and workmates- has an 
adhesive quality which binds people to their parties. Voting is seen as a symbolic act 
whereby people express their allegiance to their social group. The manual worker, for 
example, votes Labor out of class solidarity because it is 'the party of the working 
class"' (Heath et. al., 1985. 8-9). 
In the Netherlands I have to consider that besides one's social class position, one's 
membership of a religious group is also relevant. Religious people associate with 
people who have the same religious denomination and are influenced by these people. 
The sociological approach thus predicts that in addition to a person's current religious 
denomination and class position, there is a socialization effect of parental class and 
parental religious denomination. People brought up in a working class environment 
are more likely to cast a vote for a Labor party and people brought up religiously are 
more likely to cast a vote for a confessional party. 
14 
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In general, the sociological approach claims that people are socialized within 
a social context into a specific political environment, and this will have an effect on 
their present voting behavior. If the socialization process is so important, this implies 
that in addition to parental social class position and parental religious denomination, 
the political climate in a person's parental home would also have an impact on his or 
her present voting behavior. 
The economic approach claims that people vote for parties with policies that 
will bring them the greatest advantage in future. According to this approach, voting 
is primarily an individual act based on rational calculation. People with the same 
socio-economic position will have the same interests and thus vote for the same 
political party. This explains why blue-collar workers generally vote for a left-wing 
party. One can distinguish two versions of this economic approach. The first one, 
called the "homo-economicus" approach, claims that people make rational 
calculations based purely on material considerations. This approach predicts only an 
effect of a person's own social class position on voting behavior, and no effect of a 
person's religious denomination or socialization. 
However, it is more realistic to assume that people are not only driven by 
material interests. For instance, in the Netherlands people vote for a certain political 
party because of religious motives. This argument corresponds to the second version 
of the economic approach, what I call the "consumer" approach. The consumer 
approach views the political arena as a market consisting of political parties that 
satisfy a variety of interests. Voters cast a vote for the political party whose political 
program is closest to their own preferences. Knowing that still a large proportion of 
the Dutch electorate is religious, we may conclude that this part of the electorate has 
an interest in maintaining the structure and the norms of their religion. Religious 
norms pertain to issues such as abortion and euthanasia. Maintaining the structure of 
a religion means, for instance, maintaining denominationally based schools and 
hospitals. According to this consumer approach, both social class and religious 
denomination affect voting behavior. I would like to note that the economic approach 
predicts no socialization effects at all. This becomes clearer when I draw attention to 
an important assumption of the economic approach: "Emotional ties, habit and group 
loyalty do not come into it" (Heath et. ai, 1985:9). 
With respect to their initial assumptions, the sociological and the economic 
approach are, or at least appear to be, very different. However, as I have stated above, 
both approaches assume that voters are rational. Both theories would give us the same 
predictions about the relationship between social class and religious denomination on 
the one hand, and a person's voting behavior on the other hand. People can vote for 
the same party because of their mutual interests and because they have been 
influenced by each other (Heath et al., 1985). It is very likely that one is especially 
influenced by those who are in similar structural circumstances and thus have similar 
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interests (Burt, 1987). Moreover, associating with others from the same social class 
may make people more conscious of their common interests and the political party 
that serves their interests best. Therefore, the two approaches are more 
complementary than contradicting. In a way, each one requires the other. The 
sociological approach predicts that manual workers are influenced by their co-
workers and hence will vote for the same political party. However, it does not explain 
why classes have certain interests. Thus, the sociological approach does not explain 
why the co-workers prefer left-wing parties to begin with. On the other hand, the 
economic approach has not yet been able to explain why people are influenced by 
other voters. The connection between both approaches is ad hoc and needs 
elaboration. An integrating theory is required, but this new theory should not define 
new interests. Popkin (1991) offers such an integration theory. Central in Popkin's 
work is the idea that it is rational for voters not to believe the pronouncements of 
politicians. His integrating theory combines the economic and the sociological 
approach. According to the economic approach, people have certain interests. 
According to the sociological approach, people inherit certain interests. According 
to the theory of the reasoning voter, people inherit not only certain interests, but they 
also inherit information with respect to these interests. Before I present this 
integrating theory, I first discuss some relevant empirical findings with respect to 
voting behavior in the Netherlands. 
2.2 Previous findings 
Much research has been done in the field of electoral behavior in the Netherlands. In 
this section I will not discuss all studies that have been published on the topic of 
electoral choice. Instead, I briefly describe the results of studies about the impact of 
religious and social mobility on voting behavior. First, I will go into studies that 
examine the relationship between intergenerational social and religious mobility on 
the one hand and political mobility on the other hand. Then, I will briefly discuss the 
literature on intragenerational mobility and voting behavior. 
2.2.1 The effect of intergenerational social and religious mobility on 
voting behavior 
Within political science as well as in sociology there has been much research on the 
determinants of voting behavior. The results of these studies generally show a 
significant effect of social class on voting behavior (Den Uyl, 1951; Lijphart, 1968; 
Andeweg, 1982; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b; Nieuwbeerta, 1995). Members 
of the working class are much more likely to vote for a left-wing (i.e. labor) party, 
16 
INTRODUCTION 
while people from other classes are more likely to cast a vote for a right-wing (i.e. 
conservative) Studies that distinguish more classes corroborate these general findings 
(Nieuwbeerta, 1995). Figure 2.1 illustrates this relationship between social class and 
voting behavior. 
Figure 2.1 
Class Vole 
Because of evidence on the diminishing effect of social class on voting 
behavior, in several studies the class perspective has been maintained by pointing 
towards the phenomenon of class mobility. Some have predicted that class mobility 
weakens the relationship between social class and political preferences. In addition, 
they have demonstrated that class mobility is on the rise (Ganzeboom, Luijkx & 
Treiman, 1989). Research of De Graaf & Ultee (1990) and Nieuwbeerta (1995) 
makes clear that class mobility indeed weakens the relationship between social class 
and political preferences. Figure 2.2 displays the relationships I have discussed. 
Figure 2.2 
Parental 
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Vote 
In the Netherlands, however, a class perspective is of limited use to the 
study of voting behavior. Religion is more strongly related to voting behavior than 
is social class. Research on the Netherlands invariably shows a strong relationship 
between religious denomination and voting behavior (Lijphart, 1968; Andeweg, 
1982; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1987; Middendorp, 1991). 
Figure 2.3 describes how strong the relationship between religion and voting 
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has been since 1956. To give a fair comparison of the relationship between religion 
and voting over time, I use a measure that is not influenced by the changing overall 
popularity of confessional parties over time, nor by the decreasing number of 
religious people in the Netherlands. This measure is the log-odds ratio. The odds ratio 
of a two by two table of religion against vote is the odds that religious people will 
vote for a confessional party divided by the odds that non-religious people will do the 
same. The log-odds ratio is the natural logarithm of the odds-ratio. The reason I use 
log-odds-ratio's is that they adjust for 'floor' and 'ceiling' effects. If there is a strong 
relationship between religion and voting, a small change in the strength of the 
relationship results in a large alteration of the odds-ratio. 
If voting is independent of religion, the log-odds ratio is zero. The higher the 
log-odds ratio is, the higher is the level of religious voting. A log-odds ratio below 
zero indicates that religious people are less likely to vote for confessional parties than 
are non-religious people. In Figure 2.3,1 present the level of religious voting in the 
Netherlands by using log-odds ratio's. 
The trend in religious voting seems similar for the different denominations. 
The Orthodox Protestants display the highest level of religious voting, while the 
Protestants exhibit the lowest level of religious voting. Figure 2.3 shows that there 
has been a decline in the level of religious voting over time. However, even though 
there are strong indications that the relationship between religion and voting behavior 
has declined, religion still plays an important role with respect to voting behavior. In 
a recent study, Nieuwbeerta (1995) presented the level of class voting in twenty 
countries. His log-odds ratio's for the level of class voting are rarely larger than 1. In 
countries with relatively high levels of class voting, such as Sweden, he finds log-
odds ratio's that are occasionally larger than 2. Figure 2.3 shows that the level of 
religious voting in the Netherlands has always been higher than 2, and for Catholics 
in the sixties even as great as 5. In the Netherlands religious denomination has been 
and still is better able to explain voting behavior than social class. Even at its lowest 
point, religion still has a greater impact on voting in the Netherlands than does class 
at its highest point in Sweden. Extending Figure 2.2 to include religion results in the 
relationships shown in Figure 2.4. 
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As I discussed in chapter 1, the number of religious people in the Netherlands 
declined rapidly from the 1960's onwards, but this decline did not result in 
simultaneous losses for the confessional parties. Yet, the relationship between 
religious denomination and voting behavior has been declining in the Netherlands 
Figure 2.4 
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Vote Religion 
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(Andeweg, 1982; Eisinga, Felling & Lammers, 1994). This fact might be explained 
by the occurrence of religious mobility. I predict that religious mobility weakens the 
relationship between religion and political preferences because the people who have 
abandoned the religion of their parents might continue to vote for confessional 
parties. As of yet not much attention has been paid to the direct relationship between 
the religious denomination of parents and the voting behavior of their children in the 
Netherlands. Sometimes researchers implicitly take parental religious denomination 
into account. Andeweg (1982), for instance, does make a distinction between confes-
sional and non-confessional voters. He divides the non-confessional voters into 
secularized and secular voters. Pijnenburg (1984, 1994) makes a similar distinction 
between church members, ex-members of the first generation (e.g. the secularized), 
and ex-members of the second generation (the secular voters) who have never been 
a church member. He shows that the ex-members of the second generation were less 
likely to vote for confessional parties than were the ex-members of the first 
generation. Compared to church members, the ex-members were less likely to vote 
for confessional parties. However, the distinctions Andeweg and Pijnenburg make are 
implicit mobility measures. In chapter 1,1 argued that it is better to disentangle the 
effect of parental religious denomination on voting behavior from that of a person's 
own religious denomination on voting behavior. When one uses mobility scores these 
effects can not be separated. Figure 2.5 summarizes the relationships I have 
discussed. 
Figure 2.5 
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Many researchers have studied the transmission of political values 
from parents to their children (Campbell et. al, 1960; Butler & Stokes, 1969; 
Jennings & Niemi, 1968,1974, 1981; Sears, 1975; Himmelweit et. al., 1981; Rose 
& McAllister, 1986; and for the Netherlands Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood, 1995). One 
of the main socialization-agents turns out to be the family (for instance Jennings & 
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Niemi, 1968). Parents are said to transmit their political preferences to their children 
directly. Rose and McAllister (1986) use characteristics like social class, father's 
social class and father's political preferences to explain why a person might vote for 
the Labor party or the Conservative party in England. They find that of all parental 
characteristics, the political preferences of the father predicts best a person's voting 
behavior. The social class of the father is the second best predictor. Others have 
found quite similar results for Australia and Britain (McAllister & Kelley, 1985). 
In the Netherlands there are only a few studies that explicitly deal with the 
intergenerational transmission of political preferences (Gemmeke, 1995). Most 
studies only mention the subject occasionally (Hagendoorn & Janssen, 1983; Janssen 
& Voestermans, 1984; De Hart, 1990). Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood ( 1995) estimated 
the effect of parental social class, parental religious denomination and parental 
political preferences on the political preferences of Dutch high school students. Their 
results show a direct influence of parental political preferences, even if parental social 
class and parental religious denomination were controlled for. Furthermore, fathers 
and mothers influence their children's party preference equally. Since this study only 
deals with high school children aged 15 to 17, one may wonder whether these effects 
remain when the children grow to maturity and take on their own social class 
position. Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood also did not measure the religious 
denomination to which these children belong independently from the religious 
denomination of their parents. It is therefore hard to tell whether the effects of social 
class and religious denomination can be attributed to the parental milieu. I examine 
the intergenerational transmission of political preferences to adult voters. Figure 2.6 
incorporates all the relationships I have discussed so far. 
Figure 2.6 
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2.2.2. The effect of intragenerational social and religious mobility on voting 
behavior 
In the previous section I discussed studies on the relationship between 
intergeneraüonal social and religious mobility on the one hand, and political mobility 
on the other hand. This section deals with intragenerational social and religious 
mobility, and how these affect voting decisions over time. 
There has been abundant research on electoral change in the Netherlands 
(Daudt, 1972; 1981; 1983; Lijphart, 1974; Bakvis, 1981; Andeweg, 1982; Van der 
Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b; Irwin & Dittrich, 1984; Houska, 1985), especially in the 
last decades (Thomassen, 1986). Some of these studies concern aggregate analyses 
of voting behavior (Bakvis, 1981; Houska, 1985), while other research focuses on 
individual changes in voting. The most extensive of the latter type of studies have 
undoubtly been those by Andeweg and Van der Eijk and Niemöller. Andeweg (1982) 
examines the declining impact of social cleavages and generational replacement on 
electoral change. He first tests whether the loss of the religious parties is due to 
religious processes such as secularization and the weakening relationship between 
religion and voting. Second, he examines whether changes in the socio-economic 
structure, such as social mobility, can explain changes in voting behavior. He 
concludes that "electoral change, however, does not appear to be related to any of 
these socio-economic characteristics" (Andeweg, 1982: 121-122). Since Andeweg 
made use of mobility scores in his analyses, it remains unclear whether this 
conclusion is valid when the concept of mobility is decomposed into its major 
components. 
Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983b) argue that electoral changes are largely 
due to individual changes in party choice. They claim that "sociological theories 
emphasize the importance of a voters' social-structural characteristics in determining 
the vote. These traits are largely of an ascribed rather than achieved character, and are 
thus of a relatively stable nature for adult voters" (Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b: 
151). They prefer a spatial approach to voting, in which they assume voters vote for 
the party that comes closest to their preferences. 
Despite criticism of the sociological approach to electoral change, I examine 
the impact of socio-structural characteristics on vote changes. I do so for the 
following reason: I argue that socio-structural characteristics are not stable. 
Especially since the 1960's the so-called 'ascribed' socio-structural characteristics 
became more and more achieved. More and more people left the church. In addition, 
as they grow older, people attend religious services less often (Becker & Vink, 
1994a). Also, since a job is no longer a position for Ufe, intragenerational mobility 
is more likely than it was forty years ago (Pollaerts, De Graaf & Luijkx, 1997). I will 
not examine the effect of socio-structural characteristics on voting, but rather the 
effect of changes in these characteristics on voting behavior. 
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Andeweg (1982) has examined the effect of intergeneratìonal social mobility 
on electoral changes. He concluded that electoral change is not particularly strong 
among the socially mobile. I therefore focus on the effect of religious mobility on 
electoral change. Andeweg did not examine intragenerational mobility as a possible 
explanation for electoral change. To explain individual changes in voting behavior 
I focus on intergeneratìonal religious mobility as a possible explanation as well as on 
intragenerational religious mobility. Figure 2.7 illustrates the relationships I have 
discussed so far. 
Figure 2.7 
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In section 2.1,1 described different theories that have been used to explain 
voting behavior. In this section I discussed the results of studies of voting behavior 
in the Netherlands and summarized the relationships that I will examine in my study. 
Next, I will integrate the different theories into one theory, the so-called theory of the 
reasoning voter. I will use this theory to make new predictions about the effect of 
social attributes on voting, and about the intergeneratìonal transmission of political 
preferences. 
2.3 An integrating theory: the reasoning voter 
In section 2.1,1 argued that we need an integrating theory on voting behavior. To do 
so, I build on previous work by Popkin, who developed the theory of the reasoning 
voter (Popkin, 1991). This theory predicts that voters reduce information costs; in this 
process of cost reduction the direct social environment plays an important role. 
Popkin postulates that it is rational for voters not to believe the pronouncements of 
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politicians. He assumes that the expected gains of being an informed consumer in the 
economic market for private goods remain higher than the gains of being an informed 
voter in the political market for collective goods. In this theory "low information 
rationality" plays a dominant role. It consists of a method of combining, in an 
economical way, learning and information from past experiences, daily life, the 
media and political campaigns (1991:10). 
Popkin conceives of the voter "..as an investor and the vote as a reasoned 
investment in collective goods, made with costly and imperfect information under 
conditions of uncertainty" (1991:10). Note that this viewpoint draws attention to the 
difference between public and private goods. Popkin mentions three of these 
differences. First, time spent on gathering information about political parties does 
lead to a better vote - as it would lead to a better consumer choice -, but it does not 
necessarily lead to the desired outcome. In other words, the election outcome is 
uncertain. Voters therefore do not invest as much time in gathering information about 
public policy and government activities as they do gathering information about 
consumer choices; most of the information they have about politics is derived from 
experiences in their daily life. Second, voting is a form of collective action; enough 
people need to vote for the same political party in order to win an election. Because 
voting is a collective action voters focus not only on their own concerns and 
preferences but also on those of others. Therefore, voters will be affected by 
information about what other voters are doing, especially by information about those 
who are in similar social, economic and religious positions. Third, public choices 
involve the provision of services. The voters have to judge the likelihood that 
political parties will deliver the services they have promised. 
In this study I will apply these ideas to the Dutch case. Therefore, I would like 
to adjust and extend the theory of the reasoning voter to make it apply to the Dutch 
political context. A common criticism of the classical version of the economic 
approach is that voters have limited knowledge of the programs that political parties 
represent. This is especially true for the Netherlands since many political parties 
participate in the elections. In his (neo-classical) version of the economic approach 
Downs (1957) tried to overcome this objection by assuming that gathering 
information is costly for voters and that all voters minimize costs. That is why voters 
rely on information "shortcuts". This leaves unanswered the question of how voters 
acquire the information they posses. 
In my adjusted version of the theory of the reasoning voter I assume the 
following: information about the programs of political parties is quite unreliable since 
all political parties inflate their promises, especially in the competitive situation of 
free elections that Downs emphasizes. It is therefore quite rational for voters not to 
vote according to the future promises of political parties but rather according to the 
records political parties have built up in the past. As Popkin (1991) phrases it, the 
voters' prime concern is what the parties have done for them in recent times. 
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The fact that voters vote according to the record political parties have built up 
in the past explains, for instance, why parental vote has an effect on a person's voting 
behavior. The longer the period in which a specific political party has tended to one's 
interests, the better the choice for that party will seem. To be reliable, therefore, 
information about the records of the political parties, is best not obtained from the 
political parties themselves, but from those who have experienced the consequences 
of the decisions of those political parties. The idea that people obtain information 
about political parties from other people can also be found in the works of, for 
instance, Butler and Stokes (1969) and Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (1948). A 
person's parents are among those who inform voters about politics. Parents not only 
transmit interests, as in the case of intergenerational social and religious stability, but 
they also transmit information about the records of political parties, as in the case of 
both intergenerational social and religious stability and mobility. One example of 
such information is, for instance, that at the beginning of the century the confessional 
parties supported universal suffrage in exchange for public financing of 
denominationally based schools. Another is that the labor party when it first came to 
power after the second world war introduced old-age pensions. 
By using the theory of the reasoning voter, I am able to say why people are 
motivated to vote for a particular political party. I am also able to say more about the 
reason why people are influenced by those around them. Popkin's theory illuminates 
why voters exchange information concerning politics with other voters. Such an 
exchange is a cheap way of obtaining reliable information. 
2.4 Predictions derived from the theory of the reasoning voter 
In the remainder of this study I will test some implications of the theory of the 
reasoning voter. Popkin (1991) applied his theory to the impact of electoral 
campaigns. In this study I will test other predictions derived from this theory. If 
people are indeed affected by parties' past performances, campaign promises do not 
only have short-term effects but long-term as well. In this study I focus on how 
keeping or not keeping campaign promises affects political preferences. I do not test 
the theory of the reasoning voter by measuring the transformation of information 
direcüy. Instead I make new predictions about how social attributes affect voting and 
about how parents transmit political preferences to their children. 
In Part 2 of this book I make predictions on factors relating to one's parents 
in the past. According to the theory of the reasoning voter, voters rely - at least partly 
- on information obtained from their parents. Figure 2.6 illustrates how I test 
predictions I derive from this theory. In chapter 5, I test whether parental 
characteristics such as parental social class, parental religious denomination and 
parental voting behavior have an independent effect on a person's voting behavior, 
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after controlling for that person's own religious denomination and social class. Thus, 
I test indirectly whether voters rely - at least in part - on information they obtain from 
their parents as the theory of the reasoning voter predicts. 
People do not only receive information about politics from their parents. They 
also inherit interests from them. If one finds no influence of parental class and 
parental religious denomination on a person's voting behavior after controlling for 
his or her social class and religious denomination, we can conclude that parents 
transmit interests to their children. If parental vote influences one's voting behavior, 
this would suggest that parents transmit some kind of information to their children. 
And if the effects of parental class and parental religious denomination on a person's 
vote are mediated through parental vote, that would suggest that parents transmit a 
particular kind of information to their children, namely information with respect to 
their interests. In chapter 6 I demonstrate how large the total, - all measured and 
unmeasured - parental influence is on voting behavior is. I also investigate whether 
parental vote, parental class and parental religious denomination encompass all 
parental influences. 
In Part 3 I perform a more specific test of the theory of the reasoning voter. 
Using recall data, I examine to what extent information with respect to politics 
influences the confessional vote later in life. I also explore sources of information 
other that parents, namely churches and schools. I test whether having attended a 
confessional high school in adolescence still affects a person's vote later in life. 
Moreover, I test whether previous church attendance affects voting behavior 
independently from present church attendance. 
26 
PART 2 
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 

PART 2 
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
In part 1, I elaborated upon the theory of the reasoning voter. In this Part I test 
some predictions derived from this theory. According to the theory of the 
reasoning voter, people are affected by how parties have performed in the past. 
Therefore, campaigns not only have short-term effects but long-term effects as 
well. In this study I focus on the long-term influences of keeping or not keeping 
campaign promises on political preferences. 
In this Part I concentrate on the long-term effects of past experiences with 
regard to one's parents. According to the theory, voters rely - at least partly - on 
information they obtain as a by-product of activities in their daily lives. Hence, 
they will get political information from their parents. People not only receive 
information about politics from their parents, they also inherit interests from them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL MOBILITY 
In this chapter, the first of four chapters dealing with intergenerational mobility, 
I answer descriptive questions regarding the amount of intergenerational social, 
religious and political mobility that is present in the Netherlands. First, I examine 
to what extent parents transmit their political preferences to their children. If there 
is hardly any political mobility in the Netherlands, it would be useless to point out 
that intergenerational social and religious mobility can serve as an explanation. On 
the other hand, if we do find a reasonable amount of intergenerational political 
mobility, but there is hardly any intergenerational social or religious mobility, the 
latter factors cannot serve as an explanation for political mobility. Hence, in this 
chapter I answer the following descriptive question: 
1. How large has (a) intergenerational political mobility; (b) intergenerational 
social mobility; and (c) intergenerational religious mobility been in the 
Netherlands during the period from 1970 to 1994? 
In this chapter I make use of surveys conducted between 1970 and 1994. I 
therefore address not only the question of how large the different types of mobility 
are but also the question of whether this mobility has altered over time. 
Furthermore, I address the question of whether the differences in mobility over 
time can be ascribed to cohort replacement, or whether the changes in mobility 
patterns over time are the same for everyone. 
This chapter is organized in the following manner. In the next section I 
describe the data and operationalizations. In section 2, 3 and 4,1 show the amount 
of intergenerational political, social and religious mobility in the Netherlands over 
the past decades. In section 5 I connect social and religious mobility to political 
mobility. In the concluding section I discuss the main findings. 
3.1 Data and operationalization 
In this chapter I use a pooled data-set consisting of eleven separate data-files. The 
data consist of representative Dutch surveys conducted between 1970 and 1994. 
I tried to make use of as many comparable surveys as possible, covering as many 
years as possible. I used the following data sets: (Steinmetz archive number / 
ICPSR number between brackets)1 
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1. Verkiezingsonderzoek 1970-1973 [Election Survey 1970-1973] (P0136) 
2. Political Participation and Equality in Seven Nations, 1971 (ICPSR: 07768) 
3. Inkomensongelijkheid en rechtvaardigheidscriteria 1976 [Income Inequality 
and Social Justice Criteria 1976] (P0653) 
4. National Election Survey 1977 (P0354) 
5. National Election Survey 1981 (P0350) 
6. National Election Survey 1982 (P0633) 
7. National Election Survey 1986 (P0866) 
8. Religion in Dutch Society 1990 (P1000) 
9. Family Survey of the Dutch population 1992-1993 (P1245) 
10. Dutch SSCW/TelePanel Survey 1994 (P1211c) 
11. National Election Survey 1994 (P1208) 
These surveys contain comparable data on voting behavior, social class, parental 
social class, religious denomination and parental religious denomination. I restrict 
my analyses to the working electorate. The minimum voting age was 21 until 
1972, when it changed to 18. As a consequence of selecting only the working 
electorate, a lot of women (those not currently employed) and the retired are not 
included in my analyses. A common practice among sociologists is to regard the 
class position of a family as determined by the male 'head', thus attributing to 
married women the same class position as their husbands (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 
1993). Several sociologists have argued that the class position of all individuals 
should be determined by their own employment (Abbot & Sapsford, 1987). Van 
Berkel (1997) showed that for voting behavior in the Netherlands the occupation 
of women was at least as important as the occupation of their husbands. In some 
cases their own class position was the prime determinant of their voting behavior. 
My decision to only analyze the voting behavior of respondents who are currently 
employed considerably lowered the number of respondents that are included in the 
data-set. Furthermore, from the data I selected respondents who had a valid score 
on the variables I have mentioned. This means that I excluded all respondents who 
did not provide information for one or more of the relevant variables. Before 
selection there were 23.539 respondents in the combined data-file. After the 
selections 8.495 respondents remain, 36% of the original sample. 
Some surveys also contain information on parental political preferences. 
This is the case for the surveys held in 1970, 1971, 1977, 1986 and 1992, and for 
both surveys in 1994. Selecting only the cases for which I have information on 
parental political preferences leaves me with 3.608 cases. In the following analyses 
I use the 8.495 selected respondents whenever I do not examine parental political 
preferences. Only when I specifically analyze parental political preferences do I 
use the smaller selection of 3.608 cases. 
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Political preferences and parental political preferences 
The respondents were asked for which political party they would vote if 
elections were held today or tomorrow, or for which political party they voted in 
last elections2. Parental political preferences refer to the political preferences of 
the father when the respondents were 15 years old. If there was no information 
available for the party preference of the father I used the party preference of the 
mother. The political preferences of fathers and mothers are not always the same. 
Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood (1995) have investigated the relative effects of the 
political preference of fathers versus those of mothers on the political preference 
of their children. Their results showed that 73% of the parents had exactly the 
same party preference. Furthermore, the relative effect of the party preference of 
fathers and mothers on the party preference of their children did not differ 
significantly. In my analysis I put a number of different political parties together 
under one category, and one might therefore expect that even more than 73% of 
the parents will have the same party preference. I place each political party into 
one of the following three categories3: (1) Left-wing; (2) Right-wing; and (3) 
Confessional. 
I have two reasons for not treating the different political parties separately. 
First, joining the categories lowers the risk of misreports. For instance, one might 
not be able to recall whether one's parents voted for a specific political party, but 
one might be more likely to know whether they voted for confessional, left-wing 
or right-wing parties. Second, by collapsing parties into a few categories I avoid 
the problem of classifying parties that were newly founded (such as D'66 in 1966), 
or disappeared (such as DS'70 in 1982), or merged (such as the ARP, CHU and 
KVP into the CDA in 1977). If one were to distinguish between the different 
parties for which parents and their children voted, some voters would be 
considered to have voted for a different party than did their parents, when in fact 
the party for which their parents voted does no longer exist. 
Social class and parental social class 
I constructed these variables using data on occupation and self-employment. 
I classified social class and parental social class according to the EGP-class 
scheme (Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero, 1979). I distinguish the following six 
classes: 
(1) Higher professionals (2) Routine non-manual (3) Self-employed (4) Skilled 
labor (5) Unskilled labor (6) Farmer. 
Religious denomination and parental religious denomination 
I measure parental religious denomination in the following manner: the 
respondent is asked in which religious denomination he or she was raised or - this 
was the case in one survey - to which religious denomination his or her father 
belongs. Almost all surveys use a similar question to determine a person's religious 
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denomination.4 Both variables are coded into four categories: (1) No religious 
denomination (2) Catholic (3) Protestant (4) Orthodox Protestant. 
3.2 Intergenerational political mobility 
In this section I describe the amount of intergenerational political mobility in the 
Netherlands over the period between 1970 and 1994. Table 3.1 presents the 
number of people voting for left-wing, right-wing or confessional parties by 
parental vote. In other words, it shows the similarity between parents and their 
children with regard to voting behavior. 
If we compare the voting behavior of parents and their children in Table 
3.1, we see that support for the confessional political parties declined from 61% 
of the votes to 36% of the votes. It appears that right-wing political parties 
benefitted more than did left-wing political parties from the declining support for 
confessional parties. While only 10% of the parents voted for a right-wing party, 
30% of their children did so. For the left-wing political parties, little seems to have 
changed between two generations. Twenty-nine percent of all parents voted for a 
left-wing party versus 34% of their children. 
Table 3.1: Parent-children similarity in voting; row-percentages between brackets (N=3608) 
PARENTAL VOTE 
Left-wing 
Right-wing 
Confessional 
Total 
Left-wing 
651 (62) 
67 (23) 
464(22) 
1222 (34) 
VOTE 
Right-wing 
305 (29) 
242 (65) 
551 (25) 
1098 (30) 
Confessional 
99(9) 
43(12) 
1147 (S3) 
1288 (36) 
Total 
1054 (29) 
372 (10) 
2182 (61) 
360Θ 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
Table 3.1 shows that 57% of the respondents vote for the same party as did 
their parents. Children are most likely to take over their parents' political 
preference when parents voted for a right-wing political party; sixty-five percent 
of right-wing voting parents have children with the same preference. Parents who 
voted confessionally are least likely to have children who vote similarly; only 53% 
of parents who voted for a confessional party have children who do the same. 
Table 3.2 shows how the intergenerational transmission of political 
preferences has changed over time. In this table I present the percentage of parents 
whose children vote similarly in the different surveys. 
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Overall, we see a decrease in the intergenerational transmission of political 
preferences over time. In 1970 parents and their children voted for the same group 
of political parties in 64.5% of the cases, whereas in 1994 this percentage was only 
46.7. 
There are two explanations that can account for this trend in parent-children 
similarity over time. First, the decline in intergenerational transmission of political 
preferences can be due to a generational replacement. People born longer ago 
might be more likely to vote for the same party as did their parents than people 
bom in more recent times. Since the people who were bom earlier are over-
represented in the earlier surveys, generational replacement might be the driving 
force behind the decline in intergenerational transmission of political preferences 
Table 3.2: Parent-children similarity in voting (percentages) by year (N=3608) 
% SIMILAR VOTE 
YEAH 
1970 64.5 
1971 67.2 
1977 65.7 
1986 57.8 
1992 49.1 
1994 46.7 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
found in Table 3.2. When I test this hypothesis, I am thus looking for differences 
in parent-children similarity between different birth cohorts. 
A second possible reason for the decline in parent-children similarity is that 
over time politics became more of an individual choice. This change would have 
an impact on earlier as well as on more recent generations. If this were the case, 
one would expect that over time the intergenerational transmission of political 
preferences would decline for everyone, irrespective of the year they were bom. 
In Table 3.3, I present the intergenerational transmission of political 
preferences over time, while separating people bom in different birth cohorts. I 
make use of ten year cohorts. Unfortunately, the years in which the surveys were 
held do not allow me to compare between the cohorts in exactly ten year periods. 
This makes it difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions. When I look for evidence for 
the first explanation, namely, that people bom in earlier periods have higher levels 
of intergenerational transmission of political preferences than have people bom in 
later periods, I need to compare a cell for a given cohort in a given column with 
the cell for the next cohort ten years later. Ideally, the older birth cohorts would 
have higher levels of intergenerational transmission than would the younger birth 
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cohorts, and there would be no change in parent-children similarity over time 
within one birth cohort. 
The second explanation for the decline in parent-children similarity over 
time would predict a decline for everyone. This means that we would expect to see 
a decline in parent-children similarity in each row of Table 3.3, irrespective of the 
year in which one was bom. 
Table 3.3 shows that the older birth cohorts tend to have a higher 
intergenerational transmission of political preferences. In general, people born 
earlier vote more in accordance with their parents than people bom in later cohorts. 
In most years older birth cohorts have higher levels of intergenerational 
transmission than have younger cohorts. An exception to this rule is the youngest 
Table 3 3 Parent-children similarity in voting (percentages) by cohort and by year (N=3608) 
YEAR 
1970 1971 1977 1986 1992 1994 
BIRTH COHORT 
1900-1909 
1910-1919 
1920-1929 
1930-1939 
1940-1949 
1950-1959 
1960-1969 
76 3 
69 4 
65 0 
62 7 
55 8 
Average 64 5 
Source pooled data-set; own calculations 
cohort. People bom after 1960 are more likely to vote like their parents did than 
are people bom between 1950 and 1959. 
Table 3.3 also shows whether or not there is also support for the second 
hypothesis. There seems to be no clear pattern over time in intergenerational 
transmission of political preferences within each row. It is not the case that as 
people get older, they are less likely to vote for the same group of parties as their 
parents did. Hence, we can conclude that the decline in intergenerational 
transmission of political preferences mainly can be related to the succession of 
generations. Overall, I find support for the hypothesis that the decline in parent-
children similarity is to a large extent due to generational replacement. 
With this conclusion in mind, we move on to the next section, were I 
examine the pattern and trend in social mobility in the Netherlands. 
74 5 
70 6 
67 7 
49 3 
672 
82 3 
62 1 
544 
60 0 
62 1 
65 7 
76 5 
73 2 
643 
51 1 
46 7 
654 
57 8 
566 
47 5 
418 
47 7 
491 
513 
46 0 
430 
481 
467 
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3 3 Intergenerational social mobility 
Similarly to Table 3.1 on political mobility, Table 3.4 presents the outflow 
percentages for each parental social class. On the diagonal, the percentage of 
immobile for each parental social class is presented. 
If we compare parents and their children, the percentage of farmers has declined 
17% (parents) to only 5% (children). A growth of the managerial class can be 
detected: the percentage of higher professionals has increased from 25% (parents) 
to 34% (children). 
Overall, 32% of the people belong to the same social class as their parents, 
which means that two third of the people are socially mobile. The lowest amount 
of mobility can be found among the higher professionals: almost 55% of parents 
in this class have a son or daughter in the same social class. The highest amount 
of mobility can be found among the self-employed: only 17% of the self-
employed's children is self-employed as well. Not surprisingly, Table 3.4 also 
shows that mobility mostly occurs to the most adjacent social class. Further away 
from the diagonal, the percentages abate. 
Table 3.4: Parent-children similarity In sodai dass; row-percentages between brackets (N=8495) 
Higher 
Professionals 
Routine 
non-manual 
Self-
employed 
Skilled 
labor 
Unskilled 
Labor 
Farmer 
Total 
Higher 
Profes-
sionals 
1139 
(55) 
380 
(44) 
353 
(33) 
451 
(27) 
254 
(20) 
335 
(23) 
2912 
(34) 
Routine 
non-
manual 
555 
(27) 
303 
(35) 
272 
(25) 
465 
(27) 
299 
(23) 
223 
(15) 
2117 
(25) 
Self-
employed 
75 
(4) 
29 
(3) 
183 
(17) 
59 
(4) 
52 
(4) 
69 
(13) 
467 
(6) 
Skilled 
labor 
153 
(7) 
61 
(9) 
123 
(11) 
387 
(23) 
275 
(21) 
191 
(13) 
1210 
(14) 
Unskilled 
labor 
142 
(7) 
73 
(8) 
139 
(13) 
326 
(19) 
382 
(30) 
305 
(21) 
1367 
(16) 
Farmer 
16 
(1) 
6 
(1) 
11 
(1) 
17 
(1) 
26 
(2) 
346 
(24) 
422 
(5) 
Total 
2080 
(25) 
872 
(10) 
1081 
(13) 
1705 
(20) 
1288 
(15) 
1469 
(17) 
8495 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
At first sight, it seems that there is more social mobility present than 
political mobility. Two-third of the people are socially mobile, compared to 43% 
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politically mobile people. However, we should be careful in making such a 
comparison. I distinguished three categories of political parties, and six social 
classes. One would expect to find more mobility when more categories are 
distinguished. Nevertheless, we can conclude that the barriers between (some) 
classes seem weaker than those between the political parties. 
In Table 3.5, I show how the intergenerational transmission of social 
position has changed over time. In this table, I presented the percentage of parents 
with children who belong to the same social class for different surveys. 
Overall, there is a decrease in the intergenerational transmission of class 
position over time. In 1970, in 40% of the cases, parents and children belonged to 
the same social class, whereas in 1994 this percentage was reduced to 30. 
Two factors can account for this increase in social mobility. First, the 
increase in social mobility may be due to generational replacement. People bom 
in later times may be more likely to be socially mobile than people bom earlier. 
A second explanation might be that over time there is an increase in social 
mobility for old and young alike. 
In order to examine whether generational replacement causes the decline in 
intergenerational social mobility, I present the intergenerational transmission of 
social class over time while separating people bom in different birth cohorts (Table 
3.6). 
Table 3.5: Parent-children similarity In social class (percentages) by year (N=8495) 
% SIMILAR SOCIAL CLASS 
YEAR 
1970 39.7 
1971 33.5 
1976 39.3 
1977 32.2 
1981 29.0 
1982 32.4 
19B6 30.7 
1990 30.7 
1992 30.8 
1994 29.9 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
From Table 3.6 it seems that older birth cohorts tend to have a higher overall 
intergenerational transmission of social class position than have younger birth 
cohorts. In general, although not at all points in time, people bom earlier are more 
likely than those bom later to belong to the same social class as their parents did. 
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The pattern of decline in social mobility found in Table 3.5 thus seems to relate, 
if only weakly, to generational replacement. 
According to the second interpretation, there is an increase in 
intergenerational class mobility for everyone irrespective of their year of birth. 
There seems to be no clear pattern over time in intergenerational transmission of 
social class position within a given birth cohort. From the results as presented in 
Tables 3.4 through 3.6, I cannot conclude definitively that the decline in 
intergenerational transmission of social class position is related to the succession 
of generations. In the next section I examine the pattern and trend in religious 
mobility in the Netherlands. 
Table 3.6: Parent-children similarity In sodai dass (percentages) by cohort and by year (N=8495) 
YEAH 
1970 1971 1976 1977 1961 1982 1986 1990 1992 1994 
BIRTH COHORT 
1900-1909 
1910-1919 
1920-1929 
1930-1939 
1940-1949 
1950-1959 
1960-1969 
38.1 
42.3 
41.9 
41.8 
35.4 
51.6 
25.0 
34.4 
26.4 
34.8 
Average 39.7 33.5 
Source: pooled data-aet; own calculations 
3.4 Intergenerational religious mobility 
In this section I describe the amount of intergenerational religious mobility in the 
Netherlands between 1970 and 1994. Table 3.7 cross tabulates a person's own 
religious denomination by his or her parental religious denomination: it shows the 
parent-children similarity in religion. 
A comparison of parents and their children shows that the percentage of 
non-members doubled from 20 (parents) to 41 (children). People who are raised 
non-religiously usually stay non-religious; of all parents without a religious 
denomination, almost 90% have children who are also without a religious 
denomination. For those who do join a religious denomination later in life the 
Protestant Church is the most appealing: almost 7% of those who have non-
religious parents become a member of this church. 
44.4 28.9 
37.9 32.2 
36.1 36.0 
42.1 34.5 
40.8 27.4 
39.3 32.2 
32.0 39.5 
33.1 26.2 
24.6 26.4 
27.9 32.2 
26.7 34.6 
29.3 
29.0 32.4 
36.8 
28.9 26.2 
32.4 29.7 
29.4 33.3 
29.9 30.5 
26.9 31.1 
30.7 30.7 
23.1 
23.7 24.6 
34.0 33.3 
31.1 32.0 
35.2 29.5 
30.8 29.9 
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Striking is the high percentage of "stayers" among Catholics: 73% of those 
who were raised in a Catholic environment remain Catholic. The largest loss of 
members occurs among Protestant Churches, where only 59% of those raised 
religiously remain member. The first column of Table 3.7 shows the number of 
non-religious people. This amount is lowest among people with an Orthodox 
Protestant background: only 22% of the people who were raised in this religious 
denomination abandon religion altogether. As we have seen, this does not mean 
that the Orthodox Protestant churches always retains their members since 9% of 
Orthodox Protestants switch to a - non-Orthodox - Protestant Church. 
Table 3.7: Parent-chlUren similarity In religious denomination; row-percentages between brackets (№8495) 
RELIGIOUS D E N O U N A T O N 
No 
Religion 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Orthodox 
Protestant 
Total 
No 
Religion 
1510 
(90) 
975 
(26) 
760 
(38) 
231 
(22) 
3476 
(41) 
Catholic 
42 
(3) 
2736 
(73) 
30 
(2) 
13 
(1) 
2821 
(33) 
Protestant 
113 
(7) 
25 
(1) 
1182 
(59) 
97 
0) 
1417 
(17) 
Orthodox 
Protestant 
12 
(1) 
12 
(0) 
41 
(2) 
716 
(68) 
781 
0) 
Total 
1677 
(20) 
3748 
(44) 
2013 
(24) 
1057 
(12) 
8495 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
When one compares Table 3.7 with Table 3.1 and 3.4, it looks as if there 
is more social and political mobility than religious mobility. Seventy-two percent 
of the respondents adopt the religious preference of their parents. Furthermore, the 
religious mobility that we do find in the Netherlands takes the form of leaving the 
church rather than switching denominations. In Table 3.81 present the percentages 
of people who leave the church over time. 
In Table 3.8 we see that over time more and more people leave the church 
of their parents. In 1970, 20% of the respondents left the church. By 1994 this 
percentage had more than doubled. 
The next table will show whether or not this increase in leaving the church 
in the Netherlands can be attributed to the fact that younger cohorts are more 
likely to leave their parents' church than older cohorts, or to the fact that leaving 
the church is something that happens to older and younger cohorts alike. In Table 
3.9 I present the percentage of people who leave the church over time while 
separating those bom in different birth cohorts. This table is far from ideal since 
the years of the surveys do not correspond to the ten year intervals. However, the 
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years 1971,1981 and 1992 make it somewhat possible to follow birth cohorts over 
time. 
Table 3.8: Percentage of respondents who leave the church by year (N-849S) 
% LEAVING THE CHURCH 
YEAR 
1970 20.1 
1971 22.3 
1976 20.0 
1977 20.0 
1981 18.6 
1982 22.2 
1986 29.4 
1990 44.6 
1992 26.9 
1994 41.9 
Source; pooled data-set; own calculations 
In Table 3.9 we see that older birth cohorts tend to have a higher intergenerational 
transmission of church membership than younger birth cohorts. Overall, people 
bom earlier are less likely to leave the church than people bom in later cohorts. 
In every year older birth cohorts have higher levels of intergenerational 
transmission than do younger birth cohorts. 
We might also expect to see a decline in parent-children similarity for 
everyone irrespective of the year in which one was bom. We can see that within 
birth cohorts more people leave the church in later periods than in earlier periods. 
Thus, over time there is more intergenerational religious mobility for everyone 
regardless of the period in which they were bom. I therefore conclude that both 
younger and older cohorts experienced a decline in church membership, but that 
younger cohorts were overall more likely to have left the church. 
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Table 3 9 Percentage of respondenis who leave the church by cohort and by year (N-849S) 
BIRTH COHORT 
1900-1909 
1910-1919 
1920-1929 
1930-1939 
1940-1949 
1950-1959 
1960-1969 
Average 
1970 
19 7 
19 8 
18 9 
188 
225 
201 
1971 
212 
27 0 
173 
209 
219 
223 
1976 
12 5 
18 0 
15 3 
268 
316 
20 0 
1977 
104 
189 
222 
28 6 
203 
20 0 
YEAR 
1981 
98 
15 7 
180 
203 
219 
186 
1982 
11 1 
14 0 
215 
25 2 
299 
222 
1986 
179 
161 
225 
331 
397 
338 
294 
1990 
352 
347 
417 
556 
440 
446 
1992 
167 
154 
27 3 
298 
354 
26 9 
1994 
267 
418 
457 
52 9 
41 9 
Source pooled data-set, own calculations 
3.5 The effect of intergenerational social and religious mobility on political 
mobility 
In the next chapters I test whether social and religious mobility are connected to 
political mobility. As an introduction to this topic, I present the parent-children 
similarity in voting, only for people who belong to the same denomination as their 
parents and who also belong to the same social class as their parents. Table 3.10 
shows the amount of political mobility for those people who are religiously and 
socially immobile. 
Table 3 1 0 
PARENTAL VOTE 
Parent-children similarity in voting for people who are religiously and socially Immobile only, row-
percentages between brackets (N=862) 
Left-wing 
Right-wing 
Confessional 
Total 
Left-wing 
139 (66) 
22(19) 
70 (13) 
231 (27) 
VOTE 
Right-wing 
57 (27) 
81 (69) 
118(22) 
256 (26) 
Confessional 
16(8) 
14 (12) 
345(65) 
1288 (36) 
Total 
212 (25) 
117(16) 
533(62) 
862 
Source pooled data-set; own calculations 
Table 3.1 displays the level of intergenerational political mobility for all voters. 
Table 3.10 shows it only for those people who belong to the same social class and 
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religious denomination as do their parents. We can draw several conclusions from 
this table. First, a comparison between Table 3.1 and Table 3.10 shows that those 
who are religiously and socially immobile are also less likely to be politically 
mobile. In Table 3.1, I found 57% of the people to vote for the same group of 
parties as their parents did. Table 3.10 shows that this percentage is 66 for those 
who are religiously and socially immobile. For those people who are socially and 
religiously mobile this percentage (calculated on basis of Table 3.1 and 3.10) is 54. 
This result supports the hypothesis that social and religious mobility affect political 
mobility. However, Table 3.1 shows that the number of people who vote for the 
same party as did their parents is still reasonably high, considering that most 
people are either religiously or socially mobile. This indicates that interest is not 
the only basis for the intergenerational transmission of political preferences. 
Another source of intergenerational transmission of political preferences must exist. 
The fact that there is still a great deal of similarity in voting behavior 
between parents and their adult children even though people are increasingly likely 
to leave the church and be socially mobile indicates that there are persisting 
influences from the past that make people loyal to the party preference of their 
parents. 
3.6 Discussion 
In this chapter I answered descriptive questions about the amount of 
intergenerational social, religious and political mobility in the Netherlands. I 
addressed not only the question of how large the different types of mobility are but 
also the question of whether this mobility has altered over time. Furthermore, I 
addressed the question of whether differences over time can be attributed to period 
effects or to generational replacements. To do so, I examined whether there is 
more or less intergenerational mobility for different birth cohorts, and I compared 
the intergenerational mobility of older people with that of younger people. 
The results of this chapter show that there is more intergenerational social 
mobility than intergenerational political mobility or intergenerational religious 
mobility in the Netherlands. There is also more political mobility than religious 
mobility: 72% of the people take over the religion of their parents, whereas only 
57% take over the political preference of their parents, and only 33% take over the 
social class position of their father. The intergenerational mobility I find with 
regard to religion pertains mainly to those who leave the church; only 10% of 
religious people change from one religious denomination to another. 
Over time there was an increase in intergenerational political mobility. In 
1970, 65% of the people voted for the same party group as did their parents while 
in 1994 this percentage was 47. For social or religious mobility to be able to 
explain this trend in voting behavior, we should be able to detect a more or less 
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similar trend in the pattern of social or religious mobility. Table 3.3 showed an 
increase in social mobility over time. In 1970, 40% of the people belonged to the 
same social class as their father, in 1994 this percentage had declined to 30. The 
increase in religious mobility is much stronger than the increase in social mobility. 
The percentage of people leaving the church increased from 20% in 1970 to 42% 
in 1994. Hence, religious mobility is more likely than social mobility to be able 
to explain the trend in political mobility. Given the abundant literature on the 
causes of social mobility (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993), in the next chapter I will 
first examine the reasons that people leave the church. 
To conclude this chapter I showed the parent-children similarity in voting 
behavior for people who belonged to the same social class and to the same 
religious denomination as did their parents. I demonstrated that immobile people 
experience much less political mobility than do mobile people. This result 
tentatively supports the hypothesis that social and religious mobility affect political 
mobility. 
With respect to religious mobility the results showed that the Catholic 
Church is best capable of keeping its members. This finding is perhaps a bit 
surprising. I do not wish to argue that the reforms within the Catholic Church 
prevented Catholics from leaving the church. Rather, I think that given its 
hierarchical structures, the changes within the Catholic Church made the process 
of disaffiliation more visible. In addition, it should be noted that Catholicism has 
been more widespread than the Protestant religions in the Netherlands. 
An important debate in the sociology of stratification is the question whether there 
is a general tendency towards more openness of societies (Dronkers & Ultee, 
1995). For example, one would expect the process of modernization to diminish 
the relationship between fathers' occupation and their children's occupation. The 
results of this chapter confirmed that this is indeed the case. Moreover, my results 
also showed a growing openness with respect to political preferences and with 
respect to the religion a person chooses. 
44 
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
Notes Chapter 3 
1. The surveys for the years before 1991 have been put into an aggregate data file by 
Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom (1996). The variables in the surveys for 1992 and 1994 
have been receded in the same way as those described by Nieuwbeerta and 
Ganzeboom. I am grateful to Paul Nieuwbeerta for providing the recode files. 
2. The questions were: 
"For which political party would you vote if elections were held today/tomorrow?" 
Survey number: 1,2,8,9,10. 
"For which political party did you vote at the last elections?" Survey number 
4,5,6,7,11. 
The exception is survey number 3. The relevant question from this survey concerned 
political party preference rather than voting behavior: 
"Which political party has your preference?" 
3. Left-wing: CPN (Communistische partij Nederland), PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid), 
D'66 (Demokraten '66), DS'70 (Demokratisch socialisten '70), PSP (Pacifistisch-
Socialistische Partij), PPR (Politieke Partij Radikalen), SP (Socialistische Partij), Groen 
Links. 
Right-wing: W D (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demokratie), BP (Boeren Partij), 
extreem rechts. 
Confessional: ARP (Anti-Revolutionaire Partij), KVP (Katholieke Volks Partij), CHU 
(Christelijk Historische Unie), SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij), GPV 
(Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond), RKPN (Rooms-Katholieke Partij Nederland), CDA 
(Christen-Democratisch Appel), RPF (Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie), EVP 
(Evangelische Volks Partij). 
The politica] position of D'66 is ambiguous. However, when I repeat all analyses with 
D'66 categorized as part of the right-wing, the results are not essentially different. 
4. All surveys ask the following two questions: 
"Do you consider yourself to belong to a particular religion or denomination? And if 
so, to which one?" 
The answer categories are: (1) Roman Catholic; (2) Dutch Reformed; (3) Calvinist; (4) 
Other religion; (5) no religion; (6) don't know. Only in the surveys conducted in 1976 
and 1990 the respondents had to answer the first question separately from the second 
one. 
Most surveys ask for the religion according to which the respondent was raised. 
Survey number 1 asked for the denomination of the father. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CAUSES OF REUGIOUS MOBILITY: ISDIVIDUAL AND CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON 
LEAVING THE CHURCH1 
In chapter 3 I showed that between 1970 and 1994 there was an increase in 
intergenerational political mobility. In that period also an increasing percentage of 
people left the church in the Netherlands. The trend in social mobility was less 
strong than the trend in religious mobility. Thus, if we want to explain the trend 
in political mobility, religious mobility is a more likely candidate than is social 
mobility. Before I examine the effect of intergenerational social and religious 
mobility on political mobility, I first examine the causes of intergenerational 
religious mobility. In this chapter I therefore tackle the second question of this 
study: which individual and structural characteristics influence the likelihood that 
a person will leave the church in the Netherlands? 
4.1 Leaving the church in the Netherlands 
Religion has traditionally played a dominant role in Dutch society. Ever since the 
foundation of the country there have been many denominational groups (Lane & 
Ersson, 1987; Bax, 1988). Almost every inhabitant of the Netherlands belonged to 
one of these denominational groups, and as a consequence hardly anyone was not 
a church member. At the beginning of the twentieth century this ideological 
segmentation became organized, resulting in a system of 'pillars'. This system 
provided not only separate organizations for Catholics and Protestants but also for 
Socialists and Liberals in the fields of education, politics, media, health care and 
so on. Since the 1960's, however, secularization has led to a breakdown of the 
pillarized structure and also to a decline in church membership (Felling, Peters & 
Schreuder, 1991). 
The trend in church membership in the Netherlands differs from that of 
other European countries. The number of non-members was neglectable at the 
beginning of this century but grew slowly despite the flourishing pillarization. At 
the time of the Dutch census of 1930, 14% of the population reported themselves 
to be non-members, and by 1947 this percentage had grown to 17 (CBS, 1968). 
The process of leaving the church accelerated from 1960 onwards. In 1960, 21% 
of the Dutch population was not a church member compared to 42% in 1979 and 
55% in 1990 (Peters, 1993). Other European countries show far lower percentages 
of non-members than does the Netherlands. Even in western Europe today, only 
France (26%) and Belgium (15%) have a percentage non-members that exceeds 
10% (Halman et ai, 1987). 
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Because the pillarized structure involved almost every aspect of life, the 
decline of the influential institution of religion over the last three decades in the 
Netherlands has had many important consequences for society (Becker & Vink, 
1994a). Moreover, in the previous chapter I showed that there has been an increase 
in political mobility over time. Since the change in social mobility was not large, 
it seems most likely that religious mobility would be able to explain political 
mobility. I also showed that the religious mobility that we do find in the 
Netherlands is among those who change from being a church member to being a 
non-member. It would therefore be desirable to gain insight in the factors that 
influence whether or not an individual becomes disaffiliated. 
In this chapter I examine the process of leaving the church at the individual 
level. I will give an example to illustrate why it is important to study leaving the 
church at the individual level: when a similar number of people are church 
members at two points in time, this does not necessary imply that nobody has left 
the church. The number of Catholics in the Netherlands increased from 1947 to 
1960 but when we take into account the relatively high birth rate among Catholics, 
then we see that a great number of Catholics left the church (CBS, 1968). 
A number of studies have looked at the attributes of non-members and 
church members in the Netherlands (Doom & Bommeljé, 1983; Felling, Peters & 
Schreuder, 1986; Schepens, 1991; Becker & Vink, 1994a). In these studies 
disaffiliation is considered a fixed state; people are either church members or they 
are non-members. In this chapter I treat disaffiliation instead as a process; people 
who are church members can either stay church members or become non-members. 
The most recent and comprehensive study on disaffiliation in the 
Netherlands has been written by Becker and Vink (1994a). In the previous chapter 
I concluded that the decline in church membership can be related not only to the 
succession of generations but also to the fact that people, the young and old alike, 
tend to become less religious over time. In this chapter I specify these effects by 
using theoretically driven variables instead of just comparing certain birth cohorts 
or differences over time. The advantage of this approach is that it becomes clearer 
how to interpret the effects substantively. 
To explain differences in leaving the church, I draw upon theoretical 
explanations of disaffiliation. Unfortunately, existing research does not study the 
causal direction of this process. For example, Becker and Vink (1994a) claim that 
more educated people are more likely to be non-members than less educated 
people. However, they do not convincingly argue that more education causes 
disaffiliation. Perhaps religious people leave school early2. 
In this chapter I try to disentangle the mechanisms that cause people to 
leave the church. When one only investigates whether the more educated are more 
likely to be non-members than the less educated, one does not properly take into 
account the process of leaving the church. Better educated people may leave the 
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church before completing their education. This would mean that education affects 
disaffiliation through the context it provides rather than, for instance, through 
greater enlightenment due to greater knowledge. Thus, it is necessary to obtain 
information about the whole educational career of a person and about the timing 
of his or her leaving the church. I am able to model the order of causation by 
using a dynamic approach that investigates the influence of various individual 
attributes on the likelihood that a person will leave the church. This brings me to 
the main question of this chapter: 
2. Which individual and structural characteristics cause people to leave the 
church in the Netherlands? 
Using a dynamic approach, I test specific hypotheses derived from previous 
studies3. Almost all studies on disaffiliation ignore the fact that the likelihood of 
a person leaving the church may not be the same for each age group. To be able 
to establish a causal effect of several life-cycle characteristics - like the presence 
and religious denomination of a spouse - on the likelihood that a person will leave 
the church, it is important to determine that these factors precede the event of 
leaving the church. For instance, Schepens investigated how having a spouse, and 
a person's educational level and job situation affected his or her likelihood of 
having left the church. He measured all these attributes at the time of the interview 
(Schepens, 1991). However, as Table 4.1 shows us, in many occasions people 
leave the church before they meet their spouse, before they complete their 
education, and before they find a job. It is thus crucial to examine these 
characteristics at the time of leaving the church. 
Table 4.1 Percentage of disaffiliated people living with a spouse, who finish their education, start their first 
¡ob and start IMng wHh their present spouse before and after they have left the church (N*175) 
stHrt living 
highest education start first with present 
completed Job spouse 
before leaving 
the church 48 59 Э1 
after leaving 
the church 52 41 69 
Source: Family-survey, own calculations. 
Static approaches are not able to model the causal order and can therefore lead to 
incorrect conclusions. Following Sherkat (1991) who used a dynamic approach to 
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study religious switching in the United States, I will in this chapter improve upon 
earlier research by analyzing life-event data using an event history model. Using 
this more appropriate model, I test hypotheses based on earlier studies. Moreover, 
I explain differences between periods and between cohorts with specific theoretical 
hypotheses. 
This chapter has the following outline. In the following section I discuss 
theories and research findings regarding disaffiliation. Section three describes the 
data and the research method I use to test my hypotheses. In section four I present 
the results of my analyses. Then in the final section I discuss these results. 
4.2 Theories on religious mobility 
A great deal has been written on the reasons that people in the Netherlands leave 
the church (Faber & Ten Have, 1970; Doom & Bommeljé, 1983; Felling, Peters 
& Schleuder, 1986; Stoffels & Dekker, 1987; Schepens, 1991; Becker & Vink, 
1994a; and for the United States on religious switching Hadaway, 1978; Kluegel, 
1980; Greeley & Hout, 1988; Sherkat, 1991). Researchers generally distinguish two 
types of factors to explain why people do or do not leave the church. The first type 
emphasizes the importance of modernization. The second stresses the relevance of 
integration and socialization into a religious community. I review both approaches 
and derive hypotheses that I test in the analyses that follow. 
Modernization hypothesis predicts that a higher level of education increases 
the likelihood that religious people will leave the church (Inglehart, 1977; Peters, 
1993). In advanced industrialized societies, with their increasing educational levels, 
a mechanistic world view becomes more plausible. In addition, more educated 
people tend to develop more liberal norms than do less educated people. 
Consequently, more educated people are more likely to leave the church. Previous 
research has repeatedly shown that people with more education are more likely to 
be non-members than people with less education (Doom & Bommeljé, 1983; 
Felling, Peters & Schreuder, 1991). Schepens (1991) has examined people who left 
the church specifically. He has shown that more educated people are more likely 
to leave the church during their lives. 
We might also expect that parental education influences the likelihood that 
a person will leave the church. More educated parents are less successful in 
transmitting their religious norms to the next generation than are less educated 
parents because their liberal attitude makes them less motivated (Schepens, 1991). 
More educated parents are also more likely to give their children alternative 
information. I therefore expect people with more educated parents to have a greater 
likelihood of leaving the church than people with less educated parents. 
The integration or socialization perspective (Durkheim, 1960; cf. Ultee, 
Arts & Flap, 1992) predicts that people who are strongly integrated into their 
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social group are more likely to obey the norms of mis group than are people who 
are weakly integrated. A key indicator of religious integration is the religious 
homogeneity of a person's environment. To determine the extent to which a 
person's social environment during his or her childhood should be regarded as 
homogeneous, one should also look at whether or not his or her parents were 
religiously homogamous, that is whether or not they have the same religious 
denomination. I expect that people with religiously heterogeneous parents are more 
likely to leave the church than individuals with religiously homogeneous parents. 
Previous research supports this hypothesis. Faber and Ten Have (1970) found the 
following distribution 12% of the children of religious homogeneous parents have 
left the church, among the children of religiously heterogeneous parents 30% 
(when both parents church members) and 64% (when only one of the parents is 
a church member). 
Whether or not a person's spouse is religious will also strongly affect his 
or her religious integration. Using a similar reasoning than I have used previously 
I hypothesize that having a non-religious spouse rather than a religious one results 
in a greater likelihood that a person will leave the church. 
Integration in a religious community is also determined by whether or not 
a person frequently attended religious services during childhood. Church attendance 
as a child indicates the strength of religious socialization. This religious 
socialization has an independent effect on the likelihood of leaving the church. 
Religious denominations differ in the strictness of their religious tenets. This 
will lead them to differ also in their ability to retain members. Becker and Vink 
(1994a: 112) have developed measures to asses the degree of orthodoxy and 
tolerance of religious denominations. They showed that Catholics are the most 
tolerant and the least orthodox, while the reverse holds true for the Orthodox 
Protestants. We can expect Orthodox Protestant to have the lowest likelihood of 
leaving the church and Catholics to have the highest likelihood. Schepens (1991) 
expected that Catholics and Protestants would be more likely than Orthodox 
Protestants to leave their church. He demonstrated that Protestants indeed are more 
likely to leave the church than are Orthodox Protestants. But Protestants are not 
more likely to leave the church than are Catholics. He distinguishes between 
Catholics who live in the north and Catholics who live in the south of the 
Netherlands. He concludes that while Catholics in general are more inclined to 
leave the church than are Orthodox Protestants, this is not the case for Catholics 
in the southern part of the country. 
Macro context: The number of non-members in the province in which one lives 
When an increasing number of people leave the church, this ultimately leads to a 
decrease in the percentage of people who are church members. The church as an 
institution will become less significant and this might accelerate the process of 
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disaffiliation. This change on the societal level might also influence behavior on 
the individual level. If one lives in a society in which almost everyone is religious, 
one is less likely to leave the church than when one lives in a society where there 
are only a few religious people. A changing social context will therefore have an 
impact on the likelihood that individuals will leave the church. This fact suggests 
that secularization is a self-reinforcing process. 
Middendorp (1991) has shown that major changes in Dutch society have 
taken place since the 1960's. He assumes that these changes influence the 
generations differently. He argued that people bom before 1950 were raised in a 
different climate than were people bom after 1950. As a consequence, those bom 
before and those bom after 1950 differ in the likelihood that they will leave the 
church. In this chapter I distinguish between two different context effects. 
A first context is based on the expectation that when there are many non-
members in one's surroundings during adolescence this increases the likelihood 
that one will leave the church at a later point in time. An alternative hypothesis 
predicts being surrounded by many non-members at any moment in one's life-
cycle increases the likelihood that one will leave the church at that moment. Thus, 
the first interpretation predicts that living in a more secularized society as an 
adolescent increases the likelihood that one will leave the church at a later point 
in time. The second interpretation predicts that the more secular one's current 
social context is the greater the likelihood is that one will leave the church at that 
moment. 
4.3. Data and method 
To test my hypotheses I made use of the Family Survey of the Dutch Population 
(Ultee & Ganzeboom, 1993). This survey was conducted among a representative 
cross-section of Dutch adult population. Retrospective data regarding several life-
events - including religious and educational careers - as well as data regarding 
demographic characteristics were collected from 1000 respondents and, when 
present, their spouses. 
I restricted my analyses to people with religious parents only, since people 
whose parents are not church members can not leave the church. Furthermore, I 
selected from the data those respondents who had a valid score on all relevant 
variables. Six hundred and twenty one of the original 1000 respondents remained 
after my selection. Of these 621 respondents 175 had left the church. 
To test my hypotheses I created a so-called person-period data file. This file 
contains a record for each year of the selected respondents' life between the age 
of 10 and the moment when they leave the church. If a person has not left the 
church, I kept a record for each year up until the moment of interview. This 
procedure resulted in 17.204 records. Each record contains information for a given 
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year on: whether a person still was a church member or had just left the church; 
the percentage of the population in the province in which the respondent lived who 
were non-religious in that specific year; whether this person had a spouse during 
that year, and if so, whether this spouse was religious; the educational level of the 
respondent at that moment or, if the respondent was not enroled in an education, 
the highest level of education he or she completed. Each record also contains 
information on other, time-invariant variables such as the religious denomination 
in which the respondent was raised. The time-invariant variables are the same for 
every record of a given respondent. 
In Table 4.1 I showed that to model the causation of certain attributes, one 
must know the exact time when people leave the church. I measured the age of 
leaving the church with the following question: 'At what age did you change 
religious denomination? Or when did you first consider yourself as not belonging 
to a religious denomination?'. I only included in the analysis those people whose 
parents were religious, and if they were not a church member at the time of the 
interview they had to be able to indicate the age at which they left the church. 
For every year in a respondent's life, I measured the educational level on 
an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (did not finish primary school) to 10 (completed 
a dissertation)4. Hence I treat education as a covariate that changes over time, as 
a so-called 'time varying co-variate'. In other words, for every year in the 
respondent's life, I coded not the educational level he or she ultimately completed, 
but rather his or her educational level at that particular point in time. I measured 
a respondent's parental education by asking for the highest level of education that 
either of the parents had completed. 
I also included one dichotomous variable that indicates whether both parents 
belonged to the same religious denomination and one dummy variable that 
indicates whether both parents were church members but belonged to different 
religious denominations. People with parents who are both member of the same 
church constitute the reference category. I constructed two dummy variables to 
indicate the church membership of a respondent's spouse. One dummy variable 
indicates whether or not the respondent is living with a spouse. Another variable 
indicates whether or not the spouse is a church member. People with a religious 
spouse constitute the reference category. These dummy variables are time-varying 
covariates. Up until the age that a person lives with a spouse he or she gets the 
value 1 on the dichotomous variable 'no spouse'. After this age he or she gets the 
value of 0 for this variable. If the spouse is a church member, the value for the 
dichotomous variable 'spouse church member' is a 1.1 obtained the information 
about the church membership and age of leaving the church for the spouse directly 
from that spouse who was also interviewed. 
I also constructed a dichotomous variable to indicate how frequently a 
person's parents attended church when the respondent was 15 years old. The two 
categories for this variable were once a week or more and less than once a month. 
53 
THE KINDRED VOTE 
I divided religious denomination into three categories: Catholic, Protestant and 
Orthodox Protestant. I used the Orthodox Protestant group as a reference category. 
I constructed the following macro-indicators of the level of secularization. 
I took the percentage of the Dutch population who were not church members as 
an indicator for the level of secularization. I obtained this information through the 
following procedure: using census data to obtain the percentage of non-members 
for 1930, 1947 and 1960, I interpolated the percentage of non-members for the 
years between 1930 and 1960. For the years between 1962 and 19921 used weekly 
surveys which provided the necessary information5. 
The Dutch provinces differ substantially in the percentage of people who 
are not church members. For instance, during the 1960's less than 1% of the 
population in the southern provinces was not member of a church, whereas this 
was the case for more than 60% of the population in the northern provinces. To 
achieve a more accurate measure of the percentage of non-members in the region 
where the respondent was bom, I weighted the percentage of non-members on the 
basis of national figures. To have a measure of the differences between the 
provinces in the percentage of non-members, I weighted the percentage of non-
members on the basis of their ratio's at the census data. For the years between 
1962 and 1992 the percentage of non-members was weighted on basis of their 
ratio's at the annual surveys. 
To capture the level of secularization in childhood I gave each respondent 
a score on the variable secularization. This variable indicates the percentage of 
non-members in the province in which the respondent was born when this 
respondent was 15 years old. I would have preferred to use data on the provinces 
in which the respondents lived throughout their lives. However, this information 
was not available in the survey. To capture the level of secularization in society, 
I gave each respondent a different score on the secularization variable for each 
year in the person-period data file. 
On the basis of earlier studies, I hypothesized that several attributes might 
be able to explain whether or not a person would leave the church. To test these 
hypotheses I made use of event history analysis. Event history analysis can be used 
to study individual life events such as marriages, divorces, becoming unemployed, 
finding a job, or leaving the church. One major advantage of event history models 
is that they can take into account censored observations (Yamaguchi, 1991: 3). An 
observation is censored, for instance, if someone has not left the church by the 
time of the survey. Because we do not know whether, and if so when, this 
respondent will leave the church, we have no value for the age of leaving the 
church, even though we do have information about how long the respondent was 
a church member, up until the time of the survey. Event history analysis can deal 
adequately with these censored observations, given that the timing of the interview 
is independent from the likelihood to leave the church. When cross-sectional 
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surveys are used this condition is fulfilled (Yamaguchi, 1991). Another relevant 
advantage of a dynamic approach is that one can model more convincingly the 
exact causation involved in the process of leaving the church. 
Several types of models can be distinguished within the class of event 
history models. One major distinction is between discrete-time and continuous-time 
models. One can use discrete-time models when the time unit has been measured 
relatively crudely measured, as is the case in my study since I measure time in 
years. Given that I know only the year of leaving the church, I use a discrete-time 
model. 
Event history analysis models hazard rates. A hazard rate, h(r), expresses 
the conditional probability that a person will leave the church at time t, given that 
he or she is still a church member at time t. The hazard rate has the following 
function: 
h(t) = P(T = t,\ Ti f,) (1) 
In the discrete-time logit model I model the odds of the conditional probabilities. 
The following function expresses this model: 
In ( hW ) = η + У\ bkXb (2) 
1 - h(t) ' ¿* k b 
In formula 2, a, is the baseline hazard function for an individual with covariate 
vector X=0. The parameters bk indicate the effect of covariate Xta on the odds that 
a person will make the transition from being a church member to being a non-
member. Equation (2) can be estimated by using logistic regression on a person-
period file. 
4.4. Findings 
Before I present the results of the event history analysis, I first show how leaving 
the church is related to other factors on the basis of the regular data file in which 
the cases are represented by the respondents. In Table 4.2,1 present the percentage 
of people who have left the church by parental education, parental religious 
homogamy, frequency of parental church attendance and religious denomination.6 
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Table 4.2 Percentage leaving the church In different groups (N=621) 
CHARACTERISTIC PERCENTAGE LEAVING THE CHURCH 
PARENTAL EDUCATION 
LO- (less than primary education) 
LO (priman/ education) 
LBO (pre-vocabonal education) 
MAVO Quntor general secondary education) 
MBO (senior secondary vocational education) 
HAVO (senior general secondary education) 
VWO (pre-university education) 
HBO (higher professional education) 
WO (university) 
WO+ (Phd-level) 
PARENTAL RELIGIOUS HOUOGAMY 
not homogamous' one parent not church member 
not homogamous: parents member of different churches 
homogamous 
FREQUENCY OF PARENTAL CHURCH ATTENDANCE 
less than once a week 
once a week or more 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Orthodox Protestant 
Average 
15 
24 
25 
29 
33 
64 
19 
55 
38 
29 
46 
35 
27 
36 
25 
23 
37 
43 
28 
Total 
33 
233 
143 
59 
52 
11 
26 
44 
13 
7 
24 
40 
557 
187 
434 
424 
146 
51 
621 
Source: Family-survey, own calculations. 
Inspection of Table 4.2 shows that the different groups do indeed differ in 
the likelihood that one of them will leave the church. On average, 28% of the 
respondents have left the church. People whose parents had the lowest level of 
education are most likely to stick to their religion; only about 20% of them leave 
the church. People with more educated parents are more likely to become 
disaffiliated than are people with less educated parents. At first sight, it appears 
that only very few people with parents educated at the 'VWO' level leave the 
church. One must note, however, that this percentage is based on a small number 
of cases. 
Having parents who are religiously homogamous also influences the 
likelihood that a person will leave the church. Children of parents who are 
religiously heterogeneous are more likely to leave the church: 46% of those who 
have one non-affiliated parent leave the church, and 35% of those whose parents 
have different church affiliations leave the church. Only 27% of those with 
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religiously homogamous parents leave the church. Table 4.2 makes clear that the 
vast majority of parents are married to a person who shares their religion. 
Table 4.2 also shows that if a respondent's parents attended religious 
services once a week or more when the respondent was 15 years old, the 
likelihood that he or she will leave the church is lower than for a respondent 
whose parents attended services less frequently. Religious denominations differ in 
their ability to retain their members. The Catholic Church is the most successful 
in this respect and the Orthodox Protestant Church is the least successful. 
However, only 51 respondents in this selection belong to the Orthodox Protestant 
denominations. Thus, it will be difficult for me to find significant differences in 
disaffiliation between the religious denominations. 
Table 4.2 showed us that different groups have different rates of 
disaffiliation. However, up until this point, I did not consider the fact that people 
tend to leave their church when they are relatively young. In Table 4.3, I cross-
classify the number of people who have left the church by the age at which they 
did so. This distribution clearly shows that people tend to leave the church when 
they are in their late teens and early twenties. As they get older, it becomes 
increasingly unlikely that they will leave the church. 
ТаЫе 4.3 Age of leaving for those who left the church (N=175) 
PERCENTAGE LEAVING THE CHURCH 
Ttöl 
younger than 12 2.9 
13-14 2.9 
15-16 12.6 
17-18 17.1 
19-20 21.7 
21-22 8.0 
23-24 8.6 
25-26 9.7 
27-28 4.0 
29-30 3.4 
31-34 1.7 
35-39 2.9 
40-49 2.3 
over 50 2.3 
Source: Family-survey, own calculations. 
Table 4.4 presents the results of an event history analysis. It shows how a number 
of different factors affect the probability of leaving the church. In this analysis I 
coded education and parental education slightly differently than in Table 4.3. 
Preliminary analyses showed that both a person's own and parental education had 
non-linear effects. When a person or his or her parents obtained a level of 
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education that was higher than senior general secondary education (HAVO), this 
no longer increased the likelihood that that person would leave the church. That 
is why I gave all educational levels that were 'HAVO' or above the same score. 
I do not present interaction effects between age and socialization because none of 
these effects proved to be significant. 
The first column of Table 4.3 contains the parameter estimates. The second 
column contains the exponents of these parameter estimates. These exponents can 
be interpreted as odds-ratio's. The third column shows the significance of these 
effects. Comparing this model with a model that has only a constant gives a χ2 of 
232 with 24 degrees of freedom. This shows that in general the effects are 
significant. 
A first significant effect (i.e. ρ < .05) in Table 4.4 is that of a person's own 
education. The higher one's education is (until HAVO), the greater is the 
likelihood that one will leave the church. This result corroborates Schepens' (1991) 
earlier results. Parental education does not have a significant independent impact 
on the likelihood that a person will leave the church. However, this effect borders 
on significance. 
Having parents who are religiously heterogeneous also increases the 
likelihood that a person will leave the church. However, given the large standard 
errors these effects are not significant. I assumed that cohabitating with a spouse 
who is church member rather than a non-member would lower the likelihood that 
a person would leave the church. The parameter estimates in Table 4.4 support this 
hypothesis. A person who is not living with a partner is just as likely to leave the 
church as a person who lives with a religious spouse. However, compared to 
people with a religious spouse, people with a non-religious spouse are significantly 
more likely to leave the church. Table 4.4 shows that people whose parents 
attended religious services frequently when the respondent was 15 years old are 
not significantly more likely to leave the church than people whose parents did not 
attend frequently during childhood. 
Table 4.4 shows that Catholics are significantly less likely to leave the 
church than are Orthodox Protestants. There are no differences in disaffiliation 
between Protestants and Orthodox Protestants. Later on in this chapter I present 
the results of a significance test of the variation in disaffiliation between the 
religious denominations. 
Table 4.4 also allows us to examine the context effects. We see that 
growing up in a more secular society during childhood does not have a significant 
effect. However, living in a society that is more secular does indeed influence the 
likelihood that a person will leave the church at that moment.7 Finally, I examined 
the effects of age groups8. The parameter estimates for the different age groups 
indicate life-cycle effects. All parameter estimates are negative. This indicates that 
the reference category, which is the age group 19 through 
58 
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
ТаЫ 4.4 Event history analysis: likelihood that a person wiB leave the church (N=17204; model χ'=232; 24 degrees 
ot freedom) 
effect on leaving the church (B) Exp (B) Significance 
EDUCATION 
PARENTAL EDUCATION 
PARENTAL RELIGIOUS HOMOOAHY 
not homogamous: one parent not church member 
not homogamous: parents member of different churches 
homogamous (ref) 
0.14 
0,09 
0,31 
0,15 
1.15 
1,09 
1,36 
1,16 
0,04 
0,09 
0,35 
0,62 
CHURCH MEMBERSHIP SPOUSE 
no spouse 
spouse not church member 
spouse church member (ref) 
0,31 
1,82 
1,37 
6,16 
0,25 
0,00 
FREQUENCY OF PARENTAL CHURCH ATTENDANCE 
less than once a week 
once a week or more (ref) 
-0,05 0,95 0,73 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION 
Catholic 
Protestant 
orthodox Protestant (ref) 
PERCENTAGE NON-MEMBERS IN PROVINCE AT AGE 15 
CURRENT PERCENTAGE NON-MEMBERS IN PROVINCE 
A G E 
younger than 12 
13-14 
15-16 
17-18 
19-20 (ref) 
21-22 
23-24 
25-26 
27-28 
29-30 
31-34 
35-39 
40-49 
over 50 
-0,58 
-0,19 
-0,03 
0,06 
-2,09 
-1,95 
-0,50 
-0,25 
-1,06 
-1,00 
-0,86 
-1,75 
-1,89 
-3,24 
-2,87 
-3,42 
-2,83 
0,56 
0,83 
0,97 
1,06 
0,12 
0,14 
0,61 
0,78 
0,35 
0,37 
0,42 
0,17 
0,15 
0,04 
0,06 
0,03 
0,06 
0,02 
0,47 
0,13 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,07 
0,31 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Source: Family-survey, own calculations. 
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20, is most likely to leave the church. Hence we see that leaving the church is a 
phenomenon that typically occurs during early adulthood. 
As noted above, a χ2 test indicates that the difference between this model 
and a model that has only a constant is significant. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that all variables included in the model are significant. I checked 
whether the fit of the model worsened significantly when I excluded one or a 
group of variables from the equation. 
Table 4.5 shows the change in χ2 that takes place when one drops each 
term from the model. Table 4.5 shows that five variables meet the significance 
criterion of .05. A person's age, education, religious denomination, the church 
membership of his or her spouse, and the percentage of non-members in the 
province in which he or she lives all significantly affect the likelihood that that 
person will leave the church. Contrary to what is commonly believed, the 
education and religious homogamy of a person's parents do not affect the 
likelihood that that person will leave the church. 
Table 4.5 Significance event history analysis: likelihood to leave the church (N= 17204) 
Chi2 
4,40 
2.75 
0,98 
26,4 
0,12 
8,04 
2,27 
13,9 
107,5 
degree ot 
freedom 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
13 
ChiVdegree 
of freedom 
4,50 
2.75 
0,49 
13,2 
0,12 
4,02 
2,27 
13,9 
8,27 
ρ < 0.05 
Ρ «ooi 
Source: Family-survey, own calculations. 
EDUCATION 
PARENTAL EDUCATION 
PARENTAL RELIGIOUS HOHOGAMY 
CHURCH MEMBERSHIP SPOUSE" 
FREQUENCY OF PARENTAL CHURCH ATTENDANCE 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION* 
PERCENTAGE NON-MEMBERS m PROVINCE AT AGE 15 
CURRENT PERCENTAGE NON-MEMBERS m PROVINCE" 
A G E " 
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4.5 Discussion 
In this chapter I treated leaving the church as a dynamic process. By using a 
discrete-time event history model to estimate the conditional likelihood of leaving 
the church, I was able to ascertain the effects of individual attributes (education, 
parental education, parental religious homogamy, religious homogamy, frequency 
of parental church attendance during childhood, and religious denomination) and 
contextual characteristics (the percentage non-members in the province in which 
one lives and the percentage non-members in the province when one was 15 years 
old). I gained more insight into the process of disaffiliation by using substantive 
variables to estimate the effects of growing up in certain circumstances and the 
effects of the time in which one lives. 
I found that individual attributes have the following effects. A person's 
current education has a significant impact. More education leads to a higher 
probability that a person will leave the church. Moreover, I found that education 
has a non-linear effect9. Having obtained an educational level higher than 'HAVO' 
(senior general secondary education) does not further increase the likelihood that 
one will leave the church. An interesting consequence of this non-linear effect of 
education is that if educational expansion only increases the proportion of the 
population with a university degree but does not increase the proportion of the 
population with more than a HAVO-degree, this will not affect the process of 
disaffiliation. 
I found that the church membership of a person's spouse has an 
independent effect on the likelihood that that person will leave the church. This 
result supports Schepens' (1991) research. A question not taken into account by 
Schepens (1991) is whether or not the person was married or cohabitating before 
leaving the church. Schepens (1991) also shows that people who have a church 
affiliated spouse are less likely to leave the church than people who have no 
spouse. This last finding is not supported by my data. Furthermore, he finds that 
people who attended religious services frequently during childhood are less likely 
to leave the church than are people who did attend these meetings regularly. I did 
not find this effect to be significant. However, I used a slightly different 
operationalization. Rather than looking at a person's own church attendance during 
adolescence, I looked at his or her parents' church attendance during that same 
period. I concluded that Catholics are less inclined than are Orthodox Protestants 
to leave the church. This finding supports those of Schepens (1991) partially. He 
demonstrated that Catholics are more inclined to leave the church than are 
Protestants. He also found that this relationship does not pertain to Catholics in the 
southern part of the country. Hak (1995) argued that my findings might have been 
caused by an oversampling of the southern part of the Netherlands. However, this 
is not the case. First of all, 50% of the Catholics in my analysis were bom in the 
northern part of the country. Second, I controlled for differences between regions 
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of birth. I did so by including as an independent variable in the analysis the 
percentage of non-members in the province in which one was bom. 
Becker and Vink (1994a) argued that youngsters are less often church 
members than are the elderly. My analyses show that people tend to leave the 
church when they are between IS and 20 years old, regardless of the period in 
which they live. A question that is beyond the scope of this chapter is why people 
are most likely to leave the church at this stage of their life-cycle. It seems that 
there are life-cycle effects for which I do not have adequate measures. 
Interestingly, people are most likely to leave the church when they are 19 or 20 
years old (see Table 4.4). The most obvious explanation for this is that young 
people tend to leave the parental home in the Netherlands at that age. Leaving the 
parental home means not only that the influence of the parents decreases but also 
that other people appear in one's social network (Currie, Gilbert & Horsley, 1977). 
I also tested whether there are contextual effects that affect the likelihood 
that a person will leave the church. I formulated hypotheses with respect to 
possible cohort- and period effects. To improve upon earlier studies (Peters, 1993; 
Becker & Vink, 1994a), I not only compared different birth-cohorts but also 
formulated specific hypotheses (cf. Blossfeld, 1986; De Graaf, 1988; De Graaf & 
Luijkx, 1992). My first hypothesis regarding social context posits that the more 
secular the environment is in which one is socialized, the greater is the probability 
that one will leave the church. This hypothesis is not confirmed. 
Finally, I tested whether the level of secularization in a person's current 
environment affects the likelihood that he or she will leave the church. My results 
suggest that secularization in general does indeed have an effect. At any moment 
in time, the greater the percentage of non-members in the province in which one 
lives, the greater is the probability that a person will leave the church. As a 
consequence, disaffiliation will reinforce the likelihood that other persons become 
disaffiliated. Secularization thus seems to be a self-reinforcing process. 
In this chapter I predicted on the basis of modernization and integration or 
socialization theory how certain factors affect whether or not people will leave the 
church. The results do not give preference to one theory over the other. Both 
theoretical perspectives lead to predictions that hold true. One important finding 
with regard to integration theory is that the church membership of a person's 
spouse is an important predictor of the probability that that person will leave the 
church. My result underscores once again the importance of using a dynamic 
approach. It is, after all, rather crucial to know, first, whether a person had a 
spouse prior to leaving the church, and second, whether this spouse was a church 
member. 
In this study I focus on how social and religious mobility affect political 
mobility in the Netherlands. In the next chapter I examine whether or not the 
religion according to which one was raised affects what political party a person 
chooses during elections. 
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Notes chapter 4 
1. Part of this chapter is based on an article published in the European Sociological 
Review (Need & De Graaf, 1996a). A Dutch version of this article was published in 
Mens & Maatschappij (Need & De Graaf, 1994). 
2. In fact, the authors claim to make no assumptions about causality in their analysis (c.f. 
Becker and Vink, 1994b). This is rather awkward considering that their book contains 
a full chapter on the explanation of secularization. 
3. Unlike the American custom (cf. Sherkat, 1991; Sullins, 1993) I do not discus 
religious switching. The reason for this is that changing denominations is extremely 
rare in the Netherlands (Dekker, 1987: Schepens, 1991). 
4. The exact codings are in English and Dutch: (1) Did not finish primary education: LO-
; (2) Primary education: LO; (3) Pre-vocational training: LBO; (4) Junior general 
secondary education: MAVO; (5) Senior secondary vocational education: MBO; (6) 
Senior general secondary education: HAVO; (7) Pre-university education: VWO; (8) 
Higher professional education: HBO; (9) University: WO; (10) PHD-level: WO+. 
5. These data are documented in: Eisinga & Felling (1992). The weekly surveys have 
been aggregated to obtain yearly measures. To obtain the percentage of non-members 
in 1961, 1963 and 1968,1 performed a regression analysis on the basis of the data 
between 1952 and 1972.1 would like to thank Rob Eisinga who was so kind to 
provide me with the figures from the weekly NIPO-surveys. 
The survey asks with which Christian church one is affiliated. Therefore, persons 
belonging to a non-christian denomination have been excluded, which might affect the 
results. However, since traditionally very few people have non-christian denominations 
in the Netherlands, their exclusion will only affect the results slightly. 
6. In Table 4.2 I cannot include time varying covariates (like the respondent's education 
and the denomination of his or her partner) nor continuous variables (like the 
percentage of non-members in a province). 
7. In an earlier analysis (Need & De Graaf, 1994) I tested for a contextual effect of 
secularization as well as for a contextual effect of modernization. In that analysis, 
however, I did not have a measure of secularization for each province. The measure of 
secularization for each province I use in this analysis is a more accurate measure and 
gives more variation within years than a measure of secularization for the whole 
country. The inclusion of the level of secularisation and the level of modernization, as 
well as the inclusion of indicators of cohort effects caused problems of multi-
collinearity. Separate analyses showed that the effect of secularization is stronger than 
the effect of modernization. 
8. I added age groups to the analysis because the groups do not differ much in their 
likelihood of leaving the church. Adding them to the analysis did result in a gain of 
degrees of freedom. 
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9. Interestingly, when I analyze the data in a non-dynamic way I encounter a linear 
relationship between education and the likelihood of leaving the church. 
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CHAPTER S 
THE EFFECT OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS MOBILITY ON 
POLITICAL MOBILITY 
In chapter 3 I described the amount of intergenerational political, social and 
religious mobility in the Netherlands. I showed that, on average, 57% of the 
respondents had political preferences that were similar to those of their parents. 
There has been an increase in political mobility over time. Since the change in 
social mobility was much smaller than the change in religious mobility, I argued 
that religious mobility would be the factor most likely to explain political mobility. 
The kind of religious mobility most typical for the Netherlands was that of people 
leaving the church. One hardly finds people switching from one religious 
denomination to another, or becoming religious when they started off as non-
religious. To gain more insight into the causes of disaffiliation, I examined in 
chapter 4 the factors that lead people to leave the church in the Netherlands. 
In this chapter I examine the extent to which patters in political mobility 
in the Netherlands can be explained by social and religious mobility. In chapter 2, 
I argued that voters do not vote according to the promises political parties make 
about the future, but rather according to the records political parties have built up 
in the past. People obtain information about these records from those who have 
experienced the consequences of the policies that political parties enacted. Among 
those who inform voters about politics are their parents. Parents transmit not only 
interests - which we see when there is no intergenerational social and religious 
mobility - but also information about the performances of political parties in the 
past. Moreover, in discussions parents validate new information about politics. In 
this chapter, I test whether the social class, religious denomination and voting 
behavior of a person's parents influence his or her voting decisions. I look for 
effects of these parental attributes that are independent from a person's own 
religious denomination and social class. 
5.1 The effect of intergenerational social and religious mobility on political 
mobility 
I aim to explain peoples voting behavior by examining not only their own 
characteristics but also characteristics of their parents. In Part 2 of this study I 
concentrate on a person's past experiences with regard to his or her parents. Voters 
obtain information as a byproduct of social contact, since they do not invest as 
much time in gathering information about political activities as they do in 
gathering information about consumer choices. Therefore one can expect that 
parents will influence their children's voting behavior. Not only do they transmit 
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interests - which occurs when there is no intergenerational social and religious 
mobility - but they also exchange information with their children about politics. 
From previous research (Andeweg, 1982; Van derEijk & Niemöller, 1983b; 
Nieuwbeerta, 1995) we know that political preferences depend not only on a 
person's own social class but also on the social class of his or her parents. 
However, in the Netherlands religious denomination is, and always has been, more 
important than social class in determining a person's political preferences. In this 
chapter I examine the independent effect of a person's own social class position 
and religious denomination, and the independent effect of parental vote, parental 
social class and parental religious denomination on voting behavior. 
I am assuming that parents, as well as their children, vote according to their 
interests. Hence, both parental social class and parental religious denomination will 
affect the parental vote. To determine whether parental social class, parental 
religious denomination and parental vote directly affect a person's vote, I first 
estimate simple multivariate models. In a later stage I include additional variables. 
My third question is the following: 
3. To what extent does the relationship between the political preferences of 
parents and the political preferences of their children remain if we control 
for intergenerational social and intergenerational religious mobility? 
I test predictions derived from the theory of the reasoning voter somewhat 
differently than one might expect when looking at the figures in chapter 2. First, 
I establish the total effect of parental religious denomination and of parental class 
on voting behavior. Second, I determine the extent to which these effects are 
mediated by parental political preferences. If some mediation takes place and 
parental political preferences have an effect of their own, this suggests that parents 
transmit information to their children. Third, I test whether the effect of parental 
vote can be attributed to the fact that parents transmit interests to their children. 
If we find that parental vote has a significant impact on a person's voting behavior, 
independently from the effect of parental social class, parental religious 
denomination, own social class and own religious denomination, this indicates that 
parents transmit not only interests to their children but also information about 
politics. When I argue that parents transmit interests, I derive this argument from 
the finding that parents transmit their social class and religious denomination to 
their children. The additional assumption I make here is that social classes and 
religious groups have interests. 
To answer the research question of this chapter, I used the pooled data-set 
that I described in chapter 3. In the following section I describe the research 
method, multinomial logistic regression analysis, and its advantage for my 
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purposes. In section four I present the results of my analyses, which I discuss 
further in the last section. 
5.2 Method 
In chapter 3 I described in detail the pooled data-set which covers the period from 
1970 to 1994. Because the analyses I perform in this chapter concern parental 
political preferences, I use the smaller data set which consists of 3608 cases. 
In the research question that I formulated in the previous section I assume 
that political preferences depend on parental political preferences, a person's own 
social class, parental social class, a person's own religious denomination and 
parental religious denomination. Since older people and men are generally more 
conservative (see for instance Van Holsteyn & Irwin, 1992), I included age and 
gender as covariates in the analysis. To control for the political climate in a certain 
year, I also included a covariate that represents the year in which the survey was 
conducted. I would have preferred to include the year of birth in the analysis as 
well. However, estimating this effect would lead to severe multicollinearity. Thus, 
while my pooled data-set should enable one to separate the effects of a person's 
age, the cohort to which a person belongs and the period in which an election took 
place, it is in fact not powerful enough. 
To overcome this problem, I included the same contextual variables that I 
discussed in the previous chapter. However, including these contextual 
characteristics in the analysis in this chapter leads to problems of multicollinearity. 
Clearly, there is not enough power to estimate the effects of age, period and 
cohort. On the basis of the findings in chapter 41 decided which variables to leave 
out of the analysis in order to avoid multicollinearity. Since I found that age and 
period affect the likelihood that a person will leave the church, but that cohort does 
not have such an effect, I decided to focus on the first two effects when examining 
the political consequences of leaving the church in this chapter. Thus, in this 
chapter I leave year of birth out of the analysis and I only interpret age and period 
effects. 
Researchers usually measure voting behavior in the Netherlands on a left-
right scale (see for instance De Graaf & Ultee, 1987; Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 
1987; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf, 1993). However, some claim that Dutch political 
parties can be organized not only in terms of a difference between left and right, 
but also in terms of a difference between libertarian and authoritarian. When one 
recognizes the libertarian-authoritarian dimension, one can distinguish between 
confessional parties and non-confessional parties (Middendorp 1979,1991; Felling 
& Peters, 1984). To examine how both social class and religion shape voting 
behavior, I fmd it useful to categorize political parties not only in terms of a left-
right dimension but also in terms of a confessional-secular dimension. To do so, 
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I categorized the different parties in the Netherlands into three groups: (1) left-
wing parties; (2) right-wing parties; and (3) confessional parties. 
Since my dependent variable is categorical, a multinomial logistic 
regression (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989) is the best model to examine the effect of 
a person's own characteristics and the effect of characteristics of his or her parents. 
In other words, I estimated the likelihood that a person would vote for a left-wing, 
a right-wing or a confessional party, given the year of survey, his or her age, 
gender, the political preferences of his or her parents, social class, the social class 
of his or her parents, religious denomination and religious denomination of his or 
her parents. To estimate the parameters of this model, I used the SPSS procedure 
COXREG (cf. Lammers, Pelzer & Hendrickx, 1996). 
5.3 Findings 
I start the analysis by describing the voting behavior of different social groups. 
Table 5.1 presents the percentage of voters for left-wing, right-wing, and 
confessional political parties by gender, social class, parental social class, religious 
denomination, parental religious denomination, year of survey and parental vote. 
The table also shows the average age of voters for each category of political 
parties. 
Table 5.1 shows that indeed social groups differ in their voting behavior. 
On average, 34% of the respondents vote for a left-wing party, 30% vote for a 
right-wing party, and 36% vote for a confessional political party. As one might 
expect, manual workers are most likely to vote for a left-wing political party: about 
44% of skilled manual workers and 40% of unskilled manual workers vote for a 
left-wing political party. The self-employed (39%) and higher professionals (38%) 
favor right-wing political parties. Finally, more than 71% of all farmers vote for 
a confessional political party. 
Votes distributed by parental social class show a similar pattern as votes 
distributed by a person's own social class. As a rule, children of manual workers 
vote for a left-wing party, children of non-manual workers, higher professionals 
and the self-employed generally vote for a right-wing political party, and sons and 
daughters of fanners are very likely to vote for a confessional party. 
When examining the distribution of votes according to the different 
religious denominations, two particular facts are noteworthy. First, 7% of the non-
religious population vote for a confessional political party. Second, Orthodox 
Protestants (78%) vote overwhelmingly for a confessional party. We find a similar, 
though less pronounced, pattern when we look at the distribution of votes 
according to parental religious denomination. Less than 6% of those whose parents 
were non-religious vote for a confessional party, while nearly 64% of those with 
Orthodox Protestant parents do so. 
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Table 5.1: Percentage of voters for durèrent political parties by gender, sodai dass, parental sodai dass. тНдкше 
denomination and parental muoJous denomination (N*360B) 
AVERASEAOE 
Male 
Female 
PARENTAL SOCIAL CLAM 
Higher professionals 
Routine nonmanual 
Selt-emptoyed 
Sidled labor 
Unskilled labor 
Farmer 
PARENTAL REUOJOUS DENOHMATION 
Catholic 
Uberai Protestant 
Orthodo« Protestant 
No religious denomination 
PARENTAL von 
Lett-wing 
Right-wing 
Confessional 
SOCIAL CLASS 
Higher professionals 
Routine nonmanual 
Self-employed 
Skilled labor 
Unskilled labor 
Farmer 
REUOIOUS DENDWUTION 
Catholic 
Liberal Protestar« 
Orthodox Protestant 
Ho reUglous denomination 
YEAR or SURVEY 
1970 
1971 
1977 
1986 
1992 
1994 
Total 
32,4 
36.9 
32,1 
34.5 
24,3 
45,2 
43,8 
21,1 
28,1 
33,7 
19,1 
57,1 
61,8 
23,4 
22,2 
31,9 
35,6 
19,1 
44,4 
40,2 
12,6 
20,6 
27,8 
10,9 
53,3 
26.3 
29,6 
39,2 
36,9 
22,9 
42,9 
33,9 
30,4 
30,4 
42.9 
35,0 
32,9 
27,9 
24,6 
17,5 
28,7 
35,5 
17.1 
37,2 
28,9 
65,1 
25,3 
37,5 
31,8 
39,1 
21,9 
21,6 
15,9 
25,4 
29,6 
11,2 
39,6 
27,4 
20,4 
20,9 
23,9 
46.4 
35,1 
30,4 
37,2 
32,7 
25,1 
30,5 
42.7 
26.8 
31,6 
81,5 
43,3 
30,8 
83,9 
5.7 
9.3 
11.6 
52,6 
30,6 
32,8 
41.8 
33,7 
38,2 
71,5 
54,0 
42.8 
77,8 
7,0 
46,3 
50,0 
.39,9 
39,2 
30,7 
22,0 
35,7 
2409 
1199 
870 
377 
419 
723 
560 
659 
1636 
619 
451 
702 
1054 
372 
2182 
1304 
820 
225 
520 
532 
207 
1243 
594 
338 
1433 
668 
274 
464 
699 
599 
904 
3608 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
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The impact of parental vote on voting behavior seems clear. People whose 
parents voted for a left-wing party are themselves much more likely to vote for a 
left-wing party (62%) than for any other party. Likewise, people whose parents 
voted for right-wing parties are most likely to vote for those parties themselves 
(65%), while people whose parents voted for confessional parties also tend to vote 
similarly (53%). These percentages match those presented in Table 3.1 exactly. 
Finally, I compare how the distribution of votes changes over time, how men 
and women differ in their choice of political party, and how the average age of 
voters is different for each of the political parties. Women are slightly more likely 
than men to vote for a left-wing party and slightly less likely to vote for a 
confessional party. Men and women are about as likely to vote for a right-wing 
political party. The age of those who vote for a left-wing or a right-wing party is 
lower than average, and the age of those who vote for a confessional party is 
above average. Over time, we find a rise in support for right-wing political parties 
and a decline in support for confessional political parties. 
Table 5.1 does not allow me to draw any conclusions about whether and how 
the characteristics of a person's parents shape his or her voting behavior. The 
reason for this is that the effect of, for instance, parental religious denomination 
might be mediated through one's own religious denomination. In that case, parental 
religious denomination may affect a person's vote indirectly rather than directly. 
To determine whether parental social class and parental religious denomination 
directly affect voting behavior, I conduct a multivariate analysis. I use a 
multinomial logistic regression model. I estimate the effects of parental political 
preferences, parental social class and parental religious denomination, while 
controlling for a person's own social class and religious denomination. I divide 
voting behavior into three categories: left-wing, right-wing and confessional1. 
Table 5.2 presents the parameter estimates of this multinomial logistic regression 
model. 
To represent the causal order of events, I estimate the parameters of three 
different models. In model 1, I estimate the effects of age and gender and the 
effects of parental social class and parental religious denomination. I also control 
for the year of the survey. In model 2, I add parental vote since I assume that 
parental vote is influenced by the social class position and religious denomination 
of a person's parents. Finally, model 3 expands model 2 to include the individual 
attributes of social class and religious denomination. 
For each of the independent nominal variables I use a deviation contrast from 
the general mean. Therefore, the parameter estimates of all categorical variables 
should be interpreted in relation to the general mean. The first column shows the 
parameter estimates of a logistic regression that compares people voting for left-
wing parties with people voting for confessional parties. The second column shows 
the parameter estimates of a logistic regression that compares people who vote for 
right-wing parties with people who vote for confessional parties. Finally, the third 
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column shows the results of a logistic regression that compares people who vote 
for left-wing parties with people who vote for right-wing parties. I obtained the 
parameter estimates in the third column by subtracting the estimates in the second 
column from those in the first. 
Model 1 shows that parental social class and parental religious denomination 
significantly affect voting behavior. In general, children of manual workers are 
more likely to vote for a left-wing party than for a right-wing or a confessional 
party, children of farmers are more likely to vote for a confessional party than for 
a left-wing or a right-wing party, and children of the self-employed are more likely 
to vote for a right-wing or a confessional party than for a left-wing party. 
Orthodox Protestant and non-religious parents are particularly likely to influence 
the voting choices of their children. People with non-religious parents prefer both 
left-wing and right-wing political parties over confessional parties. 
Model 2 expands model 1 by adding parental vote. Once I do this, we see 
clearly that the effects of parental social class and parental religious denomination 
become weaker. This indicates that at least part of the impact of parental class and 
parental religious denomination occurs indirectly, and is mediated by parental vote. 
These findings suggest that parents indeed transmit information regarding their 
interests to their children. Not surprisingly, when in model 3 I add a person's own 
social class and own religious denomination, the effects of parental class and 
religious denomination diminish even further. This does not imply, however, that 
parental social class and parental religious denomination have no direct effects on 
a person's voting behavior. Even after taking into account a person's own social 
class and religious denomination, one finds that the children of higher professionals 
are more likely to vote for a left-wing party or for a right-wing party than for a 
confessional party. The children of farmers tend to vote for confessional parties. 
Finally, the children of Orthodox Protestant parents are more likely to vote for 
confessional parties than for right-wing parties, while they are also more likely to 
vote for right-wing parties than for left-wing parties. However, since the effects of 
parental social class and parental religious denomination diminish greatly when I 
control for a person's own social class and religious denomination, this implies that 
a great deal of the effect of parental social class and parental religious 
denomination is mediated through a person's own social class and religious 
denomination. Given the independent effect of parental vote, we may therefore 
conclude that parents indeed transmit not only their interests to their children, but 
also information. 
How substantial are the overall parental effects? Table 5.2 tells us how much the 
voting behavior of a social group, for instance Catholics, deviates from the 
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THE KINDRED VOTE 
general mean. Since most variables are categorical in character, Table 5.2 does not 
provide information regarding the overall effects of the different variables, for 
instance, religious denomination. Table 5.3 compares the overall effects of different 
variables on voting behavior. In this table I present the standard deviation of each 
group of parameter estimates from model 3. This standard deviation indicates the 
size of the average absolute effect for each group of variables. 
Table 5.3: Variance in voting behavior: standard deviation of parameter estimates from model 3 
SOCIAL CLASS 
PARENTAL SOCIAL CLASS 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION 
PARENTAL RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION 
PARENTAL VOTE 
left-wing/ 
confessional 
0,4 
0,2 
1,1 
0,2 
0,7 
right-wing/ 
confessional 
0,3 
0,3 
0,9 
0,2 
0,7 
left-wing/ 
right-wing 
0,4 
0,0 
0,2 
0,2 
0,7 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
From Table 5.3,1 conclude that, on average, the effects of religious denomination 
and parental vote are strongest, and that the effects of parental class and parental 
religious denomination are weakest. The effect of religious denomination is not 
strong when voters choose between left-wing and right-wing political parties. This 
finding underscores those by Eisinga, Felling and Lammers (1994), who concluded 
that religious denomination affected the choice between religious and non-religious 
parties but was completely irrelevant to the choice between the non-religious 
parties. Their analysis, however, did not include parental characteristics. 
Previously I asked how substantial the overall parental effects are. Table 5.3 
shows the impact of different variables for each of the three equations. To 
determine the average impact of the variables on voting behavior in general, I 
compare models, each time leaving out one of the independent variables. My null 
hypothesis is that each group of variables does not contribute to the explanation. 
I examine whether the fit of the model worsens significantly when I exclude one 
variable or a group of variables from the equation. For instance, I estimate the 
model leaving out the dummy variables for parental social class. To test the 
common effect of a set of variables, I use the log-likelihood ratio-test2. This test 
enables me to investigate whether the gain in degrees of freedom results in a non­
significant diminution of χ2. We find these log-likelihood ratio's in Table 5.4. 
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ТаЫв 5.4: Significance tests of effects of groups of variables on voting behavior 
PARENTAL SOCIAL CLASS 
PARENTAL RELIGIOUS DENOMNATION 
PARENTAL VOTE 
SOCIAL CLASS 
RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION 
X2 
34 
17 
272 
53 
292 
d.f. 
10 
6 
4 
10 
6 
X2 
/d.f 
3,4 
2,8 
68,1 
5,3 
48,7 
Source: pooled data-set; own calculations 
Table 5.4 shows that the fit of the model does not decrease significantly 
when I exclude parental class or parental religious denomination from the equation. 
In other words, both parental religious denomination and parental social class do 
not have a direct effect on a person's voting behavior, when one controls for 
parental vote and a person's own social class and religious denomination. This is 
not to say that there are no significant differences in voting behavior between these 
social groups. In Table 5.2 I demonstrated that parental social class and parental 
religious denomination have significant indirect effect on voting behavior. The 
effects are mediated through parental vote and through a person's own social class 
and religious denomination. That the effects of parental social class and parental 
religious denomination are mediated through parental vote suggests that parents 
transmit information regarding their own interests to their children. However, the 
finding that the effects of parental social class and parental religious denomination 
are also mediated through a person's own social class and religious denomination 
suggests that parents also transmit interests to their children. In Table 5.2, I also 
showed that parents belonging to certain religious denominations and certain social 
classes do directly affect the voting behavior of their children. Apparently, the 
number of people with parents belonging to these religious denominations and to 
these social classes is not large enough to make a statistical difference in term of 
Chi square. 
5.4 Discussion 
In this chapter I examined whether parental social class, parental religious 
denomination and parental voting behavior influence a person's voting decision, 
regardless of his or her own religious denomination and social class. In doing so, 
I indirectly tested the theory of the reasoning voter. This theory claims that voters 
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rely - at least partly - on information obtained from their parents when they decide 
for which party to vote. My results showed that this is indeed the case. What is 
striking is that parental vote affects a person's voting behavior more than his or 
her own religious denomination or social class. These findings suggest that the 
social context during childhood is at least as important in shaping voting behavior 
as is a person's present social context. The findings thus support the predictions 
derived from the theory of the reasoning voter. The fact that the effects of parental 
social class and parental religious denomination are mediated through parental vote 
suggests that children vote in order to further their own interests and the interests 
of their parents, and that parents somehow transmit information with respect to 
these interests. 
Parental social class and parental religious denomination do significantly 
affect voting behavior. However, these effects tum out to be indirect once I take 
parental vote and a person's own social class and religious denomination into 
account. This finding suggests that parents transmit not only information to their 
children but also interests. 
In chapter 8 I will test the theory of the reasoning voter more directly. 
Using recall data I examine the extent to which information about politics 
influences people to vote for confessional parties later in life. I explore various 
sources of information, such as the parental home, churches and schools. I test 
whether having attended a confessional high school during adolescence continues 
to affect how a person votes later in life. Moreover, I test whether a person's 
previous church attendance affects voting behavior independently from his or her 
current church attendance. First, however, I examine in chapter 6 the total parental 
influence on voting behavior. 
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Notes Chapter 5 
1. One can think of a multinomial logistic regression model as a model that allows one 
to estimate two logistic regression-equations simultaneously: one equation for voting 
left-wing compared to confessional, and one equation for voting right-wing compared 
to confessional. It is not necessary to estimate the third equation: voting left-wing 
compared to right-wing, as I can logically deduce the parameters of this equation from 
the former two. However, for the sake of completeness, I also present the results of 
this third equation. 
2. The test-criterion is two times the (absolute) difference of the log likelihood of the 
model with and without the variable(s). This test-criterion is χ 2 distributed, with the 
number of excluded variables representing the degrees of freedom. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SIBLING RESEMBLANCE IN POLITICAL PREFERENCES: 
INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY INFLUENCES ON THE VOTE1 
In chapter 5 I showed that parental social class and parental religious denomination 
have significant effects on voting behavior. When I take into account parental vote 
these effects weaken. Both the effect of parental class and the effect of parental 
religious denomination are mediated completely through parental vote and a 
person's own social class and religious denomination. Parental political preferences 
has a strong effect on a person's voting behavior. This effect is even stronger than 
that of one's own social class or religious denomination. It is possible that other 
factors relating to one's family background influence how people vote. Therefore, 
in this chapter I focus on the total effect (all measured and unmeasured effects) of 
family background on voting behavior. To establish this total effect of family 
background, I compare voting patterns among siblings. The rationale behind 
comparing siblings is that if parents influence the voting behavior of their children, 
siblings should vote similarly. Furthermore, I investigate whether and to what 
extent this total family influence can be attributed to parental characteristics such 
as parental political preferences, parental social class and parental religious 
denomination. 
6.1 The intergenerational transmission of political preferences 
In chapter 3 I demonstrated that 57% of the Dutch population have a political 
preference that is similar to that of their parents. In chapter 5 I showed that not 
only do parents transmit their political preferences directly to their children, they 
also influence their children's voting behavior indirectly through their social class 
and religious denomination. 
In this chapter, I examine the overall intergenerational transmission of 
political preferences. This total influence of the family of origin consists of all 
measured and unmeasured parental influences. One establishes the total influence 
that the family of origin has on voting behavior by comparing the political 
preferences of siblings. The advantage of such a comparison is that one can 
estimate the total effect of all -measured and unmeasured- parental influences on 
voting behavior, instead of the similarity in voting behavior between parents and 
their children. Gaining insight into the total influence that parents have on the 
political preferences of their children, as well as into the size of the direct and 
indirect effects will greatly expand our knowledge of the process of 
intergenerational transmission of political preferences. 
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This chapter is organized in the following manner. In the next section I 
briefly discuss the research question for this chapter. In the third section, I describe 
the data and operationalizations. Then I explain the sibling model I use and its 
advantages. In section four, I present the results of the analyses. Then in the 
concluding section I discuss these results. 
6.2 Comparing siblings to capture the total influence of the family 
Most studies on electoral behavior focus attention on the ways that individual 
attributes affect voting. Until recently, voting behavior in the Netherlands was 
strongly determined by a person's religious denomination and social class 
(Lijphart, 1974). Major changes in Dutch society over the past 20 years, such as 
depillarization and secularization, have resulted in an electorate that is less 
determined by these traditional factors (Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 1989). 
In chapter 5 we saw that parental vote directly influences a person's voting 
behavior. Parental social class and parental religious denomination also have 
indirect effects on voting behavior. Hence the question arises of how large the total 
effect of family background is, relative to the effect of individual attributes. 
Previous studies have not been able to conclusively determine the size and 
nature of the effect of family of origin compared to the effect of individual 
characteristics. In this chapter, I examine the total influence of the family of origin 
on voting behavior by looking at the political preferences of siblings. One might 
expect the political preferences of siblings to be more alike than the political 
preferences of two unrelated people, simply because the former have the same 
parents. By examining the similarity in voting behavior between siblings, one can 
determine exactly how large the total effect of family background on voting 
behavior is. This total effect is the sum of all measured and unmeasured parental 
influences. Moreover, I examine how much of the influence of family background 
comes from parental attributes such as parental social class, parental vote and 
parental religious denomination. My fourth research question therefore concerns 
the size and mechanisms of family influence: 
4. To what extent is the voting behavior of siblings influenced by (a) 
individual characteristics and (b) parental characteristics? 
Before I answer this question, I first describe the data I used, the 
operationalization of the variables and the research method. 
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6.3 Data, operationalization and method 
To answer this chapter's research question I used the Family Survey of the Dutch 
Population 1992-1993 (Ultee & Ganzeboom, 1993). This survey was conducted 
among a representative cross-section of the adult Dutch population. One thousand 
respondents and, when present, one of their parents and a sibling were asked about 
their social position, religious denomination and voting behavior. I obtained 
information about all the relevant variables of 352 respondents and one of their 
siblings. Therefore, my analyses include 704 individuals from 352 families. 
I constructed the variables for my analyses in the following manner: To 
determine the political preferences of individuals, respondents were asked for 
which political party they would vote if parliamentary elections were held at the 
day of interview. Respondents were also asked what political preferences their 
parents had when they (the respondents) were 15 years old. It is at this age that 
political values are said to be formed (cf. Inglehart, 1977), and hence it is then that 
people will be especially influenced by their parents. When both the primary 
respondent and his or her sibling answered the question about parental political 
preferences I used the answer of the primary respondent. 
One parent of each of the respondents received a questionnaire. Only 400 
of these questionnaires were sent back. When I compared the answers of parents 
to questions about church membership, occupation, and political preferences with 
the answers of their children to the same questions, I found that 90% of their 
answers were the same. If I had used the information about parental social 
position, parental religious denomination and parental political preferences 
provided by the parents, I would have excluded many respondents from the 
analysis. Therefore, I used the respondent's and their sibling's answers2. 
I used the political preferences of the respondent's father as an indicator of 
parental political preferences. I only used the political preferences of the mother 
when I had no information about the political preferences of the father. 
Nieuwbeerta and Wittebrood (1995) showed that fathers and mothers have an equal 
influence on the party preference of their children. Hence, I do not expect my 
results to be affected by the choice to use the political preferences of the father. 
I constructed a continuous scale for political parties by assigning each 
political party a score from one to ten on the left-right scale. This score was based 
on the average score that potential voters assigned to each party (cf. Van der Eijk 
& Niemöller, 1983b). I had no information on the party preference of 98 
respondents or their siblings. In these cases I estimated their placement on the left-
right scale on the basis of information about their left-right selfplacement. In the 
case of respondents and siblings who answered the questions about party 
preference and left-right placement, I estimated a regression equation with left-right 
party choice as the dependent variable and the left-right selfplacement as the 
independent variable. Next, on the basis of the parameter estimates of this 
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equation, I estimated the left-right party choice for those respondents and siblings 
who had missing values on the question of party choice3. I included a dummy 
variable in my analyses to indicate whether the left-right party choice was 
estimated or obtained directly from the respondents. I found that estimation of 
party preference did not lead to different conclusions. Therefore, I did not include 
this dummy variable in the analysis I present in this chapter. 
As a measure of religious denomination, I used the question that asked 
respondents whether they considered themselves member of a church or religious 
group, and if so, which church or religious group4. Subsequently I constructed 
four categories for the respondent's religious denomination: (1) No religious 
denomination; (2) Catholic; (3) Protestant; and (4) Orthodox Protestant. I obtained 
information about parental religious denomination by using the question that asked 
respondents and their siblings whether their parents were a member of a church or 
religious group, and if so, which church or religious group. The religious 
denomination of the parents pertains to the period in which the respondents were 
about 15 years old. When both the primary respondent and his or her sibling 
answered the question about parental religious denomination, I used the answer of 
the primary respondent. 
I constructed the variables social class and parental social class on the basis 
of occupation and selfemployment. Parental social class refers to the occupation 
and selfemployment of a respondent's father when the respondent was about 15 
years old. If both the respondent and his or her sibling provided information about 
the occupation and selfemployment of their father I used the answers of the 
primary respondent. Subsequently, I classified social class and parental social class 
according to the EGP-class scheme (Erikson, Golthorpe & Portocarero, 1979). I 
distinguished the following six classes: (1) Higher professionals; (2) Routine non-
manual; (3) Self-employed; (4) Skilled labor; (5) Unskilled labor; and (6) Farmer. 
Finally, the survey asked respondents and their siblings about their age and 
gender. I subtracted 18 years from the actual age of the respondents and their 
siblings to make the results easier to interpret. 
In Table 6.1 we find the average score on the left-right scale for each social 
category. I provide these averages for respondents and siblings separately. The 
average score on the left-right scale for the respondents is 5.37, slightly higher 
than that of the siblings (5.30). In general, there are no significant differences in 
the average score on the left-right scale between the respondents and their siblings. 
Therefore, I do not discuss differences between respondents and their siblings with 
respect to the average left-right score for different social categories. Table 6.1 
shows that the average score on the left-right scale differs between social groups. 
With an average score of 4.65, people without a religious denomination tend to be 
most left-wing. Catholics, by contrast, are the most right-wing (average score 
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Table β 1 /Average score on the left-right sale by social group (scale from 1-10) 
Characteristic 
Average 
left-right 
position 
SffiUNG 
Average 
Left-right 
position N 
INDMDUM. СНАНЛСПИвТІС» 
Нейдкнш denomination 
No RBNgrow denomination 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Orthodox Protestant 
465 
5 96 
564 
5 84 
148 
149 
40 
15 
4 73166 
578140 
5 7 1 30 
6 2 2 16 
S o d a l e ) · · · 
Higher professionals 
Routine погнпапиаі 
Self-employed 
Stoned labor 
Unskilled labor 
Fanner 
517 
561 
568 
514 
506 
6 91 
146 
101 
13 
28 
50 
14 
504155 
5 51107 
6 56 16 
5 57 29 
4 6 9 32 
5 9 3 13 
527 
546 
182 
170 
522186 
538166 
PAHonvu. с н д я А і і И н т а л 
Parental religious denomination 
No reUgkxe denomination 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Orthodox Protestant 
554 
565 
5 27 
580 
70 
185 
70 
27 
4 91 7 0 
5 41185 
5 3 5 70 
5 3 5 27 
Parental sodai d a a a 
Higher professionals 
Routine non-manual 
Self-employed 
Skilled labor 
Unskilled labor 
Farmer 
529 
565 
530 
515 
490 
6 01 
112 
35 
34 
67 
48 
56 
526112 
4 68 35 
5 4 1 34 
4 99 67 
5 82 48 
5 61 56 
Average 537 352 
Source Family survey, own calculations 
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5.96). A person's position on the left-right scale also varies considerably depending 
on his or her social class. Farmers (6.91) tend to be most right-wing. However, this 
is a very small group. Unskilled manual workers tend to be relatively left-wing 
(5.06). Table 6.1 also shows that men tend to be slightly more right-wing in their 
party preference than women. The average score on the left-right scale for men is 
5.46 while that of women is 5.27. When we compare the religious denomination 
of respondents with the religious denomination of their parents, we can conclude 
that within one generation the number of people who do not belong to a religious 
denomination has almost doubled. We also see that more parents than respondents 
were farmers, while more respondents than parents belong to the routine manual 
class. With an average score of 5.27 on the left-wight scale, people whose parents 
were Protestant parents are the most left-wing. The children of Orthodox Protestant 
parents tend to be most right-wing (average score 5.80). Note, however, that this 
group consists of very few people. While a person's position on the left-right scale 
varies more according to his or her own social class than it does according to his 
or her parent's social class, the two patterns are similar. Children of farmers tend 
to be most right-wing (6.01), whereas the children of unskilled manual workers 
tend to be most left-wing (4.90) in their party preference. 
In this chapter I address the question of the extent to which a person's voting 
behavior is influenced by family versus individual characteristics. Comparing 
siblings constitutes a powerful method to establish parental influences. The first 
to develop sibling models were researchers who used structural causal models to 
establish the influence of family background on educational careers (Hauser & 
Sewell, 1985). Dutch sociologists have used these models to determine family 
effects on, for instance, educational careers (Dronkers, 1991) and patterns of 
cultural consumption (Ganzeboom & De Graaf, 1991). 
Since siblings come from the same family, one needs to take into account 
the hierarchical structure of the data. Neglecting this hierarchical structure would 
lead to an underestimation of the standard errors of the coefficients. This might 
lead me to infer that some factors affect political preferences when, in fact, these 
effects are solely due to chance (Woodhouse, Rabash, Goldstein & Yang, 1993). 
Alternative models have been developed to analyze data with a hierarchical 
structure (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). These so-called multilevel models have 
been used to analyze electoral data (Jones, Johnston & Pattie, 1992; Nieuwbeerta, 
1995; Heath & Goldstein, 1997) and sibling data (Van der Velden & Bosker, 
1991). 
I use a hierarchical sibling model in which the siblings are nested within 
families. I measure the intercept, that is the average position on the left-right scale, 
and allow the intercept to vary between individuals and between families. This 
variance within and between families can then be explained by individual and 
family characteristics. 
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The following two equations summarize the general model I use: 
Y„ = 6oj + β,Χ,; + ε4 (1) 
In equation 1, the left-right position of individual i in family j is estimated as a 
function of the intercept for family j , his or her score on the independent variables 
X,
r
 and some random error e,
r
 In this model, the variation of the random term ε,} 
can be summarized by c?t, the variance of the random variation at the individual 
level. 
во, = в0 + щ (2) 
In equation 2, I allow the intercept terms в^ to vary between families. In 
this equation the μ, terms are the family-level random terms, which, like the е
ц 
terms can be summarized with a single variance term σ2,,. This model allows for 
intra-class correlation, with voters within one family being more alike than 
unrelated persons. To estimate this multilevel model, I used the interactive package 
MLN (Rabash & Woodhouse, 1995). 
6.4 Findings 
In the multilevel analysis I estimate four different models. In model 1, I estimate 
an overall constant and the two variance terms (within and between families). 
These estimates allow us to conclude how much variance in political preferences 
can be attributed to differences between families, and how much of this variance 
is purely individual. 
Model 2 introduces parental social class and parental religious 
denomination, as well as the control variables age and gender. Like the procedure 
followed in chapter 3,1 attempt to elucidate the causal order in which factors have 
their impact on voting behavior. I attempt to gain insight into the process of 
political socialization by disentangling the direct and indirect effects of different 
factors on voting behavior. When I predict that parental political preferences 
influence their children's political preferences, I have to consider that parents also 
vote according to their own interests. In other words, the political preferences of 
parents are influenced by their social class and religious denomination. In model 
3 I add parental political preferences to model 2. Given the results from chapter 
5,1 expect that the - direct - effects of parental social class and parental religious 
denomination to weaken once I include parental political preferences since parents 
transmit information about their interests to their children. 
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Table β 2 Partmeter estimates trom multHeml stoting model and model Ш, standard errors between brackets (N*704) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 ModeM 
Constant 
IMXVIOUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Religious denomination 
No religious denomination (ref) 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Orthodox Protestant 
5 3(01) 3 7 (0 4) 2 9 (0 4) 2 β (0 4) 
11 (0 2) 
0 β (0 3) 
1 1 (04) 
Sodai CI»»» 
Higher professionals 
Routine non-manual 
Self «employed 
Skilled labor 
Unskilled labor (ref) 
Farmer 
0 Э (0 2) 
0 8 (0 2) 
1 4 (0 4) 
0 3 (0 3) 
1 0 (0 4) 
Female (ref) 
Age 
PARENTAL CHARALIUUIIICS 
Parental Rellgloua denomination 
No religious denomination (ref) 
CathoUc 
Protestant 
Orthodox Protestant 
Parental Social CI»*» 
Higher Professionals 
Routine non-manual 
Self-employed 
Skilled labor 
Unskilled labor (ref) 
Farmer 
Parental left-right position 
0 2(01) 0 2(01) 0 3(01) 
00(00) 00(00) 00(00) 
0 7 (0 2) 
0 S (0-2) 
07(03) 
-01 (02) 
-01 (0 3) 
-0 1 (0 3) 
-0 3 (0 3) 
-0 2 (0 3) 
0 1 (0 2) 
0 2 (0 2) 
0 1 (0 3) 
-0 4 (0 2) 
-0 4 (0 3) 
-0 4 (0 3) 
•0 Э (0 3) 
•01 (03) 
0 3 (0 0) 
-0 S (0 2) 
0 2 (0 2) 
-04(0 4) 
-0 1 (0 2) 
-0 2 (0 3) 
-04(0 3) 
-0 2 (0 2) 
-0 1 (0 3) 
0 2 (0 0) 
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Table 6.2: (continued) Variance components and model lit 
Variance components 
Individual 
family 
Total variance (%) 
Individual 
family 
Model fit 
2 ' log-likelihood 
Δ 2 * too-llkeUhood 
Ad.f 
Modell 
2.39 
0.98 
71 
29 
2823 
Model 2 
2.37 
0.82 
Models 
2.37 
0.68 
Model 4 
Variance explained compared to model 
1 
16 
2789 
34 
10 
1 
31 
2763 
26 
1 
2.23 
0.54 
1 ( % ) 
7 
45 
2701 
62 
8 
Source: Family Survey, own calculations 
Model 4 adds the individual characteristics social class and religious 
denomination to model 3. Considering that parents transmit their social class and 
religious denomination to their children, we can expect to find weaker effects of 
parental social class and parental religious denomination in model 4 than in model 
3. 
A comparison of the variance terms in model 1 to the variance terms in 
model 2, 3 and 4 allows me to determine how much of the variance in political 
preferences can be explained by parental characteristics and individual 
characteristics. 
Table 6.2 presents the results of the analysis. The first part of this table 
contains the parameter estimates and the standard errors that accompany them. The 
second part of the table shows how the variance is distributed between individuals 
and families. To be complete, I show the variances in model 2 to 4 as a percentage 
of the total variance (i.e. individual and family together) that is explained 
compared to model 1, the model with only an overall constant. Finally, Table 6.2 
shows how well each model fits and the degrees of freedom compared to the 
previous model. 
In model 1 the average position on the left-right scale is 5.3. Since this 
scale ranges from one to ten, this means that the average score is almost exactly 
mid-way between left and right. The variance components in this model can be 
found in the lower part of the table. These components shows that 29% of the 
variance in the position of respondents and their siblings on the left-right scale can 
be attributed to systematic differences between families and 71% to differences 
between individuals within families. This finding allows me to answer the research 
question of this chapter: political preferences are 71% influenced by individual 
characteristics and 29% by family characteristics. In the following models I 
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examine the extent to which family characteristics such as parental religious 
denomination, parental social class and parental vote, and individual characteristics 
such as religious denomination, social class and age and gender explain this 
variance in left-right position. 
Model 2 adds parental religious denomination and parental social class, as 
well as the control variables age and gender to model 1. In this model the constant 
refers to the average position on the left-right scale for 18 year-old women whose 
parents are unskilled laborers without a religious affiliation. This group of people 
are most likely to have the most left-wing political preferences. Therefore, I expect 
all other categories to be more right-wing than this reference group, and hence I 
expect all parameter estimates to have a positive sign. The average position of the 
reference group on the left-right scale is 3.7. Children of religious parents tend to 
be more right-wing than children of non-members. The most right-wing are the 
children of Catholics and Orthodox Protestants; they score 0.7 points higher on the 
left-right scale than do members of the reference group. Parental social class does 
not significantly affect the score on the left-right scale. Men tend to be somewhat 
more right-wing than women. However, this difference is not significant. A 
person's age does not significantly affect his or her position on the left-right scale. 
Once family characteristics parental religious denomination and parental 
social class, and the control variables age and gender are added to model 1, the fit 
of the model increases significantly. The difference in χ2 between model 1 and 
model 2 is 34, against 10 degrees of freedom. Together, parental religious 
denomination, parental social class, age and gender account for 1% 
(i.e. (2.39-2.37)/2.39*100) of the variance at the individual level, and for 16% (i.e. 
(0.98-0.82)/0.98*100%) of the variance at the level of the family. 
Model 3 adds parental vote to model 2. The constant in model 3 refers to 
the same reference group as in model 2, only now members of this reference group 
have parents who scored 0 on the left-right scale. This reference group tends to be 
even more left-wing than the reference group in model 2: the average score on the 
left-right scale of the reference group is 2.9. The inclusion of parental political 
preferences in this model significantly altered the effect of parental religious 
denomination. It now becomes insignificant. The effect of parental social class 
remains insignificant. 
The change in χ2 between model 2 and 3 is 26 with 1 degree of freedom. 
This means that adding parental vote to a model that includes parental social class 
position, parental religious denomination, age and gender significantly improves 
the fit of the model. The explained family variance in model 3 compared to model 
1 is 31%. 
Finally, I add a person's social class and religious denomination to model 
3. In model 4 the reference group contains individuals who not only have all the 
characteristics of those belonging to the reference group in model 3, but also work 
as manual laborers and are non church members. The constant indicates the 
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average score on the left-right scale for members of the reference group. It is 2.6. 
Social class and religious denomination both affect political preferences 
significantly in the direction one would expect. 
Comparing model 4 to model 3, we find that including social class and 
religious denomination decreased the model χ 2 by 62. Model uses 8 degrees of 
freedom more than model 3. This finding indicates that social class and religious 
denomination contribute significantly to an explanation of political preferences. 
Together, the variables included in model 4 explain 7% of the individual level 
variance and 45% of the variance at the family level. The fact that a person's 
social class and religious denomination are able to explain some of the variance 
between families illustrates that a person's religious denomination and social class 
are related to his or her family of origin3. 
As noted above, a χ2 test of model 4 versus model 1 was significant. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that all model terms are significant. Table 
6.3 shows the change in χ2 when I drop each independent variable from model 4. 
Table 6 3 Significance test, change In χ' it venable is deleted from model 4 
Variable T p Tdl ΔχΊ&ύΙ 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Religious denomination 
Sodai class 
Gender 
Age 
PARENTAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Parental religious denomination 
Parental sodai dass 
Parental left-right position 
Source Family Survey, own calculations 
Four variables meet the significance criterion of 0.05. Religious denomination, 
social class, gender, and parental left-right position all significantly affect a 
person's position on the left-right scale. Age, parental social class and parental 
religious denomination are not significant. 
37 9 
238 
4 9 
19 
12 β 
4 8 
4 9 
19 
7 9 
21 
20 0 
26 
04 
200 
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6.5 Discussion 
In this chapter I have used an unusual method to examine the effects of family of 
origin on voting behavior. Usually, researchers measure the direct transmission of 
political preferences by looking at parent-children similarity. Instead of examining 
such direct parent-children similarity, I looked for sibling similarity in political 
preferences. This allows me to estimate the total parental influence on voting 
behavior, that is, the sum of all measured and unmeasured parental influences. 
My results show that 29% of political preferences derive from family of 
origin. Only 45% of this family influence is transmitted through parental political 
preferences, parental social class and parental religious denomination. Since the 
majority of the family influence is unaccounted for, families, it seems, have a 
greater influence on voting behavior in the Netherlands than is commonly assumed. 
The total family influence encompasses all that siblings have in common. Usually, 
sibling grow up in the same neighborhood and neighborhoods have also been 
shown to influence voting behavior (Jones et. al., 1992). Most of the time, they 
also attend the same school and this may affect how they vote in later life. In 
chapter 8 I will investigate whether the latter is indeed the case. 
The results of this chapter showed that 29% of the variance in political 
preferences can be attributed to family background, and 71% of the variance in 
political preferences can be attributed to purely individual factors. My findings are 
similar to the results of other sibling studies on other dependent variables. 
Researchers have found that one-third of the variance in culture participation can 
be attributed to the family of origin, and two-thirds to individual factors 
(Ganzeboom & De Graaf, 1991); others found that 35% of the variance in 
educational attainment can be attributed to the family, 13% to differences in 
neighborhoods and 48% to individual factors (Van der Velden & Bosker, 1991). 
At first sight the effects I found of individual and family characteristics on 
voting behavior seem to be similar to those in studies that do not use a sibling 
approach. Of all parental characteristics, parental political preferences have the 
strongest effect on a person's political preferences. Jennings and Niemi (1968) 
have found this to be true in the United States and McAllister and Kelley (1985) 
in Australia and Britain. 
However, if we look at the effects of parental social class and parental 
religious denomination, the results do differ from those of other studies. In this 
chapter I found parental social class and parental religious denomination to have 
no significant effects. In chapter 5,1 did find significant effects of parental class 
and religious denomination, but only before controlling for a person's own class 
and religious denomination. One can attribute this difference to the fact that in this 
chapter the number of respondents is relatively low to the number of estimated 
parameters. The sibling analysis was based on only 352 families. Given the large 
standard errors of the parameters this seems a reasonable explanation for the lack 
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of direct effects of parental social class and parental denomination. I expect that 
I would have found significant effects if my sample had been larger6. 
Nonetheless, using the political preferences of siblings to establish family 
effects on voting behavior has proven to be useful. My results show that parental 
socialization accounts for almost 30% of the family influence on political 
preferences. In other words, almost 30 percent of a person's voting behavior relates 
in one way or the other to his or her parents. The next part of this study tests 
predictions derived from the theory of the reasoning voter. Using recall data, I 
examine whether information about politics received earlier in life influences 
whether or not one votes for a confessional party later in life. I explore various 
sources of information other than the family, namely churches and schools. I test 
whether previous church attendance affects voting behavior independently from 
current church attendance. Because of the relatively small impact of social class 
on voting behavior in the Netherlands, the last part of this study focuses instead 
on the relationship between religion and confessional voting. 
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Notes Chapter 6 
1. A Dutch version of this chapter has been published in Mens en Maatschappij (Need, 
1995). 
2. This is true for most studies that examine the effect of parental characteristics. Using 
information obtained from respondents and their siblings did not lead to results that 
were substantially different from those based on information obtained from the 
parents. 
3. Y„rBd=1.55 + 0.70 * Left-right selfplacement; R2=0.48. 
4. The question is not a strict two-phase question because respondents only had to 
answer one question. One of the possible answers to this question was 'not a member 
of church of religious group'. The percentages of non-members will lie somewhere 
between those obtained by a one-phase question and those obtained by a two-phase 
question. 
5. In a structural sibling model, which can be estimated with the aid of LISREL, we can 
examine whether parents tend to transmit their denomination and social class position 
to their children. Since I included many categorical variables in my analysis, I chose 
to use a multilevel sibling model instead of a structural sibling model. I entered 
variables into the analysis according to their temporal sequence. 
6. Collapsing the categories of the variables social class and denomination did not lead to 
significant effects. 
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PART3 
lNTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
In Paît 1 of this study I discussed the theory of the reasoning voter. According to 
this theory, voting decisions are related to the way political parties performed in 
the past. In the process of evaluating whether a particular party has been beneficial 
to them, voters obtain information from other people. Among those whom one 
consults about politics are one's parents. 
In Part 2 I focused on intergenerational political mobility. I tested 
predictions derived from the theory of the reasoning voter by examining the 
influence parents have on the voting behavior of their adult children. I examined 
to what extent parents transmit their religious denomination and their social class 
and therefore their interests to their children. I also examined to what extent voting 
behavior of children is informed by the interests of their parents, and to what 
extent it is informed by their parent's choice of political party. In Part 3,1 examine 
how sources of information other than one's parents, namely churches and schools, 
influence a person's voting behavior. Using recall data I examine whether 
information about politics obtained in the past influences how a person votes later 
in life. In Chapter 8,1 test the mechanisms which I expect are taking place. First, 
in Chapter 71 describe patterns of intragenerational religious and political mobility 
in the Netherlands. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INTRAGENERATIONAL POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS MOBILITY ' 
Previously, I asked and answered questions about intergenerational political 
mobility - differences in political preferences between parents and their adult 
children. In this chapter, I examine intragenerational political mobility - changes 
in the voting behavior of individuals over the life-course. Since religion is known 
to be more important than social class in shaping voting behavior in the 
Netherlands, I focus on whether or not a person votes for a confessional party. I 
examine to what extent religious mobility can explain changes in confessional 
voting of individuals over the life-course. 
This chapter describes how much intragenerational religious and political 
mobility takes place in the Netherlands. The usual way to ascertain whether or not 
people have changed either their religious affiliation or their voting behavior 
between two points in time is to ask them for this information in a survey and then 
interview the same people again at a later occasion. This type of panel data is 
available, but generally not for a considerable period of time. Thus, I have chosen 
to use retrospective data. In the Dutch SSCW/Telepanel survey, held in 1994, 
individuals were asked to report their voting behavior since they first became 
eligible to vote. These respondents also reported whether they had ever been a 
church member. They were asked whether they left the church, and if so, at what 
age. Finally, they reported how often they attended religious services during 
different periods of their lives. Before discussing the patterns of intragenerational 
religious and political mobility, I first discuss the quality of recall data, and the 
operationalization of the variables. 
7.1 Quality of recall data 
In 1979, Van der Eijk and Niemöller published an influential article dealing with 
the accuracy of recall data. On basis of panel data on 509 individuals from the 
Dutch Election Surveys of 1971, 1972 and 1977, they checked whether people's 
recollection of how they voted during a previous election corresponded to their 
answers about how they voted immediately after that specific election. They 
concluded that "..the use of recall data is at best hazardous. Of the cases 
considered here we find at best 70%, and at worst 53% in agreement with their 
original report of voting behavior. Only a small proportion of the remaining cases 
consist of 'don't knows' etc., most of them are per se faulty" (Van der Eijk & 
Niemöller 1979: 295). After these disappointing results, few Dutch researchers 
have used recall data on voting behavior. There are four reasons why I use recall 
data anyway. First, if there is bias in the use of retrospective data, it does not 
automatically follow that this data should not be used. In a comparison of panel 
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data and recall data. Van der Eijk and Niemöller (1983) showed that even though 
a substantial number of recalls were inconsistent, this did not lead to substantially 
different conclusions about the characteristics of voters. Second, research showed 
that recall errors are not random but tend toward consistency with the behavior at 
the time of recall (Himmelweit, Jeager & Stockdale, 1978). Since the election 
results have shown that the support for confessional parties decreased significantly 
at the 1994 elections (CBS, 1994), this tendency towards consistency makes it 
plausible that in the Telepanel survey -held in december 1994-1 underestimate the 
number of votes for confessional parties in the past. Hence, I probably 
underestimate rather than overestimate the relationship between religion or church 
attendance and confessional voting. Third, I developed a method to improve recall 
accuracy, thus reducing bias. Fourth, to examine the continuing impact of 
socialization influences on voting behavior, it is important to gain insight in voting 
behavior over a considerable time interval. Thus, I would argue that the insights 
to be obtained by using recall data are worth the risk involved. In the next section 
I discuss extensively how respondents were asked for retrospective information. 
7.2 Life history data and operationalization 
The data I use were obtained from the Dutch SSCW/Telepanel survey. This 
survey, held at the end of 1994, is a life history survey of individuals above the 
age of 18. The survey collected retrospective data on several life-events, including 
religious and political careers, and demographic characteristics for 2748 
respondents. The respondents were asked to report on the frequency with which 
they attended religious services during different periods of their lives, and, if 
relevant, the age when they left the church. Finally, the survey asked respondents 
to name the political party for which they voted at each general election after they 
became eligible to vote. I selected those respondents who had a valid score on all 
the relevant variables and who were between 18 and 64 years old. After these 
selections, 1836 respondents remained. For these respondents, I have information 
about their voting behavior at all elections since 1956. 
The following procedure was used to obtain information about voting 
behavior of the respondents over their life-course. The respondents were 
interviewed by personal computer. First, they were asked whether they always 
voted for the same political party at general elections. If they said yes, they were 
asked to specify for which political party they voted at the 1994 elections. It was 
then assumed that these respondents voted for that same party at all previous 
elections. If the respondents indicated having either switched parties, or abstained 
from voting at any previous election, they were asked to specify the party for 
which they voted at all elections. The respondents were only prompted to answer 
questions about elections for which they were eligible to vote. From 1946 to 1967 
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the minimum votíng age was 23. In 1967 it was reduced to 21, and since 1972 it 
has been 18. 
There were two ways I tried to make it easier for respondents to answer 
questions about their voting history. First, I introduced the questions with the 
following statement: "The next question concerns your voting behavior in the 
PAST. We would like to know for which political party you voted at ALL of the 
preceding NATIONAL elections. You can obtain more information about each 
election by pressing the F3 key." 
I will illustrated the information behind the F3 key, and the way questions 
were asked by using the example of the 1986 elections. The question was: "The 
next question concerns the 1986 elections. For which political party did you vote 
in 1986? One of the possible answers was "I do not recall." Respondents who 
could not recall for which political party they voted in 1986 were subsequently 
asked: "Could you perhaps indicate for which GROUP of political parties you 
voted?" Next, the respondents saw the following list of political parties:2 
(1) Left wing: CPN, PvdA, PSP, D*66, PPR 
(2) Right wing: W D 
(3) Extreme right wing: CD 
(4) Confessional: CDA, SGP, GPV, RPF, EVP. 
If respondents did not know for which political party they voted, they were 
asked whether they remembered for which bloc of parties they voted. Because it 
frequently happened that people did not know for which specific party they voted, 
but did know whether or not it was a confessional party, the number of people 
unable to answer the question was lower than it would have been had I analyzed 
the votes for each specific party. 
It was also possible to answer "did not vote" and "don't know." The F3 key 
caused a help-screen to pop up with the following message: "After this election, 
the second Lubbers cabinet was formed. This cabinet was a coalition of CDA and 
W D . The following political parties participated in this election: 
(1) Left wing: CPN, PvdA, PSP, D'66, PPR 
(2) Right wing: W D 
(3) Extreme right wing: CD 
(4) Confessional: CDA, SGP, GPV, RPF, EVP." 
I tried to refresh the memory of the respondents with this kind of 
information for each election. 
Another way to avoid erroneous classifications is to distinguishing only two groups 
of political parties: non-confessional and confessional. To illustrate the advantage 
of this procedure, I analyzed the responses of the same 509 individuals that Van 
der Eijk and Niemöller (1979) analyzed. This way, I could calculate what the 
misreports of previous voting behavior would have been if the researchers had only 
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distinguished between confessional and non-confessional political parties. This 
time, I found that, of the valid cases, at best 85% and at worst 77% were in 
agreement with their original report of voting. It is of interest to note that these 
percentages correspond to those of recall data on occupation. This kind of data is 
frequently used (Blossfeld, 1986; Pollaerts, de Graaf & Luijkx, 1997). 
A second advantage of combining parties in one category is that it 
circumvents the problem of new parties appearing (such as D'66 in 1966), and old 
ones disappearing (such as DS'70 in 1982), or merging (such as the ARP, CHU, 
KVP into the CDA in 1977). When one distinguishes each party separately, one 
starts to consider certain voters as floating, while, in fact, these voters want to vote 
for a party that no longer exists. Therefore I only consider cross-overs between 
confessional and non-confessional parties. 
I will now briefly discuss the operationalization of the other variables. I measured 
church membership over the life-course of individuals. First, I asked respondents 
whether they considered themselves members of a religious group. If they did, I 
assumed they had stayed with the church of their childhood. This is a valid 
assumption since people rarely switch denominations in the Netherlands (Dekker, 
1987; Schepens, 1991; see also chapter 3 of this study). If people did not consider 
themselves to be a member of a religious group, I asked them according to which 
religion they had been raised. The respondents who were not presently church 
members but had been raised as a church member, were asked at what age they 
left the church2. On the basis of these three questions, I was able to find out 
whether or not they were a church member in each year of their life. I coded a 
respondent's church membership at each election as either religious or non-
religious. 
I asked respondents about the frequency with which they attended services 
during different periods of their lives. I asked the following questions: "How often 
did you attend religious services when you were between 10 and 15 years old?" 
I asked the same question for the ages 10 to 15, 16 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 50, and 
above 50. On the basis of the answers to these questions, I estimated the frequency 
with which a respondent attended religious services at the time of each election. 
I divided the answers into two categories: once a month or more, and less than 
once a month. I only distinguish between religious and non-religious people, and 
between frequent and non-frequent churchgoers. I do so for the same reasons that 
I distinguished only two groups of political parties. This way I avoid erroneous 
classifications. 
In the next two sections I describe how much political and religious 
mobility people experience during their life-course. I want to answer the following 
question: 
100 
INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
S. How large has (a) intragenerational political mobility; and (b) 
intragenerational religious mobility been in the Netherlands during the 
period from 1956 to 1994? 
7.3 Intragenerational political mobility 
In this section I examine how much intragenerational political mobility took place 
in the Netherlands between 1956 and 1994. A first question I ask is how much 
change took place in individual voting behavior and what kind of changes do we 
find most often. I have information on more than one election for most 
respondents, since the respondents were asked to report their voting behavior at all 
previous elections. Table 7.1 presents the number of people voting for secular or 
confessional parties. It compares a person's voting behavior at a certain election 
to that at the time of his or her first vote. As a consequence of the fact that I have 
information on multiple elections for respondents, the number of cases in Table 7.1 
does not refer to the number of respondents, but rather to the number of first vote-
later vote combinations for which I have information. Of course, the voting 
behavior of one individual at a given election is related to his or her voting 
behavior at a later election. In this chapter, I do not control for this intra-individual 
correlation. I do so later on by the method I use in chapter 8. 
Table 7.1 Voting behavior compared to voting behavior at time ol first vote; row percentages between 
brackets (N=9669) 
VOTE AT FIRST ELECTION 
Secular 
Confessional 
Total 
VOTE AT LATER ELECTIONS 
Secular 
5455(96) 
889(22) 
6344(66) 
Confessional 
239 (4) 
3086(78) 
3325(34) 
Total 
5694 (57) 
3975 (41) 
9669 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
Table 7.1 shows that when one casts a first vote for a secular party, it is very 
likely that one keeps on voting for secular parties later in life. Of all cases in 
which people cast their first vote for a secular party, 96% of the subsequent votes 
were cast for secular parties. For the confessional parties it is less likely that the 
voters remain loyal, since only in 78% of the instances were people cast their first 
vote for confessional parties, subsequent votes were cast for confessional parties 
as well. 
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Table 7.2 shows how the loyalties of voters have changed over time. In this 
table I present the percentage of confessional votes for those instances were people 
cast their first vote for a confessional party. 
Table 7.2: Loyal confessional votais; % of confessional votes If first vote was confessional by year (N=3975) 
% loyal confessional votes 
YEAH 
1959 100 
1963 89,0 
1967 85,3 
1971 76,5 
1972 70,3 
1977 81.9 
1981 82,0 
1982 82,6 
1986 76,7 
1989 77,6 
1994 67,2 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
Overall, we see an increase in intragenerational political mobility over time. 
In 1959 the confessional voters were 100% loyal. In 1994 only 67% of those who 
cast their first vote for confessional parties still did so. Between 1959 and 1994 
there seems to have been a period in which the confessional parties were 
temporarily more successful at getting votes from people who had previously voted 
for confessional parties. In 1977, 80% of those whose first vote went to a 
confessional party, voted for a confessional party again in that year. However, after 
1982, after a temporary upswing in loyalty to confessional parties, the general 
downward trend continued. 
It should be noted however, that Tables 7.1 and 7.2 are not based on several 
cross-sectional surveys, but on one survey with retrospective questions about 
previous elections. As a consequence,the data regarding the 1960's refers to young 
people. In 1994, these same people constitute the older segment of my sample. In 
Table 7.3,1 present the percentages of loyal confessional voters over time, while 
separating people belonging to different birth cohorts. This table shows clearly that 
the data regarding the early period was based on only young people. In 1959, the 
oldest people in the sample were 29 years old. 
In general, it seems that with the passage of time the ties to the confessional 
parties become less strong. Early in the voting career, those who cast their first 
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vote for a confessional party, tend to vote confessional later as well. As people get 
older, however, their first vote becomes less influential. For the two birth cohorts 
for which I have information on their vote in the 1977 and earlier elections, there 
is evidence that they temporarily returned to the confessional parties. For the 
youngest birth cohorts, there is an overall decline in influence from the first vote. 
Over time, the percentage still voting confessional decreases. 
Table 7.3: Loyal confessional voters; % of confessional voles If first vote was confessional by cohort and by 
year (N=3975) 
YEAH 
59 63 67 71 72 77 81 BZ 86 89 94 
В и т COHORT 
1930-1939 100 89 84 71 
1940-1949 
1950-1959 
1960-1971 
Average 100 89 85 77 
65 
75 
70 
80 
82 
87 
82 
79 
81 
87 
82 
81 
80 
83 
90 
83 
74 
74 
77 
86 
77 
75 
73 
75 
87 
76 
72 
68 
66 
62 
67 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
7.4 Intragenerational religious mobility 
In this section, I examine patterns and trends in intragenerational religious mobility 
in the Netherlands. Chapter 4 showed that people are most likely to leave the 
church when they are relatively young, and that those who leave the church are not 
likely to return later in life. Therefore, in this section, I do not discuss patterns and 
trends in church membership, but rather I concentrate on church attendance. Table 
7.4 shows how stable people's church attendance was between elections. I present 
the number of people that attend services more or less than once a month by their 
church attendance at the time of their first vote. In other words, it compares the 
church attendance of individuals to their church attending at the time of their first 
vote. Like Table 7.1, the number of cases in this table does not represent the 
number of respondents, but all combinations of church attendance at time of first 
vote with church attendance at all later elections. 
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Table 7.4 Church attendance compared to church attendance at time of first vote; row percentages between 
brackets (N=9669) 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 
AT B M T ELECTION 
<onceamonth 
> once a month 
Total 
CHURCH 
<once 
a month 
5582(99) 
1900(48) 
7482 (75) 
ATTENDANCE 
> once 
a month 
85(2) 
2102 (53) 
2187 (25) 
Total 
5667(57) 
4002(41) 
9669 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
Table 7.4 shows first, that if people did not regularly attend services when they 
first voted, they are unlikely to attend such services later in life. In only 2% of the 
instances in which people attended services less than once a month when they 
were in their late teens or early twenties, they attend services more often in later 
times. Second, in half of the instances in which people regularly attended religious 
services at the time of their first vote, they attend these services less often later in 
life. Thus, we see that it is more likely that people attend religious services less 
often in the course of their life than that they start to attend them more often. This 
shows once again that leaving the church in the Netherlands is a one-way process. 
Chapter 4 showed that people who leave the church hardly ever return. Similarly, 
Table 7.4 shows that people tend to attend services less often over time, and not 
more often. 
ТаЫе 7.5 Loya/ churchgoers: % of churchgoers of those who attended more than once a month at Urne of 
first vote by year (N=4002) 
% loyal churchgoers 
YEAR 
1959 100 
1963 89,7 
1967 86.2 
1971 78,7 
1972 78,7 
1977 73,2 
1981 63,2 
1982 62,0 
1986 46,9 
1989 32,0 
1994 17,2 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
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Next, I will examine how the loyalties of churchgoers have changed over 
time. In Table 7.5 I present the percentage of frequent attenders for those people 
who frequently attended religious services at the time of their first vote. Overall, 
we see a increase in intragenerational religious mobility over time. In 1959 100% 
of those who were frequent churchgoers at the time of their first vote, were loyal 
churchgoers. By contrast, in 1994 only 17% of those who went to church more 
than once a month when they first voted, still frequently attended religious 
services. 
Again, it should be noted that I am not interpreting figures based on several 
cross-sectional surveys, but on one survey with retrospective questions about 
previous elections. In Table 7.6, I therefore present the percentage of loyal 
churchgoers over time, while separating people from different birth cohorts. 
In general, as people get older their ties to the church weaken and they tend 
to attend services less often. In the mid-1970's the oldest cohort temporarily 
stopped this life-cycle trend. The youngest birth cohorts experienced an overall 
decline in the influence of their previous church attendance. Over time, the 
percentage of people who still attend religious services more than once a month 
decreases. 
Table 7.6 Loyal churchgoers: % of churchgoers if attended more than once a month at time of first vote by 
cohort and by year 
YEAH 
59 63 67 71 72 77 81 82 86 89 94 
ΒΙΗΤΉ COHORT 
1930-1939 100 89 86 70 
1940-1949 
1950-1959 
1960-1971 
Average 100 90 86 79 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
The results from Table 7.6 indicate furthermore that church attendance 
when one is young does lead to continued attendance later in life. However, the 
older one gets, the less powerful is the influence of church attendance during one's 
late teens. 
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7.5 The effect of intragenerational religious mobility on political mobility 
In the next chapter I test whether religious mobility is connected to political 
mobility. Anticipating the analyses in chapter 8, I present, only for the stable 
churchgoers, the number of people voting for secular or confessional parties cross-
classified by their first vote. Table 7.7 thus compares the voting behavior of stable 
churchgoers to that of their first vote. 
Table 7.7 Voting behavior compared to voting behavior at time of trst vote tor stable churchgoers; row 
percentages between brackets (N=4002) 
VOTE AT FIRST ELECTION 
Secular 
Confessional 
Total 
1 
Secular 
1006 (91) 
610 (21) 
1616 (40) 
VOTE 
Confessional 
99(9) 
2287(79) 
3325 (60) 
Total 
1105(26) 
2897 (72) 
4002 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
Whereas Table 7.1 displays the level of intragenerational political mobility for all 
voters, Table 7.7 shows the intragenerational political mobility for stable 
churchgoers only. Table 7.7 allows us to draw several conclusions. First, when 
people cast their first vote for a confessional party, it does not matter much 
whether they attend services frequently or infrequently; the pattern in Table 7.7 is 
the same as the pattern in Table 7.1. Of the loyal churchgoers in Table 7.7, in 79% 
of the instances in which people cast their first vote for confessional parties, a later 
vote was also cast for confessional parties. When one puts loyal and disloyal 
churchgoers together, this percentage was 78. 
For those whose first vote went to a secular party, however, it does make 
a difference whether one is a loyal churchgoer or not. Table 7.7 shows for loyal 
churchgoers that in 9% of the instances in which people cast their first vote for a 
secular party, a later vote was cast for confessional parties. Taking loyal and 
disloyal churchgoers together, this percentage was 4. The fact that stable church 
attendance does not greatly influence political mobility suggests that other 
influences from the past make people loyal to the first party for which they voted. 
7.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, I examined how much intragenerational religious and political 
mobility has taken place in the Netherlands. I addressed not only the question of 
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how much mobility took place, but also the question of whether this mobility 
changed over time. 
I found that people are more loyal to secular parties than to confessional 
parties. If one's first vote went to a secular party, the likelihood that one will vote 
for a secular party in a later election is 99 percent. If one's first vote went to a 
confessional party, the likelihood that one will vote for a confessional party in a 
later election is only S3 percent. 
Overall, there is a decrease in loyalty to confessional parties, although there 
seems to have been a short period during which confessional parties were more 
successful in regaining votes from those who had voted for them previously. As 
people get older, however, their first vote becomes less influential. This provides 
some tentative support for the predictions that I derived from the theory of the 
reasoning voter. Information from the past - as measured by the effect of first vote 
on later voting decisions - does influence one's vote in later elections. But this 
effect diminishes. Whether the effect of first vote remains significant will be tested 
in chapter 8. 
I have found that religious mobility follows a pattern similar to that of 
political mobility. First, people who did not regularly attend services when they 
first started to vote are not likely to attend these services later in life. Second, of 
those who did regularly attend religious services at the time of their first vote, 
almost 50% attend these services less frequently later in life. It is therefore more 
likely that will people attend religious services less frequently in the course of time 
than that they do so more frequently. This suggests that leaving the church is a 
one-way process. Over time, intragenerational religious mobility increases. This 
chapter also showed that church attending when one is young makes one to 
continue attending later in life, although the older one gets the smaller is the effect 
of church attendance during the late teens. 
To conclude this chapter, I compared the voting behavior of stable 
churchgoers to their first vote. I found that if one's first vote was for a 
confessional party, it does not matter much whether one attended services 
frequently or infrequently at the time of the first election. If one's first vote went 
to a secular party, however, it does make a difference whether or not one is a loyal 
frequent churchgoer. Loyal churchgoers switch much more frequently than disloyal 
churchgoers to confessional parties in later elections. 
In the next chapter, I examine to what extent previous church attendance 
and previous voting behavior affect voting behavior later in life. Furthermore, I 
examine whether there are still parental influences after controlling for the effects 
of previous church attendance and previous voting behavior. 
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Notes Chapter 7 
1. Part of this chapter is based on an article published in The Netherlands' Journal of 
Social Sciences (Need & De Graaf, 1996b). 
2. CPN: Communist Party; PvdA: Labour Party; PSP: Pacifist Socialist Party; D'66: 
Democrats '66; PPR: Radical Political Party; W D : Liberal Party; CD: Centre 
Democrats; CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; SGP: Political Reformed Party; GPV: 
Reformed Political Union; RPF: Reformed Political Federation; EVP: Evangelical 
People's Party. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE EFFECT OF INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS MOBILITY ON 
POLITICAL MOBILITY 
The results of chapter 6 showed that parental factors account for almost 30% of 
the total influence on political preferences, while 45% of this parental influence 
could be explained by parental religious denomination, parental social class and 
parental vote. This finding supports the hypothesis derived from the theory of the 
reasoning voter, namely that parents transmit not only interests to their children but 
also information about the performance of political parties. In other words, parents 
engage in the political socialization of their children. In chapter 7,1 demonstrated 
that there is more intragenerational stability in voting patterns than would be 
expected on the basis of the pattern in intragenerational religious mobility. This 
suggests that persisting influences from the past make people loyal to political 
parties. 
This chapter provides further support for this theory. I examine whether 
information about politics that one obtained in the past influences whether or not 
one votes for a confessional party later in life. In addition to examining the 
influence of information obtained from one's parents, I explore other sources of 
information, namely churches and schools. I test whether having attended a 
confessional high school during adolescence affects a person's vote later in life. 
Moreover, I test whether previous church attendance affects a person's voting 
behavior independently from current church attendance. 
8.1 The effect of intragenerational religious mobility on political mobility 
In this chapter I explain the individual vote by examining not only a person's own 
current church membership and church attendance but also his or her previous 
church attendance, previous voting behavior and parental voting behavior. I argued 
that voters obtain information about the past performances of political parties from 
those who have experienced the consequences of the actions of these parties. I thus 
predicted that parents would be an important source of information about politics. 
The results of chapters S and 6 show that indeed parents transmit information 
about the performances of political parties as well as interests to their children. 
In this chapter I focus on the past experiences of voters. According to the 
theory of the reasoning voter, voters obtain information about politics as a 
byproduct of activities in their daily Uves. Such activities include attending 
religious services and confessional schools. I assume that, either purposefully or 
casually, people gather information about politics at school and when talking with 
other church members. 
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I use a dynamic approach to examine the impact of religious and political 
socialization. I model political mobility over the life-course using socialization 
indicators as well as changes in religious behavior. My research question in this 
chapter concerns the direct and indirect effects of a person's present attributes, 
previous attributes, and parental attributes on the likelihood that that person will 
vote for a confessional party. To unfold the independent effects of parental, 
previous attributes and current attributes, I determine their relative effects. Hence, 
I ask the following question: 
6. To what extent do previous political preferences have an independent effect 
on a person's later political preferences, if we control for both 
intergenerational and intragenerational religious mobility? 
The way I test the predictions from the theory of the reasoning voter in this 
chapter differs slightly from the procedure I presented in chapter 2.1 test indirectly 
whether churches transmit information about politics to their members, and 
whether this information concerns the interests of their members. It is relevant to 
know not only whether or not people are religious but also how tightly they are 
integrated into their religious communities. I expect that regular churchgoers 
receive more - and more positive - information about the performance of religious 
parties than those who do not attend regularly. If I find that church attendance 
affects voting behavior independently from church membership this suggests that 
churches not only endow their members with religious interests but also - through 
their religious services - transmit information about political parties to churchgoers. 
In chapter 7 I demonstrated that church attendance changes over the life-course. 
Therefore, I examine both the effect of one's current church attendance and that 
of one's previous church attendance. Besides the family and churches, there are 
other sources of information regarding political matters. I test whether schools also 
transmit information about politics to their students. If I find an independent effect 
of having attended a confessional high school during adolescence on voting 
behavior, this suggest that schools do indeed provide information about politics. 
I examine all effects controlling for election year, age and gender. I would 
have preferred to include the year of birth in the analysis as well. However, it was 
impossible to estimate the effects of age, year and year of birth simultaneously 
without suffering from severe multicollinearity. The solution that I discussed in 
chapter 4, namely to include variables with a theoretical meaning, did not solve 
this problem of multicollinearity. Apparently, there is not enough power in this 
chapter's analysis to estimate all these effects simultaneously. However, it is 
important to note that the parameter estimates of all variables did not change when 
I substituted year of birth for election year in this analysis. 
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To answer this chapter's research question, I used the data set that I 
described in chapter 7.1 refer to chapter 7 for a full description of this data. In the 
next section I describe the method I use to test my hypotheses. In section three I 
present the results of this analysis. In section four I discuss the results. 
8 2 Method 
Since I have information about the voting behavior for one or more elections per 
respondent, the data has a hierarchical structure. If I overlooked the fact that I have 
information on multiple observations for respondents, I would underestimate the 
standard errors for the coefficients, and thus I might conclude that certain factors 
have a significant effect on voting behavior, whereas, in fact, these effects are due 
to chance. In educational research, models have been developed to analyze data 
that have a hierarchical structure (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). These multilevel 
models have been used in political sociology to analyze data on voters in 
constituencies in regions (Jones, Johnston & Partie, 1992; Heath & Goldstein, 
1996), on surveys in different years in various countries (Nieuwbeerta, 1995), and 
on siblings in families (Need, 1995; see also chapter 6 of this study). In this 
chapter, I use a multilevel model in which elections are nested within respondents. 
In the model I measure an intercept which I allow to vary between and 
within individuals. The intercept is the average percentage of votes for a confes­
sional party. I try to explain this variance between and within individuals by 
examining the effect of explanatory variables that differ between individuals and 
those that differ within individuals between elections. Examples of the former are 
gender and the attendance of a confessional school during adolescence. An 
example of the latter is frequency of church attendance. 
I use a logistic multilevel model that can be summarized with the following 
two equations: 
Logta/d-Po» = β«, + 6.X.J + Ey (1) 
In equation 1, p¡, is the probability that individual j will vote for a confessional 
party at election i. I then estimate the logit of p¡r log(p,/(lp¡j)) as a function of the 
intercept for individual j , his or her score on the independent variables X^ and 
some random error tiy In this model, the variation of the random term ε4 can be 
summarized by σ\, the variance of the random variation at the level of elections. 
The E,J are assumed to have a binomial distribution. 
In equation 2, I allow the intercept terms βρ, to vary between individuals. 
In this equation, the Uj terms are the individual level random terms, and like the 
£jj terms, they can be summarized with a single variance term σ2,, 
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во, = в0 + μ, (2) 
We can think of this model as allowing for intra-individual correlation, with 
elections within one individual being more alike than elections between 
individuals. To estimate this multilevel model, I use the interactive package MLN 
(Rasbash & Woodhouse, 1995). 
S3 Findings 
Before conducting the multilevel analysis, I describe how social groups differ 
amongst themselves and over time with regard to voting for confessional parties. 
Table 8.1 shows the percentage of people who vote for confessional parties by 
gender, first vote, church membership at the time of first vote, church attendance 
at the time of first vote, church attendance, parental vote, and the type of the 
attended high school. Table 8.1 also shows the average age of voters. 
On the basis of Table 8.1 we can draw the following conclusions: In all 
elections women are more likely to vote for confessional parties than are men. A 
person's first vote seems to have a very strong influence on his or her voting 
behavior. If a person's first vote was cast for a secular party, it is highly unlikely 
that he or she will vote confessional later in life. If a person's first vote was for 
a confessional party, however, it is more likely that he or she will vote for a 
confessional party later in life. However, in later elections the effect of a person's 
first vote becomes smaller than in earlier elections. In the multivariate analysis I 
will test whether the influence of the first vote diminishes significantly as one 
grows older. 
From Table 8.1 we can conclude that church members are more likely than 
non-members to vote for confessional parties, although the difference between 
members and non-members becomes smaller over time. Attending church at the 
time of a person's first vote also affects the likelihood that he or she will vote for 
a confessional party. Those who attend church regularly at the time of their first 
vote will largely support confessional parties, while those who were infrequent 
churchgoers at the time of their first vote tend largely to support secular parties. 
Current church attendance affects voting behavior more strongly than does 
previous church attendance, since current churchgoers are more likely to vote for 
confessional parties than are those who attended services frequently at the time of 
their first vote. 
There is also a strong relationship between parental vote and the likelihood 
that a person will vote for a confessional party. If one's parents voted for a 
confessional party, one is more likely to do so oneself than if one's parents voted 
for secular parties. Over time, this relationship seems to diminish. Finally, Table 
8.1 shows that voting for confessional parties is also related to having attended a 
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confessional high school. Those who attended a confessional high school are more 
likely to vote for confessional parties than those who attended a public high 
school. 
To be able to ascertain precisely the direct and indirect effects on voting behavior 
I conduct a multivariate analysis. Since I want to examine the effect that first vote 
has as an independent variable on later voting behavior, I cannot treat first vote as 
a dependent variable as well. Thus, to gain some understanding of the factors that 
influence first vote, I conduct an analysis of first vote the results of which are 
presented in Table 8.2. To arrive at a causal model, I estimated two different 
models. In model 1,1 estimated the effects of age, gender, parental vote and the 
type of high school one attended. I also control for the year of the election. Model 
1 shows that the type of high school and parental vote significantly affect a 
person's first vote. When casting their first vote, people who went to a 
confessional high school and those whose parents voted for confessional parties are 
more likely than others to vote for a confessional party. Furthermore, those casting 
their first vote in 1972 were significantly less likely than those who cast their first 
vote in 19S9 to support a confessional party. In no other year did the first vote 
differ significantly from that in 1959. 
Model 2 adds church membership and church attendance to model 1. Once 
these characteristics are added, the effects of parental vote and the type of high 
school one attended become weaker but remain significant. This suggests that 
people vote not only according to their interests - as demonstrated by the 
significant effect of church membership - but also according to information about 
political matters obtained in the past. The results support the predictions I derived 
from the theory of the reasoning voter: people receive information not only from 
their parents - as demonstrated by the significant effect of parental vote - but also 
from the church - as demonstrated by the significant effect of church attendance -
and from school - as demonstrated by the significant effect of the type of high 
school. 
Table 8.2 provided some insight into those factors that influence first vote. 
In the following analysis I will examine whether these influences remain in later 
elections. Table 8.3 shows the results of my multilevel analysis. This table contains 
the parameter estimates and their standard errors. An asterie indicates whether a 
parameter significantly differs from 0. The last two rows of Table 8.3 shows 
distribution of the variance between individuals and between elections. The 
parameter estimates in Table 8.3 refer to the effects of the different independent 
variables on the likelihood than an individual i in election j will vote for a 
confessional party. 
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I estimated five different models. In the first model I estimated an overall 
constant and the different variance terms (within and between elections). In model 
2,1 estimated the effects of age, gender, parental vote and the type of high school 
one attended. In model 3,1 included church membership and church attendance at 
the time of first vote as independent variables. As with the procedure I followed 
in chapters 5 and 6, my goal in this chapter is to elucidate the causal order which 
factors impact voting behavior. In model 4,1 included first vote and an interaction 
of first vote with age in the analysis. I expect that a person's first vote has a 
significant impact on the likelihood that he or she will still vote for a confessional 
party later on. However, I expect that as people grow older, they will obtain 
information about politics from other sources, and that therefore the effect of first 
vote will diminish. Furthermore, I expect to find that the effects of parental vote, 
type of high school, church membership and church attendance at the time of first 
vote are all mediated through the first vote. That is why I expect these effects to 
disappear after controlling for a person's first vote. In the final model, model 5, 
I included present church attendance. Even after taking into account a person's 
current interest, I expect to still find an independent effect of a person's first vote 
on the likelihood that he or she will vote for a confessional party later in life. 
The data support most of my hypotheses. In model 2, I find indeed significant 
effects of parental vote and the type of high school attended. People whose parents 
voted for a confessional party are more likely than people whose parents did not 
do so to vote for a confessional party. People who attended a confessional high 
school are more likely to vote for a confessional party than people who did not do 
so. Regardless of church membership and church attendance at the time of first 
vote, the way one's parents voted and the type of high school one attended 
significantly affect one's later voting behavior. The effects of church membership 
and church attendance at the time of first vote are also significant. These results 
are similar to the findings in Table 8.2. With respect to the factors influencing 
voting behavior, there does not seem to be a difference between people's first vote 
and all their later votes. 
In model 4,1 included first vote as an independent variable in the analysis. 
As I expected, the effects of parental vote, high school attended and church 
attendance at the time of first vote are mediated through a person's first vote. Even 
after taking into account a person's first vote, church membership at the time of 
first vote significantly shapes later voting behavior. This indicates that previous 
church membership has a direct effect on the likelihood that a person will vote for 
a confessional party, regardless of his or her first vote. The effect of a person's 
first vote diminishes significantly as one grows older. However, even in the case 
of the oldest age group, first vote significantly affects later voting behavior. 
116 
Table β.2 Logistic regression results of first vote (N-1145) 
iNTRAGENEBjmONAL MOBILITY 
Model 1 Model 2 
Constant Τ 5 Ϊ -3.76 
GENDER 
Male 
Female 0.14 0.11 
TYPE or нюн SCHOOL 
РиЫІс 
Confessional 1.20* 0.64* 
PARENTAL VOTE 
Secular 
Confessional 2.15' 1.85* 
CHURCH MEMBERS«? 
Non-member 
Church member 1.25* 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE 
< once a month 
> once a month 1.27* 
YEAR 
1959 
1963 0.07 -0.06 
1967 -0.05 0.05 
1971 -1.15* -0.80 
1972 -1.41* -1.51* 
1977 -0.22 0.00 
1981 -0.09 0.33 
1982 0.28 0.23 
1986 0.06 0.58 
19B9 0.01 0.65 
1994 -1.13 -0.22 
Source: Telepanel survey 1994; own calculations 
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In model S I included current church attendance as an independent variable. 
Current church attendance significantly affects the likelihood that a person will 
vote for a confessional party. Previous church membership has an additional 
significant effect. This suggests that voting behavior is not only shaped by current 
information - as demonstrated by the significant effect of current church attendance 
- but also by information obtained in the past - as demonstrated by the significant 
effect of first vote. Gender does not affect voting behavior significantly but age 
does. Older people are more likely to vote for confessional parties than are 
younger people. Over time, support for confessional parties has decreased 
significantly. 
8.5 Discussion 
In this chapter I examined whether information about politics obtained in the past 
influences the likelihood that a person will vote for a confessional party later in 
life. In addition to parents as a source of information about politics, I explored 
other sources of information, namely churches and schools. I tested whether having 
attended a confessional high school during adolescence still affects how one votes 
later in life. Moreover, I tested whether previous church attendance affects voting 
behavior independently from current church attendance. 
Most importantly, this chapter has provided evidence to support the 
predictions I derived from the theory of the reasoning voter. I found that previous 
church attendance, parental vote and having attended a religious high school 
substantially affect the likelihood that a person will vote for a confessional party. 
Thus, voters do obtain information about politics from sources other than their 
parents. The effect of these sources of information are mediated through the first 
vote. The effect of a person's first vote diminishes as one grows older but remains 
significant. This suggests, in other words, that information obtained in the past 
does affect how people vote. 
The application of recall data for the study of religious voting seems 
promising. I find trends similar to those found by researchers who used time-series 
of cross-sectional data. The bias that is often assumed to characterize the recall of 
respondents does not seem to have affected my conclusions significantly. The 
advantages of using recall data, however, are that I was able to test the changing 
effects of previous characteristics over a considerable period of time. Thus, I was 
able to gain insight into the dynamics of change. 
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PART 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this study I described and explained the pattern of political mobility in the 
Netherlands over the past few decades. The central issue I addressed was: Why 
do some people experience a great deal of political mobility, others less, while 
some experience no political mobility at all? In Part 1 I introduced my research 
subject and the theory from which I derived new predictions regarding the 
effect of past experiences on voting decisions later in life. In Part 2,1 tested my 
hypotheses regarding the effect of one's past experiences with one's parents on 
voting behavior. The results suggest that parents transmit not only interests to 
their children but information about politics as well. I also examined the size of 
the total influence of a person's parents on his or her voting behavior. 
In Part 3, I examined whether information about politics obtained earlier in life 
influences whether or not a person votes for a confessional party later in life. I 
also examined how sources of information other than one's parents, namely 
churches and schools, influence a person's voting behavior. I tested whether 
having attended a confessional high school affects how one votes later in life. 
Moreover, I examined whether previous church attendance affects voting 
behavior independently from current church attendance. The results suggest that 
information gained in the past does indeed affects a person's voting behavior 
later in life. 
In this Part I briefly summarize my main fmdings. I also discuss the 
implications of these results and conclude with suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
9.1 Introduction 
I started this study with the observation that support for confessional parties in the 
Netherlands has followed a remarkable pattern since World War I. There was 
stability until 1963, then vast change, followed by stability from 1972 until 1989 
and then once again great change. I then proceeded to examine, among others, 
why, given the rapid decline in the number of religious people in the Netherlands 
from the 1960's onward, the confessional political parties did not lose their support 
much earlier. I offered an explanation based on the idea that leaving the church 
may not have an immediate effect on voting decisions. 
To gain a better understanding of the process of political change, I 
examined both intergenerational political mobility - electoral changes between 
parents and their adult children - and intragenerational political mobility - changes 
in individual voting behavior over the life-course. To understand these two kinds 
of changes in voting behavior, I examined whether people's changing social class 
position and changing religious preferences might be possible causes. It has been 
argued that social class and religious denomination do not offer a satisfactory 
explanation for changes in party choice, since these attributes do not change much 
over the life-course (Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b). I argued, by contrast, that 
these characteristics are more and more prone to change. Therefore, I sought to 
explain the increasing levels of political mobility by considering both intra- and 
intergenerational social and religious mobility. 
In chapter 2, I elaborated on the theory of the reasoning voter (Popkin, 
1991). I argued that this theory integrates a sociological approach to voting 
behavior with an economic one. The theory of the reasoning voter assumes that the 
expected gains of being an informed consumer in the economic market for private 
goods are higher than those of being an informed voter in the political market for 
collective goods. The notion of "low information rationality" is central in this 
theory. This notion of rationality presumes that, since public and private goods are 
so different in nature, it is not beneficial to voters to spend much time gathering 
information about politics. First, even if time spent gathering information about 
politics leads to a better vote, this does not ensure that one's preferred party will 
be elected, let alone one's preferred coalition will be formed. Therefore, it is 
rational for voters to not invest as much time gathering information about public 
policy and government activities as they do gathering information about consumer 
choices. Hence, most of the information about politics that people use comes from 
experiences in their daily lives. Second, since voting is a form of collective action, 
enough voters need to vote for the same party to win the election. Voters will 
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therefore focus not only on their own concerns and preferences but also on those 
of others. Voters will be influenced by what other voters are doing, especially 
those in similar circumstances. And third, public choices involve the provision of 
services. Voters have to judge the likelihood that parties will keep to the promises 
they make with respect to these services. And fourth, it is not rational for voters 
to pay much attention to the policies that politicians promise. Since all parties 
inflate such promises during election campaigns, it is quite rational for voters to 
rely on the parties' past record rather than according to their future promises. For 
this information to be reliable, it must come not from the parties themselves, but 
from those who have experienced the consequences of the decisions of these 
political parties. Among those who inform voters about politics are their parents. 
This is particularly relevant in cases of social or religious mobility when parents 
do not transmit interests but might transmit information about records of political 
parties. In this study I provided evidence to support this theory, sometimes in the 
form of direct evidence, sometimes in the form of indirect evidence. Popkin's 
(1991) test of the theory of the reasoning voter concentrated on the short-term 
effects of electoral campaigns. I focused on some other implications of the theory. 
If people are really affected by how parties have performed in the past, one could 
expect to find not only the short-term effects of campaigns but also the long-term 
effects of parties' keeping or not keeping their campaign promises. I focused on 
the long-term influences on political preferences. Rather than directly testing the 
theory, I made new predictions on the effect of social attributes on voting, and on 
the intergenerational transmission of political preferences. 
I addressed several questions regarding social, religious and political 
mobility. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss my answers to these 
questions, and review their implications for the theory of the reasoning voter. 
9.2 Questions about intergenerational political mobility 
I answered four questions about intergenerational mobility. The first of these 
questions was descriptive and concerned the amount of intergenerational social, 
religious and political mobility in the Netherlands. I formulated this question, 
which I answered in chapter 3, in the following manner: 
1. How large has (a) intergenerational political mobility; (b) intergenerational 
social mobility; and (c) intergenerational religious mobility been in the 
Netherlands during the period from 1970 to 1994? 
Using surveys conducted from 1970 to 1994,1 examined not only the amount of 
the different types of mobility, but also whether these types of mobility altered 
over time. Furthermore, I addressed the question of whether the changes in 
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mobility over time are due to generational replacement, or whether these changes 
affect all generations similarly. 
The results of chapter 3 showed that there is more intergenerational social 
mobility than intergenerational political or religious mobility in the Netherlands. 
There is also more political mobility than religious mobility: 72% of the 
respondents assume the religion of their parents, whereas only 57% of the 
respondents take over their parents' political preferences. Finally, 33% of the 
respondents have the same social class position as their father. Intergenerational 
religious mobility in the Netherlands has a particular character: most people who 
are religiously mobile leave the church, while switching denominations is 
extremely rare. 
There has been an increase in intergenerational political mobility over time. 
In 1970, 65% of the respondents voted for the same group of parties as did their 
parents. In 1994 this percentage was 47. For social or religious mobility to be able 
to serve as a possible explanation for this trend in political mobility, one should 
be able to detect a similar trend in their patterns. Chapter 3 showed that there has 
been an increase in social mobility over time. In 1970, 40% of the respondents 
belonged to the same social class as their fathers did. By 1994 this percentage had 
declined to 30. Religious mobility has increased much more strongly than social 
mobility has. The percentage of people who leave the church increased from 20% 
in 1970 to 42% in 1994. Hence, it is more likely that religious mobility could 
explain the trend in political mobility than that social mobility could do so. 
All three types of intergenerational mobility increased over time. In chapter 
3, I considered two explanations for this decrease in parent-children similarity. 
First, the increase might be due to a generational replacement. People bom during 
earlier generations may be more likely than those bom during later generations to 
resemble their parents with regard to social class, religion or politics. Second, it 
is possible that both younger and older cohorts became more mobile over time. 
This second hypothesis does not contradict the first one, since younger cohorts 
may have had a starting point different from that of older cohorts. 
The results of chapter 3 allowed me to conclude that the increase in 
intergenerational political mobility is mainly due to the succession of generations. 
The results of chapter 3 did not allow me to determine unambiguously whether or 
not the decline in the intergenerational transmission of social class is related to the 
succession of the generations. I was able to conclude that the decline in parent-
children similarity with respect to religion is largely due to generational 
replacement. However, over time there has been more intergenerational religious 
mobility for everyone, regardless of the period in which one was born. Therefore, 
I concluded that the decline in church membership which we find in the 
Netherlands is related to both the succession of generations and period effects. 
In chapter 4 I examined the reasons why people leave the church. I 
answered the following question: 
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2. Which individual and structural characteristics cause people to leave the 
church in the Netherlands? 
I tested specific hypotheses derived from earlier studies by using a dynamic 
approach. Previously, church membership has been considered a situation that does 
not change over time. People are regarded as either church members or as non-
members. By contrast, I treated disaffiliation as a process during which church 
members can either remain church members or become non-members. By using 
a discrete event history model to estimate the conditional likelihood of leaving the 
church, I was able to ascertain the effects of the following individual attributes: 
education, parental education, parental religious homogamy, religious homogamy, 
frequency of attending services in childhood and religious denomination. I was also 
able to ascertain the effects of the following contextual attributes: the percentage 
of non-members in the province in which one lives, and the percentage of non-
members in the province in which one lived during adolescence. 
I found the following results with regard to individual attributes: Five 
variables meet the significance criterion. One's age, education, religious 
denomination, the church membership of one's spouse and the percentage of non-
members in the province in which one lives all significantly affect the likelihood 
that one will leave the church. Contrary to what is commonly believed, parental 
religious homogamy, parental education, the frequency with which parents attended 
services when one was IS, and the percentage of non-members in the province in 
which one lived during adolescence do not directly affect the likelihood that one 
will leave the church. 
In the remainder of the study I focused on the relationship between social 
and religious mobility on the one hand, and political mobility on the other hand. 
In chapter 5, I examined whether social and religious mobility could explain the 
pattern of intergenerational political mobility in the Netherlands. The theory of the 
reasoning voter predicts that voters do not vote according to political parties' 
promises about the future but rather according to the records they built up in the 
past. People obtain information about these records from those who have 
experienced the consequences of the decisions of political parties. I argued that 
among those who inform voters about politics are their parents. Since people tend 
to take over the social class and religious denomination of their parents, and since 
members of classes and religious denominations tend to vote for those parties that 
promote their interests, parents also transmit interests. In chapter 5 I answered the 
following question: 
3. To what extent does the relationship between the political preferences of 
parents and the political preferences of their children remain if we control 
for intergenerational social and intergenerational religious mobility? 
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I tested first, whether parents transmit information to their children and second, 
whether this information concerns the interests of voters. My results showed that 
parents indeed transmit information about politics to their children. That the effects 
of parental social class and parental religious denomination are mediated through 
parental vote suggests that parents transmit information about their interest to their 
children. These effects of parental social class and parental religious denomination 
are also mediated by a person's own social class and religious denomination. This 
suggests that parents transmit not only information but also interests. However, 
since parental voting behavior strongly affects a person's own vote independently 
from his or her social class and religious denomination, this confirms that parents 
also inform their children about the political parties for which they voted. 
The voting behavior of a person's parents strongly and directly affects his 
or her voting behavior. This effect is even stronger than that of one's own social 
class or religious denomination. It is possible, however, that yet other factors 
pertaining to family background influence how people vote. Therefore, chapter 6 
focused on the total effect of family background on voting behavior. To do so, I 
compared siblings. My fourth research question concerned the size and the 
mechanisms of family influence: 
4. To what extent is the voting behavior of siblings influenced by (a) 
individual characteristics and (b) parental characteristics? 
The results of chapter 6 showed that 30% of the variance in political preferences 
is due to the characteristics of the family of origin, and more than 70% of the 
variance in political preferences can be attributed to individual factors. These 
results support the theory of the reasoning voter because it predicts that voters are 
influenced by their family background. Almost 45% of the family influence is 
explained by parental political preferences, parental social class and parental 
religious denomination. Since most of the family influence can not be accounted 
for, it seems that family influences voting behavior more than is commonly 
assumed. The total family influence encompasses all that siblings have in common. 
Usually, siblings grow up in the same neighbourhood and attend the same school. 
Both these factors may also affect how people vote. In Part 3, on intragenerational 
political mobility, I tried to gain more insight into the ways that family influences 
voting behavior. 
93 Questions about intragenerational political mobility 
In Part 3 of this study I examined intragenerational political mobility. Because of 
the relatively small impact that social class has on voting behavior in the 
Netherlands, I focused on the relationship between religion and confessional 
voting. I concentrated on religious mobility as a possible explanation for individual 
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changes in voting behavior over the life-course. As the results of chapter 3 and 4 
indicated, religious mobility in the Netherlands takes the form of leaving the 
church rather than of switching denominations. First I explored the descriptive 
question regarding the amount of intragenerational religious and political mobility 
in the Netherlands. Then I sought to answer an explanatory question about how 
intragenerational religious mobility affects intragenerational political mobility. I 
answered both questions with the aid of recall data. Given that recall data can be 
biased, I discussed first the quality of recall data in general, and then the specific 
procedure which I used to obtain retrospective data on religious and political 
careers. 
Retrospective questions about voting behavior during previous elections are 
not considered to be very accurate (Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1989; 1983b). 
However, compared to panel data, it has been shown that even though a substantial 
number of recalls were inconsistent, this did not lead to substantially different 
conclusions about to the characteristics of different kind of voters (Van der Eijk 
& Niemöller, 1983). I took two steps to mitigate the possible problems involved 
with recall data. I used a procedure to give respondents information regarding the 
elections about which they are questioned. I also distinguished only between 
confessional and non-confessional parties. Both steps presumably lead to lower 
numbers of misreports. 
In chapter 7,1 answered the following descriptive question: 
5. How large has (a) intragenerational political mobility; and (b) 
intragenerational religious mobility been in the Netherlands over the last 
decades? 
Chapter 4 showed that people are most likely to leave the church when they are 
relatively young, and that those who leave the church are not likely to return later 
in life. For this reason, I did not discuss patterns of church membership over the 
life-course. Instead, I focused on trends in church attendance. 
I found that people are more loyal to secular parties than to confessional 
parties. If a person's cast his or her first vote for a secular party, the likelihood 
that he or she continues to do so in the future is 99%. If a person's first vote went 
to a confessional party, the likelihood that he or she would do the same in a later 
election is only 53%. 
Overall, loyalty to confessional patties has declined, although there was a 
short period during which confessional parties succeeded in regaining votes from 
those who had previously supported them. As people get older, however, their first 
vote becomes less influential. 
I found that religious mobility follows a pattern similar to that of political 
mobility. First, people who did not attend services regularly when they first started 
to vote, are not likely to attend such services later in life. Second, of those who 
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did attend religious services regularly at the time of their first vote, almost 50% 
attend such services less frequently later in life. It is thus more likely that people 
attend religious services less often in the course of their life than that they attend 
such services more often. This indicates that abandoning religion is a one-way 
process. Over time, intragenerational religious mobility has increased. The results 
of chapter 7 also showed that attending religious services during adolescence leads 
one to continue attending later in life. However, the older one gets, the less it 
matters whether none attended church as an adolescent. 
Anticipating the explanatory analysis of chapter 8, I compared the later 
voting behavior of loyal churchgoers with their first vote. I found that if one's first 
vote went to a confessional party, whether or not one attended services frequently 
at that time does not affect one's later voting behavior. If one's first vote went to 
a secular party, however, it does make a difference whether or not one is a loyal 
churchgoer. Loyal churchgoers are much more likely than other voters to switch 
to confessional parties at later elections. In chapter 8 I answered the following 
explanatory question: 
6. To what extent do previous political preferences have an independent effect 
on a person's later political preferences, if we control for both 
intergenerational and intragenerational religious mobility? 
According to the theory of the reasoning voter, voters not only vote according to 
their interests, but they also use information about the records of political parties 
when making their voting decisions. In chapters 5 and 6, I examined only one 
source of information, namely parents. In chapter 8,1 examined two other sources 
of information, namely churches and schools. 
The results of chapter 8 suggest evidence in favour of my predictions 
derived from the theory of the reasoning voter. I found that previous church 
attendance, parental vote and attending a religious high school all substantially 
affect one's later voting behavior. This shows that voters do obtain information 
about politics from sources other than their parents. These three effects are all 
mediated through a person's first vote. The direct effect of the first vote diminishes 
as one grows older but remains evident. This suggests that information obtained 
in the past does affect how people vote. 
9.4 Discussion 
This study focused on how voting behavior is shaped by long-term influences. I 
derived predictions from the theory of the reasoning voter regarding the effects that 
parents have on the voting behavior of their children. I was able to provide 
evidence to support the hypotheses derived from this general theory. If the past 
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performances of parties really affect how people vote, then campaigns will not 
only have short-term effects but long-term effects as well. I therefore focused on 
the factors that influence political preferences in the long run. This study has 
shown that, even if short-term influences do shape voting behavior significantly, 
the long-term influences must not be neglected. The impact of parental vote, for 
instance, is much stronger than that of one's own characteristics. 
Instead of directly testing the hypotheses regarding information which are 
already part of the theory of the reasoning voter, I derived new predictions about 
the effects of social attributes on voting and about the intergenerational 
transmission of political preferences. To gain a better understanding of the process 
of political change, I examined both intergenerational political mobility and 
intragenerational political mobility. I examined to what extent changes in people's 
social class position and religious preferences could explain these patterns. This 
approach proved to be very fruitful. This study explained not only why individual 
characteristics such as church membership change but also why these changes 
might affect a person's voting behavior. 
A well known scientific rule is that when theory can integrate several 
different theories, and when the implications of this more general theory lead to 
new predictions, scientists should use this more general theory (Ultee, Arts & Flap, 
1992). The theory of the reasoning voter constitutes such an integrating theory. 
First of all, it offers a synthesis between the sociological and the economic 
approach, i.e. it combines theories from different disciplines. This integrating 
theory allows me to make the same predictions as do the sociological and 
economic approach. Second, it allows me to derive new hypotheses. While the 
theory of the reasoning voter (Popkin, 1991) was originally applied to the short-
term effects of political campaigns, I tested its other implications. This study 
provided evidence to support these new hypotheses. 
In the chapters on intergenerational mobility I examined how a person's 
parents were a source of information. In the chapters on intragenerational mobility 
I examined other sources of information namely churches and school. Given that 
religious high schools lead people to vote for confessional parties one might 
expect, for example, that private schools in Britain might cause people to vote for 
the Conservative party. Yet other predictions can be derived from this general 
theory by postulating more sources of information and interests. Hence, this theory 
based on low information rationality seems to be a promising theoretical guideline 
for future research. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Vertrekpunt van deze studie is de constatering dat de partij-aanhang van de 
confessionele politieke partijen in Nederland sinds de Eerste Wereldoorlog een 
merkwaardig patroon vertoont. Ter illustratie: tussen 1918 en 1963 kregen de 
confessionele partijen rond de 33% van alle stemmen. In 1918 behaalden ze 
50% van alle geldige stemmen en in 1963 was dit percentage 52. Tijdens de 
verkiezingen van 1967 keerden de kiezers de confessionele partijen massaal de 
rug toe: alle confessionele partijen samen verkregen toen nog maar 47% van 
alle stemmen. Tussen 1967 en 1994 heeft het percentage mensen dat op 
confessionele partijen stemt rond de 35% gefluctueerd. In 1994 stemde slechts 
27% van alle kiezers op een confessionele partij. Deze studie geeft onder meer 
antwoord op de vraag waarom de confessionele partijen, gegeven het feit dat 
sinds de jaren 60 het aantal kerkleden gestaag afnam, hun aanhang niet veel 
eerder hebben verloren. De verklaring die hiervoor gegeven wordt komt er op 
neer dat kerkverlaters niet onmiddellijk op een niet-confessionele partij gaan 
stemmen. 
Om meer inzicht te krijgen in het proces van politieke verandering is er 
voor gekozen om zowel veranderingen in stemgedrag tussen ouders en hun 
volwassen kinderen als veranderingen in het stemgedrag van individuen tijdens 
hun leven bekijken. De eerste soort veranderingen noem ik intergenerationele 
politieke mobiliteit, de tweede soort intragenerationele politieke mobiliteit. Voor 
een verklaring van beide soorten veranderingen is gekeken naar veranderingen 
in de klassepositie die mensen innemen en naar veranderingen in 
kerklidmaatschap en kerkgang. Sommige auteurs menen dat deze sociaal-
structurele kenmerken geen bevredigende verklaring kunnen vormen voor 
veranderingen in stemgedrag omdat deze kenmerken niet aan verandering 
onderhevig zouden zijn (Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983b). Deze studie laat 
echter zien dat deze kenmerken juist wél, en in toenemende mate aan 
verandering onderhevig zijn. Daarom is in deze studie de verklaring van de 
toenemende mate van politieke mobiliteit gezocht in zowel intra- als 
intergenerationele sociale en religieuze mobiliteit. 
Een verklaring voor veranderingen in politieke-partijvoorkeur bood de 
theorie van de 'redenerende kiezer' (Popkin, 1991). In hoofdstuk 2 werd een 
beschrijving gegeven van deze theorie. Uitgangspunt van de theorie van de 
redenerende kiezer is dat het mensen meer opbrengt om informatie over de 
aanschaf van consumptie-goederen te krijgen dan om op zoek te gaan naar 
informatie over de beloften van politieke partijen. Kiezers stemmen volgens 
deze theorie wél op rationele gronden, maar ze doen dit op grond van weinig 
informatie. Deze vorm van rationaliteit volgt onmiddellijk uit het verschil tussen 
collectieve goederen en privé-goederen. Ten eerste, zelfs als de tijd die kiezers 
investeren om informatie over politieke partijen te krijgen er toe leidt dat ze een 
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'betere' keuze voor een politieke partij kunnen maken, dan betekent dit nog niet 
dat andere kiezers ook op deze partij zullen stemmen, laat staan dat de coalitie 
die men verkiest ook werkelijk gevormd wordt. Het is dus rationeel voor 
kiezers om niet zoveel tijd te investeren in het zoeken naar informatie over 
politieke partijen en kabinetsbesluiten als in het zoeken naar informatie over de 
aanschaf van consumptie-goederen. Daarom zullen kiezers informatie over 
politiek gebruiken die ze verkregen hebben op grond van ervaringen in het 
dagelijkse leven. Ten tweede, omdat stemmen een collectieve actie is, moeten 
er genoeg kiezers op dezelfde partij stemmen om de verkiezingen te winnen. 
Daarom zullen kiezers zich niet alleen richten op hun eigen belangen en 
voorkeuren, maar ook op die van anderen. Kiezers zullen daarom worden 
beïnvloed door wat anderen stemmen, in het bijzonder door wat anderen in 
vergelijkbare omstandigheden stemmen. Ten derde, publieke keuzen omvatten 
de voorziening van publieke diensten. Kiezers moeten inschatten in hoeverre 
politieke partijen zich aan hun beloften zullen houden. In deze studie is aan dit 
argument toegevoegd dat het niet rationeel is om veel aandacht te besteden aan 
de beloftes van politieke partijen. Omdat alle partijen tijdens 
verkiezingscampagnes meer beloftes doen dan ze waar maken, is het rationeel 
voor kiezers om niet op de beloftes van de partijen af te gaan, maar om in 
plaats daarvan af te gaan op wat deze partijen in het verleden hebben gedaan. 
Om als betrouwbaar te worden waargenomen, moet informatie hierover niet 
komen van de partijen zelf, maar juist van mensen die de gevolgen van eerdere 
beslissingen van politieke partijen hebben ondervonden. Onder degenen die 
mensen informatie over politiek geven behoren ook iemands ouders. Ouders 
geven niet alleen vaak hun sociale positie en religie door aan hun kinderen, 
maar daarnaast krijgen kinderen ook informatie over politiek van hun ouders. 
Popkin (1991) heeft zijn theorie getoetst door te kijken naar de korte 
termijn-effecten van verkiezingscampagnes. In deze studie zijn andere 
voorspellingen uit deze algemene theorie afgeleid. Als mensen daadwerkelijk 
worden beïnvloed door de acties van partijen in het verleden, dan zullen er niet 
alleen korte-termijneffecten van campagnes zijn, maar ook lange-termijneffecten 
van het waarmaken of niet waarmaken van eerdere beloftes. In deze studie ligt 
de nadruk op deze lange-termijneffecten. In plaats van het direct toetsen van de 
theorie over informatie, werden voorspellingen getoetst over de invloed van 
sociaal-structurele kenmerken op stemgedrag en over de intergenerationele 
overdracht van de politieke-partijvoorkeur. 
In deze studie zijn in deel 2 vier vragen beantwoord die betrekking 
hadden op intergenerationele mobiliteit. De eerste vraag, die met behulp van 
enquêtes gehouden in de periode tussen 1970 en 1994 in hoofdstuk 3 werd 
beantwoord was de volgende: 
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1. Hoe groot is de (1) intergenerationele politieke mobiliteit; (b) 
intergenerationele sociale mobiliteit; en (с) intergenerationele religieuze 
mobiliteit in Nederland in de periode tussen 1970 en 1994? 
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 3 lieten zien dat er meer intergenerationele sociale 
mobiliteit is dan intergenerationele politieke of religieuze mobiliteit. Er is ook 
meer politieke mobiliteit dan religieuze mobiliteit: 72% van de mensen neemt 
de religie van hun ouders over, terwijl 57% van de mensen de politieke 
partijvoorkeur van hun ouders overneemt, en slechts 33% van de mensen 
eenzelfde klassepositie als de vader heeft. De religieuze mobiliteit in Nederland 
blijkt ook nog een specifieke vorm aan te nemen: de meeste mensen verlaten de 
kerk, het veranderen van kerk of geloofsgenootschap komt in Nederland niet 
veel voor. 
Er is een stijging in de mate van intergenerationele politieke mobiliteit. 
In 1970 stemde 65% van de mensen op dezelfde groep partijen als hun ouders, 
in 1994 was dit percentage 47. Wanneer we naar sociale of religieuze mobiliteit 
kijken als een mogelijke verklaring voor deze trend, dan zouden we een min of 
meer parallelle trend in sociale of religieuze mobiliteit moeten vinden. 
Hoofdstuk 3 liet zien dat er een trend naar toenemende sociale mobiliteit is. In 
1970 behoorde 40% van de mensen tot dezelfde sociale klasse als hun vader, in 
1994 was dit percentage nog maar 30. De toename van de religieuze mobiliteit 
is echter veel sterker dan de toename in sociale mobiliteit. Het percentage 
kerkverlaters steeg van 20% in 1970 tot 42% in 1994. Het is dus 
waarschijnlijker dat religieuze mobiliteit en niet sociale mobiliteit een 
verklaring kan bieden voor de stijging in politieke mobiliteit. 
In hoofdstuk 4 werden de oorzaken van kerkverlating bekeken. De vraag 
die in dit hoofdstuk werd beantwoord is de volgende: 
2. Welke individuele en structurele kenmerken beïnvloeden de kans op 
kerkverlating in Nederland? 
In hoofdstuk 4 werden specifieke hypothesen over kerkverlating getoetst, 
gebruikmakend van een dynamische benadering. In het verleden werd 
kerklidmaatschap opgevat als een vaststaand kenmerk van mensen. Volgens 
deze benadering kunnen mensen al of niet kerklid zijn. In tegenstelling tot deze 
statische benadering wordt kerkverlating in hoofdstuk 4 als een proces opgevat 
waarin kerkleden ofwel kerklid blijven ofwel de kerk verlaten. Gebruik makend 
van gebeurtenissenanalyse werd de kans geschat dat bepaalde individuele 
kenmerken en contextuele kenmerken een effect hebben op kerkverlating. 
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 lieten zien dat zowel individuele als 
structurele kenmerken de kans op kerkverlating beïnvloeden. Leeftijd, opleiding, 
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denominatie, kerklidmaatschap van de partner en het percentage onkerkelijken 
in de provincie waar men woont beïnvloeden de kans op kerkverlating. In 
tegenstelling tot wat algemeen wordt aangenomen hebben een gemengd 
huwelijk van de ouders, de opleiding van de ouders en de mate van kerkgang 
van de ouders geen significante invloed op kerkverlating. 
In hoofdstuk 5 werd het patroon in intergenerationele politieke mobiliteit 
in Nederland verklaard met intergenerationele sociale en religieuze mobiliteit. 
Volgens de theorie van de redenerende kiezer laten kiezers zich bij de keuze 
voor een bepaalde partij niet leiden door de belonen die partijen maken tijdens 
campagnes, maar letten ze meer op wat deze partijen in het verleden hebben 
gedaan. Informatie hierover krijgen mensen van diegenen die de gevolgen van 
de acties van politieke partijen hebben ervaren en op grond van hun eigen 
ervaringen. Onder de mensen die informatie geven over politiek kunnen 
iemands ouders worden gerekend. Ouders dragen niet alleen informatie over 
politiek over aan hun kinderen. Mensen hebben vaak dezelfde klassepositie en 
dezelfde religie als hun ouders. Voor mensen in bepaalde klassen en voor 
mensen met een bepaalde religie is het meer in hun belang om op bepaalde 
partijen te stemmen dan op andere partijen. Op deze wijze geven ouders niet 
alleen informatie over politiek, maar ze dragen ook hun belangen over aan hun 
kinderen. Verder kunnen mensen zich bij hun stemgedrag niet alleen laten 
leiden door hun eigen sociale klasse positie en religie, maar ook door de sociale 
klasse positie en religie van de ouders. De vraag die in hoofdstuk S werd 
beantwoord is de volgende: 
3. In welke mate is er een onafhankelijk effect van de politieke-
partijvoorkeur van de ouders op de politieke-partijvoorkeur van hun 
kinderen, wanneer we rekening houden met intergenerationele sociale en 
religieuze mobiliteit? 
In hoofdstuk 5 werd gekeken of ouders informatie aan hun kinderen overdragen, 
en of deze informatie betrekking heeft op de belangen van deze kinderen. Het 
feit dat er indirecte effecten van de klasse en de religie van de ouders zijn die 
via de politieke-partijvoorkeur van de ouders lopen, wijst erop dat ouders 
informatie geven aan hun kinderen die in overeenstemming is met hun eigen 
belangen. Er zijn ook indirecte effecten van de klasse en de religie van de 
ouders die via de eigen klasse en religie lopen. Dit suggereert dat ouders ook 
hun belangen aan hun kinderen overdragen. Er is echter ook een sterk effect 
van de politieke-partijvoorkeur van de ouders, zelfs wanneer we rekening 
houden met de eigen klasse en religie van kiezers. Dit doet vermoeden dat 
ouders hun kinderen ook informatie geven over de partij waarop zij zelf hebben 
gestemd. 
144 
SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
Er is een sterk direct effect van de politieke-partijvoorkeur van de ouders 
op de politieke-partijvoorkeur van hun volwassen kinderen. Dit effect is zelfs 
sterker dan dat van de eigen klasse positie en religie. Het is echter mogelijk dat 
er nog meer invloeden van de ouders op de politieke-partijvoorkeur van hun 
kinderen zijn. Hoofdstuk 6 richt zich daarom op de totale invloed van ouders op 
de politieke-partijvoorkeur van hun kinderen. In dit hoofdstuk werden broers en 
zussen (in het engels worden dit siblings genoemd) vergeleken om zo de totale 
invloed van ouders op de politieke-partijvoorkeur van hun kinderen vast te 
stellen. De vierde vraag die in deze studie werd beantwoord was de volgende: 
4. In welke mate wordt de politieke-partijvoorkeur van siblings beïnvloed 
door (a) hun eigen kenmerken; en (b) kenmerken van hun ouders? 
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 6 lieten zien dat de politieke-partijvoorkeur van 
mensen voor 29% wordt beïnvloed door kenmerken van hun ouders, en voor 
71% door hun eigen kenmerken. Volgens de voorspellingen die ik afleidde uit 
de theorie van de redenerende kiezer beïnvloeden ouders het stemgedrag van 
hun kinderen. De bevindingen in hoofdstuk 6 geven aan dat kiezers inderdaad 
beïnvloed worden door hun ouders. Bijna 45% van de totale invloed van de 
ouders kan worden toegeschreven aan de politieke-partijvoorkeur, de religie en 
de sociale klassepositie van de ouders. Het grootste deel van de invloed die 
ouders hebben op de politieke-partijvoorkeur van hun kinderen is echter 
onverklaard. Ouders hebben dus een grotere invloed op de politieke-
partijvoorkeur van hun kinderen dan algemeen wordt aangenomen. 
De totale invloed van de familie werd gemeten door te kijken naar alles 
wat siblings met elkaar gemeen hebben. Meestal groeien broers en zussen in 
dezelfde omgeving op, en vaak gaan ze ook naar dezelfde school. Dit kan ook 
het stemgedrag van mensen in hun latere leven beïnvloeden. Of er een invloed 
is van de school op de politieke-partijvoorkeur in het latere leven werd in deel 
3 van deze studie bekeken. 
In deel 3 van deze studie werden twee vragen beantwoord die betrekking 
hadden op intragenerationele mobiliteit. Uit het voorgaande bleek dat sociale 
klasse een relatief kleine invloed heeft op de politieke-partijvoorkeur van 
mensen in Nederland. Daarom is gekozen om in deel 3 de aandacht te richten 
op het stemmen op confessionele partijen en niet op stemmen op een linkse of 
rechtse politieke partij. Individuele veranderingen in het stemmen op 
confessionele versus seculiere partijen werden verklaard door te kijken naar 
religieuze mobiliteit. De vragen uit deel 3 werden beantwoord met behulp van 
retrospectieve vragen die de auteur heeft ontworpen voor de Telepanel enquête 
(1994). Omdat retrospectieve vragen een vertekening in de antwoorden kunnen 
opleveren werd in hoofdstuk 7 allereerst de betrouwbaarheid van retrospectieve 
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data aan de orde gesteld en ook de specifieke manier waarop in de Telepanel 
enquête de retrospectieve vragen naar het stemgedrag in het verleden zijn 
gesteld. 
Met betrekking tot vragen over stemgedrag bij vorige verkiezingen wordt 
gesteld dat retrospectieve vragen geen accurate antwoorden opleveren (Van der 
Eijk & Niemöller, 1989, 1983b). Vergeleken met panel data heeft onderzoek 
naar het gebruik van retrospectieve vragen laten zien dat hoewel er een 
behoorlijk aantal inconsistente antwoorden was, dit niet leidde tot substantieel 
andere conclusies met betrekking tot de samenhang tussen kenmerken van 
verschillende soorten kiezers en hun politieke-partijvoorkeur (Van der Eijk & 
Niemöller, 1983). Om een kleiner aantal inaccurate antwoorden te krijgen werd 
aan de respondenten informatie gegeven over de specifieke verkiezing waarover 
ze werden ondervraagd. Daarnaast werd alleen een onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
confessionele en seculiere partijen. 
In hoofdstuk 7 werd een beschrijvende vraag over de mate van 
intragenerationele mobiliteit beantwoord: 
5. Hoe groot is de (a) intragenerationele politieke mobiliteit; en (b) 
intragenerationele religieuze mobiliteit in Nederland in de periode tussen 
1956 en 1994? 
Hoofdstuk vier liet zien dat mensen de religie van hun ouders meestal verlaten 
tussen hun 15e en 20e levensjaar. Het komt niet vaak voor dat kerkverlaters op 
een latere leeftijd weer terugkeren naar de kerk. Op grond hiervan werd in 
hoofdstuk 7 geen beschrijving gegeven van het kerklidmaatschap gedurende de 
levensloop, maar werd de aandacht gericht op een beschrijving van de mate van 
kerkgang gedurende de levensloop. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat kiezers loyaler zijn aan seculiere partijen 
dan dat ze dat zijn aan confessionele partijen. Wanneer iemand de eerste keer 
dat hij of zij mocht stemmen op een seculiere partij stemde, dan heeft deze 
persoon een kans van 99% om tijdens een latere verkiezing weer op een 
seculiere partij te stemmen. Wanneer men de eerste keer op een confessionele 
partij stemde, is de kans om ditzelfde tijdens een latere verkiezing te doen 53%. 
Over het algemeen is er een afname in de loyaliteit aan confessionele 
partijen, hoewel er een korte periode was waarin de confessionele partijen weer 
wat meer stemmen kregen van diegenen die hun eerste keer confessioneel 
hadden gestemd. Wanneer mensen ouder worden, wordt hun eerste stem minder 
bepalend voor hun stemgedrag. 
Voor religieuze mobiliteit werd eenzelfde patroon gevonden als voor 
politieke mobiliteit. Ten eerste, wanneer mensen niet regelmatig kerkdiensten 
bezochten toen ze voor het eerste mochten stemmen (dat wil zeggen toen ze 18 
tot 23 jaar oud waren), dan is het niet waarschijnlijk dat ze dat op latere leeftijd 
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wel zullen doen. Ten tweede, van alle mensen die ten tijde van hun eerste 
verkiezingsdeelname wel regelmatig kerkdiensten bezocht doet slechts 50% dit 
nog steeds op latere leeftijd. Ook deze resultaten laten zien dat kerkverlating 
een proces is dat één kant op loopt. Sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog is er een 
toename in religieuze mobiliteit. De resultaten van hoofdstuk 8 lieten zien dat 
er een invloed is van de mate van kerkgang ten tijde van de eerste 
verkiezingsdeelname op kerkgang in het latere leven, alhoewel deze invloed 
steeds kleiner wordt als men ouder wordt. 
Vooruitlopend op de analyse in hoofdstuk 8 werd in hoofdstuk 7 het 
stemgedrag van trouwe kerkgangers (dat wil zeggen mensen die tijdens hun 
eerste verkiezingsdeelname regelmatig kerkdiensten bezochten en dat tijdens 
latere verkiezingen nog steeds doen) vergeleken met hun stemgedrag tijdens hun 
eerste verkiezingsdeelname. De resultaten lieten zien dat als mensen hun eerste 
stem uitbrachten op een confessionele partij hun kerkgang er niet zoveel toe 
doet. Wanneer mensen de eerste keer op een seculiere partij stemden doet de 
mate van kerkgang er echter wel toe: trouwe kerkgangers zullen dan tijdens 
latere verkiezingen vaker op een confessionele partij gaan stemmen. 
In hoofdstuk 8 werd de volgende vraag beantwoord: 
6. In welke mate is er een onafhankelijk effect van eerdere politieke-
partijvoorkeuren op latere politieke-partijvoorkeuren, wanneer we 
rekening houden met zowel intergenerationele als intragenerationele 
religieuze mobiliteit? 
Volgens de theorie van de redenerende kiezer zullen kiezers niet alleen volgens 
hun belangen stemmen, maar bij het uitbrengen van hun stem gebruik maken 
van informatie over de beslissingen van politieke partijen in het verleden. In 
hoofdstuk 5 en 6 werd slechts één bron van informatie onderscheiden, namelijk 
de politieke-partijvoorkeur van de ouders. In hoofdstuk 8 werden twee andere 
bronnen van informatie onderscheiden: de kerk, waar kerkgangers niet alleen 
informatie van de dominee of pastoor krijgen maar ook van de andere 
kerkgangers, en de school, waar leerlingen niet alleen informatie van de leraren 
krijgen maar ook van medeleerlingen. 
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 8 lieten zien dat er substantiële effecten zijn 
van kerkbezoek in het verleden, van de politieke-partijvoorkeur van de ouders 
en van het volgen van onderwijs op een bijzondere middelbare school. Dit 
suggereert dat kiezers ook op andere wijze dan via hun ouders informatie over 
politiek krijgen. Het directe effect van de eerste stem neemt af als men ouder 
wordt, maar blijft ook op latere leeftijd significant aanwezig. 
Deze studie bekeek lange-termijninvloeden op de politieke-partijvoorkeur. Uit 
de theorie van de redenerende kiezer werden voorspellingen afgeleid over de 
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invloed die ouders uitoefenen op de politieke partijvoorkeur van hun kinderen. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat, ook al zijn er korte-termijneffecten zijn die de 
politieke-partijvoorkeur in sterke mate beïnvloeden, de lange-termijneffecten 
kunnen niet genegeerd worden. Zo is de invloed van het stemgedrag van de 
ouders bijvoorbeeld sterker dan de invloed van de eigen kenmerken van 
personen. 
De theorie van de redenerende kiezer is door Popkin (1991) ontwikkeld 
in het kader van de invloed van verkiezingscampagnes. Hierbij stonden de 
korte-termijneffecten op het stemgedrag centraal. In deze studie zijn 
voorspellingen uit de theorie van de redenerende kiezer afgeleid die zich 
richtten op de lange-termijninvloeden op het stemgedrag. 
Uit de theorie van de redenerende kiezer, die als uitgangspunt heeft dat 
kiezers rationeel zijn, maar hun keuze voor een politieke partij maken op grond 
van weinig informatie, kunnen nog meer voorspellingen afgeleid worden door 
andere bronnen van informatie en andere belangen te onderscheiden. Een 
dynamische benadering kan hierbij bijzonder nuttig zijn. Daarom is deze theorie 
gebaseerd op 'redenerende kiezers' een veelbelovende leidraad voor toekomstig 
onderzoek. 
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People in the Netherlands increasingly tend to change their voting prefe-
rences from one election to another. Consequently, they increasingly vote 
for parties other than those their parents voted for. To gain understanding 
of the process of political change, this book discusses electoral changes 
between parents and their adult children as well as changes in individual 
voting behavior over the life-course. Change in social class position and 
change in church membership are considered possible causes of electoral 
change. This study explains not only why individual characteristics such as 
church membership change but also why these changes might affect a 
person's voting behavior. Voters are assumed to use information about the 
records of political parties when making their voting decisions. Three sources 
of information are examined, namely, parents, churches and schools. The 
results show that, even if short-term influences do shape voting behavior 
significantly, the long-term influences parents, churches and schools have 
on a person's voting behavior later in life can not be neglected. 
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